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Abstract 
 
This thesis emerges from a 10 month ethnographic participant observation 
project of an charity-run Youth and Social Clubs conducted between September 
2014 - July 2015 that examines the sensory experiences of autistic individuals in 
relation to their favourite, routinised activities or “habitual favourites”, alongside 
taking part in club activities such as board games, console gaming, casual 
discussion and club trips to public spaces. The research included 6 focus 
groups with 6 Youth Club participants, all white with 4 males and 2 females 
aged between 16-25, alongside 4 focus groups with 6 Social Club participants, 
all male and white from age 25-65+.  
 
The study uses a sociology of the senses approach to explore the habitual ways 
in which those with autism interact with their “favourites”. The thesis argues that 
the concepts of quasi-object and parasite reveal the complex interdependencies 
of stability and disruption in sensory experience. This complexity is also 
reflected in the author’s own experiences, and autoethnographic reflections 
consider how habitual and sensory experiences impact autistic academic 
identity, writing and research practices. Sensory experience is fruitfully 
understood through the influences of emplaced milieus of sensory and habitual 
interaction which are mutually constituted through distributed relations of human 
and non-human relations. Autistic experiences constitute a way to explore our 
taken-for-granted notions of social interaction and develop accounts that 
expand what we consider to be the condition of the human. Sociological 
attention to autism in the habitual favourites framework provides empirically rich 
and nuanced concepts to develop insights into autistic experience.  
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Introduction 
 
This thesis is a sociological exploration and examination of the mechanisms, 
relations and actions that impact on the intersection between habitual relations 
with “favourites” and the sensory experiences and dynamics of those with 
autism. Favourites as a singular term here is treated as conceptual short-hand 
that brings together favourite activities, people, events, objects, places, 
consumption practices and areas of interest. I examine the ways in which the 
repetitive and creative potentials of habitual social action provide a theoretical 
and empirical basis in which we can examine the social and sensory lives of 
those with autism. This is important because of the perceived “deficits” and 
“challenges” faced by those with autism create insurmountable barriers to 
effective communication and recognition as right-bearing and self-identifying 
subjects in modern social life. This introduction will begin with a very brief 
overview of the core characteristics of autism in order for readers to have a 
frame of reference when working through the theoretical framework developed 
and applied in the thesis. This overview will remain descriptive and regrettably 
cursory due to space limitations, but, certain facets of the condition noted here 
will be exemplified and analysed across the thesis. I will then outline the 
contents of each chapter in the thesis and outline core themes and aims that 
shall be developed throughout the chapters and the thesis as a whole.  
 
Autism is a life-long developmental condition that impacts on social and 
communicational abilities (Wing, 1997). Autism is described as a “spectrum” 
condition. This refers to the fact that each autistic individual manifests the core 
characteristics of the condition in unique ways that reflects personal life 
experiences, epigenetic development and expression. Because the condition is 
developmentally life-long, these unique manifestations alter over the life-course. 
This means that an autistic child may experience very different aspects of the 
spectrums manifestations throughout the life course (Orsmond and Seltzer, 
2007 and Bresnahan et al, 2014). In terms of intersubjective communication, 
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autism impacts a vast array of actions including: difficulty in reading social cues 
from others, whether these be uses of tone of voice or body language to convey 
feelings or concepts, difficulty in experiencing and being able to relate to others 
emotional responses, or formulating opinions on topics because of the inability 
to empathetically connect with bodily and verbal cues.  
 
These intersubjective difficulties are further exacerbated by the fact that those 
with autism also struggle to identify their own thoughts, emotions and ways of 
thinking as distinct modes of existence or patterns of relating. Thus, pain and 
hunger may not be innately meaningful for those with autism and go unnoticed 
as the sensations have no way of being reconciled into purposeful action. Taken 
together, these intersubjective and self-identified traits make imaginative play 
and thought problematic (Harris et al, 2000). Without recognition of other’s 
perspectives and means of making sense of complex situations, developing 
new and creative ideas is rendered a luxury for those who struggle highly with 
social communication and impaired by unfocused integration for those less 
affected. Furthermore, emotional and affective situations for those with autism 
share these problems without adequate social cues or environmental 
processing-capacities, feelings, affects and emotions do not become distinct 
entities, weaving and intersecting with each other into non-traceable origins and 
conflicted and confused responses to stimuli (Philip, 2009). Attempting to 
convey these confounding processes linguistically is met by the reality that for 
some on the more severe end of the spectrum, language difficulties and 
developmental delays may emerge during early years development (Wray et al, 
2005).  
 
For those without language issues such as people with Asperger’s Syndrome, a 
less severe form of autism that emphasises the routinised and interest focused 
aspects of the spectrum, attempting to convey the tumultuous emotional and 
social uncertainties still remains a challenge when social cues are not easily 
identifiable. These emotional and social impairments can lead to empathetic 
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difficulties connecting with others concerns, motivations and feelings and on the 
part of the autistic individual. Lack of recognisable bodily, verbal and social cues 
gives an appearance of non-emotional or “bizarre” behaviours and reactions to 
events and actions (Prince-Hughes, 2004). The aforementioned environmental 
stimuli refer in more specific terms to the senses and the subsequent 
processing capacity of these experiences. Autistic individuals not only have 
difficulties in reconciling so much divergent and qualitatively different stimuli the 
sensory apparatus of the body and mind is compromised. Depending on the 
individual’s manifestation of the spectrum of characteristics, they may be 
hyposensitive or hypersensitive so that sensory stimuli are perceived as being 
too intense or too limited to be effective and stabilising. This immensely 
distressing array of troubling personal and intersubjective confusion causes 
autistic individuals to develop a number of what is termed stereotypical 
strategies. The foremost of these is development of very rigid routines and 
interests (Boyd et al, 2012). As such, novelty in everyday activities and 
spontaneous events and deviations from these clearly outlined patterns of 
action are very distressing and disorientating.  
 
A number of approaches have been proffered for the divergent characteristics 
that comprise the autistic condition. None of them can be said to provide an 
overarching theory that adequately explains autism in a holistic manner. Rather, 
they offer piecemeal pictures of the mechanisms behind the characteristics that 
must be taken up as they are relevant to the autistic person and their social, 
environmental and epigenetic context. Starting with sensory and emotional 
difficulties, explanations for the emergence of hypo/hypersensitive sensory and 
emotional responses concern themselves with psychological and neurological 
explanations. A recent theory proposes that rather than being non-empathetic, 
autistic individuals actually feel emotional and interactional stimuli too intensely 
and this explains their apparent disregard for others concerns or feelings. This 
“Intense World Theory” (Markram and Markram, 2010) posits that if autistic 
people tried to focus on the bodily, verbal and social cues that the non-autistic 
population takes for granted, they would be overwhelmed, so much so that they 
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would permanently “shut-down” and remain cold and distant, only ever being 
able to retreat into themselves, protecting them from external stimuli. This 
results in them becoming too attached to people so that they cannot bear to be 
in love or be friends as their feelings would be to intense as to create physical 
pain.  
 
On the other side of this empathetic divide, some authors argue that at a core 
level, autism reflects a highly impaired “Theory of Mind” (ToM) (Baron-Cohen, 
2001). This is the ability to relate to others and identify communicational cues 
and integrate them so that they might put themselves in someone’s place to 
imagine how they feel and react to co-present circumstances. Because of this 
lack, autistic people are said to possess more “male-focused” brains. Thus, they 
prioritise rational, patterned and systematised modes of thought and excel at 
identifying mechanical systems and processes that follow distinct logical and 
ordered activity (Baron-Cohen, 2002). This goes, ToM theorists argue, some 
way to explain the intensity of interest in activities like scientific research, 
computer programming, engineering, mathematics and so on. These domains 
of social life value skill, results and technical competence and in some ways 
downplay social and communicational competence and mastery, thus making it 
easier for autistic individuals to focus on their talents and strengths rather than 
be troubled by their impairments. These strengths, another dominant area of 
“autism theory” claim, stem from sensory and informational processing 
capacities that autistic individuals display. This strain of thinking puts forth the 
notion that autistic neurology, physiology and psychology prioritises “local” over 
“global” processing (Happé and Frith, 2006 and Booth and Happé, 2016). Local 
processing refers to the ability of humans to identify patterns, objects or actions 
amongst a sea of sensory and informational stimuli. The whole is bracketed out 
to focus on the most important events at hand to complete them satisfactorily. 
Global processing downplays the smaller details in order to look at the larger 
context of the phenomenon at hand. They can look at a large body of material 
and identify the underlying and more abstract processes that generate their 
effects without being overwhelmed by the immense quantity of the specific 
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details that constitute such operations. Those with autism, with an intense 
attention to detail and focusing on the most pertinent stimuli and information for 
clarity, are adept at picking out specific patterns in visual images or abstract 
mechanical or logical systems. They can then work through the specifics of the 
components that make up such systems to gradually build up to a more global 
perspective.   
 
This brief overview points to some of the key characteristics and stakes that 
come with researching autism. My research will be contributing to the much 
understudied area of adults with autism1. This will be undertaken within a 
sociological perspective which is underrepresented in the large literature on 
autism2. In particular, I will be exploring the ways in which autistic experience is 
distributed across human and non-human domains through discursive, affective 
and atmospheric mechanisms. Before I undertake these conceptual moves, I 
will first provide an outline of the medical characteristics of autism as defined by 
the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual 5 (DSM-V). I do this in order to argue that 
such medical characterisations are limited to understanding autism. I will insist 
that the use of use of pragmatist influenced ideas of transactive habits and 
distributed sociality through human and non-human factors provide a more 
sensitive and empirically rich framework through which to think through the 
complexities of autism.  
 
 
 
                                                          
1
 Although, see Hofvander et al, 2009 and Leekham et al, 2007 for discussions of adult specific 
autism issues in relation to sensory and social experiences.  
2
 The recent work of Damian Milton (2012, 2013) is developing a comprehensive account of a 
sociological perspective to autism from ethnomethodological concerns to philosophical issues of 
self and other relations.  
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Autism Spectrum Conditions – Reflections and Expanding Definitions 
 
Autism is characteristically defined and conceptualised in medical and 
psychiatric terms as comprising a “triad of impairments”. These include 
difficulties in social interaction by not being able to read body language, 
difficulties in interpreting emotions from others and themselves, difficulties in 
adapting to social change which results in sticking to predefined routines 
leading to anxiety and lacking a social imagination which is conceptualised as 
difficulties in getting a sense of other people’s thoughts and feelings (Hyman, 
2013). 
 
It is important to note that just before I started to write this thesis, the Diagnostic 
and Statistical Manual 5 (DSM-V) was nearing completion and when released in 
May 18th 2013, altered the diagnostic criteria for Autism Spectrum 
Disorders/Conditions (ASD/CS). The most publicised change was the removal 
of Asperger’s Syndrome, Pervasive Developmental Disorder Not Otherwise 
Specified (PDDNOS) and Disintegrative Disorder (Hyman, 2013). The triad of 
impairments noted above are now consolidated into two diagnostic groups 
labelled “Social Communication/Interaction” and “Restricted and Repetitive 
Behaviours” (ibid).  
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ALL of the symptoms below must be present for the Social Communication 
group:  
 
“1. Problems reciprocating social or emotional interaction, including difficulty 
establishing or maintaining back-and-forth conversations and interactions, 
inability to initiate an interaction, and problems with shared attention or sharing 
of emotions and interests with others 
 
2. Severe problems maintaining relationships – ranges from lack of interest in 
other people to difficulties in pretend play… and problems adjusting to different 
social expectations. 
  
3. Nonverbal communication problems such as abnormal eye contact, posture, 
facial expressions, tone of voice and gestures, as well as inability to understand 
these.” (ibid). 
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For Restricted and Repetitive Behaviours, only two of four below criteria are 
required:  
 
“1. Stereotyped and repetitive speech, motor movements or use of objects. 
 
2. Excessive adherence to routines, ritualised patterns of verbal or nonverbal 
behaviour, or excessive resistance to change.  
 
3. Highly restricted interests that are abnormal in intensity or focus.  
 
4. Hyper or hypo reactivity to sensory input or unusual interest in sensory 
aspects of the environment.” (ibid).  
 
A point arises from the placement and wording of sensory behaviour for the 
definition and diagnosis of autism. To place them within “restricted and 
repetitive behaviours” and to delimit them from “social 
communication/interaction” characteristics may be necessary for strict medical 
definitions that categorise symptoms. Such an approach though, does not fully 
account for how a more holistic consideration of autism reveals a complex 
reality that unfolds in different times and spaces. A value judgement is present 
in the way in which “unusual” sensory engagements are presented as a 
“neurotypical”, or non-disabled and majority perspective on what constitutes 
normality and the constitutive deviations from this. Neurotypical or “NT” are 
terms used by autistic sub-cultures, found on online forums and advocacy 
groups that argue that autism, as a spectrum condition, is a part of the 
continuum of what it is to be human and are not necessarily “disabilities”. 
Rather, they are merely alternative modes of bio-social-psycho-eco of being in 
the world and hinder and highlight capacities of being human (Ortega, 2009). 
 ~ 20 ~ 
 
The symptoms are based on criteria that ANY human could display (think of 
fanatical interest and engagement with football in the UK for example). These 
ideas are encompassed within the term “neurodiverse” and constitute, in much 
the same vein as the UPIAS statement, a way to show how the characteristics 
of autism, which are both genetic and cultural, are social constructions that 
change over time. I return later in this section to expand upon neurodiversity as 
a concept.  
 
It is somewhat inaccurate, however, to suggest that the DSM-V in being written, 
debated and contested, has not sought to incorporate aspects of a more 
dynamic approach to identifying, classifying and treating medical conditions. As 
Greco (2015) has noted, the typical view that the DSM is the “Bible” of 
psychiatry from the first edition in 1952, bringing about a paradigm shift to a 
more categorical and static version of psychiatric practice is misleading. From a 
historical context, Greco refers to Stengel’s (1959) survey, commissioned by the 
World Health Organisation (WHO), where he notes that in 1959, 7 years after 
the first DSM, there were 58 different classificatory systems for psychiatry 
(Stengel, 1959). Further, both DSM-I and DSM-II utilised a different form of 
psychiatric theory than the DSM-III onwards, which used the surface based 
physiological symptoms classificatory system. The first and second editions 
incorporated elements of the influential psychoanalytic presence in the US 
during the 1950’s-60. This might be termed a “dynamic” psychiatry in contrast to 
“diagnostic” psychiatry based on symptomatic classifications discussed in 
Horwitz (2002). Dynamic psychiatry did not view surface symptoms as highly 
significant; rather, they indicated psychodynamic interactions that were unique 
to each individual cases’ biography and life history experiences. As such, these 
unconscious processes could not be empirically investigated directly and 
needed interpretative methods in order to work through intersubjective 
meanings, emotions and relationships. Because of this gradual, ongoing 
process of negotiation, the line between the normal and pathological becomes 
indistinct, as what is abnormal for one case may be normal and productive for 
another’s set of dispositions. This is not, of course, to romanticise or make light 
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of the many troublesome assumptions of the psychoanalytic framework in this 
period, including the homophobic and sexist assumptions underwriting the 
classification of “hysteria” and “homosexuality” as pathological states of being 
(Greco, 2015). Dynamic should not be attributed to being progressive or 
reflexive of social bias in this case.  
 
In fact, a primary critique of the diagnostic mode of psychiatry, the over-
medicalisation of human experience via the ever-growing entries to each DSM, 
can be attributed in part from theoretical orientations held over from the dynamic 
psychiatry era. The secular morality of the blurring of the normal and 
pathological boundary gave rise to the questionable inclusion of homosexuality 
and female emotional disorders. Even more than this, Horwitz (2002) goes on to 
argue that due to the individualised and context specific nature of dynamic 
psychiatry, the unique cases produced a huge array of symptoms and 
characteristics that described and analysed the whole gamut of human 
experience. It was only later that diagnostic psychiatry from the 1970’s onwards 
sought to categorise this diverse array of analyses into clearly delineated 
categories of disease (Horwitz, 2002: 41).3  
 
In more practical terms the DSM can be considered a polyvalent “boundary-
object”, an object with identifiable, yet mutable characteristics that can be 
translated across multiple contexts and retain a sense of coherence (Star and 
Griesemer, 1989: 393). It is polyvalent because it connects to the various actors 
involved in psychiatric affairs such as insurance companies, governments and 
pharmaceutical corporations. This means that the DSM here, in contrast to 
                                                          
3
 I do not have the space to elucidate the many reasons why this continuity in approaches is 
often missed. See Greco (2015) for further discussion of the political and historical context of the 
battle fought over making DSM-III a scientific, diagnostic based system. These processes can 
be summarised as a strategy of “clearance”, which denotes “the erection of a barrier in the past, 
so that no information or knowledge can leak through to the present” (Bowker and Star, 1999: 
257).  
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critical approaches that treat the DSM as a dominant force; it is ambiguously 
applied in practice. The standardisation of categories introduced new forms of 
bureaucratisation from stakeholders such as insurance companies that eroded 
clinical autonomy. This had the effect of leading psychiatrists to develop 
workarounds from strict adherence to the classificatory criteria and diagnostic 
practices outlined in the DSM. These practices included using alternative 
classificatory systems, over-diagnosing patients to meet quotas for insurance 
financial interests and utilisation dynamic psychiatry techniques of negotiation of 
diagnosis with clients (Whooley, 2010: 460).4 Because of this, the integrated 
category of “autism” in the DSM-V will, in practice, be utilised in divergent ways 
such that some with autism will still be characterised as having Asperger’s. 
Autism diagnosis is interesting in the context of the dynamic and diagnostic 
distinction, which as I have noted, blur into each other. Because of the social 
difficulties criteria, a high degree of socially interpretative and hermeneutical 
work is required to assess how those with autism interact in a variety of social 
situations. On the diagnostic side, because of the link of symptoms to biological 
function, sensory difficulties are often treated as physiological. Again, any form 
of dichotomisation is troubled because subsequent treatments for sensory 
issues, such as sensory rooms, also address the affordances and contextual 
milieus that impact sensory experience to dynamically and gradually alter 
sensory sensitivity and are sensitive to ways that this can be attuned to 
increased intersubjective interaction (Hussein, 2012, Stadele and Malaney, 
2001).   
 
In light of these ideas, neurodiversity as a concept is tied to the interweaving 
nature of diagnostic and dynamic modes of thought. On the one hand, the idea 
of a spectrum of human variation splits the diagnostic and dynamic binary 
                                                          
4
 Whooley primarily focuses on the US context, but the increasing marketisation, privitisation 
and austerity pressures regarding funding and support for the National Health Service in Britain 
instigated during the coalition and conservative governments during 2010-17 asks us to 
increasingly consider these market forces in this context as well.  
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directly as neurodiversity is based on what Ortega has termed a “cerebralization 
of autism” (Ortega, 2009: 427), where the neurology of autism is tied directly to 
self conceptions of those who strongly identify as neurodiverse. As such, autism 
becomes medicalised in a reconfigured form as brain-based identity politics 
which risks reinforcing medical and biological (specifically neurological) 
reductionisms. The diversity of human embodiment is reduced to one form of 
bodily experience and being. This idea can be summed up as the “essentialism 
paradox” (Goodley, 2016: 152). While the majority of those who affirm and 
advocate for neurodiverse values do not ascribe to the idea that autism should 
be treated, corrected via normalisation techniques or “cured”, by inscribing 
neurodiversity so strongly in cognitive and neurological mechanisms, the radical 
element of “diversity” becomes lost. I will go to show throughout the thesis that a 
more distributed and post-human sociality is more adequate to account for the 
diversity present in autism.  
 
On the other hand, we have the dynamic tendency to create a more flexible idea 
of autism through the notion of spectrum. The problematic question then 
becomes one of how to differentiate between the different labels given to those 
on the spectrum. Because of this, the notion and meaning of a spectrum 
becomes lost in definition and those who are labelled within such a spectrum 
can be lost within “a sea of floating signifiers of difference” (ibid: 154). I will show 
that by locating autistic sensory experience within habitual favourites, or, 
hobbies and special interests, it becomes possible to more accurately account 
for neurodiverse modes of social engagement. Equally, such a perspective 
allows for a depiction of the interaction between objects, events and subjects 
through the idea of quasi-objects. Here, the “floating sea of signifiers”, is given 
an anchor, as quasi-objects force us to slow down and consider the elements 
that constitute a given phenomenon. Following this notion, autistic sensory 
experience is grounded in specific and unique interactions and situations, that 
they acquire an empirical specificity. Ultimately, this thesis contributes to a 
sociological mode of understanding autism that can address the multiple forms 
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of interaction between objects, subjects and the environment in which they are 
located.   
 
I finish this introduction with a broad outline of the remaining chapters of the 
thesis.  
 
Outline of Chapters  
 
Chapter 1 - “Sensory Habits as Pragmatic Quasi-Object Relations”  
 
This chapter serves to provide an overview and introduce some of the core 
disciplinary and conceptual concerns that drive the thesis. I begin with a brief 
exposition of how the senses have been treated throughout the history of 
sociological thinking. I start with the classical sociologies of the founders such 
as Simmel (1950), the historical and cultural perspectives of Elias (2000) and 
Douglas (2002) before concluding with an explicit “Sociology of The Senses” 
(Vannini et al, 2012) perspective that seeks to integrate these divergent 
inquiries. My next concern will serve to introduce and elaborate a pragmatist 
inflected notion of habits and the importance of routinised, static habitual actions 
and the creative, open-ended capacity to develop new habits and modify old 
ones. This culminates in expressing a desire to account for the “transactional” 
(Cutchin, 2007) nature of habits that incorporates the subjective, environmental 
and material basis of distributed social action in specific contextual milieus. In 
order to account for these qualities, I develop the concept of “habitual 
favourites” that symbolises the spatial, temporal, material and social aspects of 
habitual engagement with “favourites”. I proceed to critically examine the 
medical model definition of autism and the dynamism that is missed when a lack 
of attention is dedicated to the sensory and transactional ways in which autistic 
individuals relate to the world around them. I conclude the chapter by explicating 
 ~ 25 ~ 
 
the work of Michel Serres (2007, 2008) and his development of the concept of 
“quasi-object”. This describes the way in which social relations are permeated 
by subjective and objective qualities and that these are distributed around 
vortex like events, objects and people. I support this analysis with a 
consideration of the way in which these processes are “parasitic” in nature and 
how this can enrich a sensory sociology of autism.  
 
Chapter 2 - “Research Design and Methodology”  
 
I begin with a descriptive outline of my entry into my research site of an 
Outreach Club run by a local autistic charity  through deciding on an 
ethnographic location, gaining access, negotiating the terms of the research and 
the subsequent research design that emerged from these interactions. After 
detailing these events, I concern myself with methodological questions around 
participant observatory ethnographic field-work with a vulnerable population. In 
particular, I hone in on concerns around how much power researchers should 
have in determining the conduct of the research when dealing with those who 
have a much reduced ability to determine their own course of action and 
independence in life (Barr et al, 2001, Thomson, 2007). These ethical concerns 
lead me to discuss ways in which research can be made participatory rather 
than pre-ordained by an enlightened researcher. I focus here on specific factors 
that impact the activities and social life of activity and group identity oriented 
social spaces. I go on to introduce methodological aspects of what has been 
termed “autoethnography” (Anderson, 2006, Ellis and Bochner, 2006) that will 
be addressed in chapters 4 and 5. I outline the ways in which my status as 
someone with autism impacts my position as group member and researcher and 
the dynamics this generates. The chapter concludes with a summary of my 
research design and the key questions I aim to address through it.  
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Chapter 3 - “Habitual Favourites - Modulated Thresholds and Parasitic Quasi-
Objects”   
 
This first empirical chapter takes questions around habitual favourites and 
applies the concepts of the “quasi-object” and “parasite” to them. Each term is 
taken and developed further from their introduction in the literature review. I 
specify past frameworks that have examined the modulations and intensities of 
autistic sensory experience and incorporate them into my own discussions 
(Smith and Sharp, 2013). I then take the concept of quasi-object and add 
empirical specificity in talking about different “social” kinds of quasi-object that 
have differential effects on social action (Simon, 2013). Before I move to my four 
empirical case studies, I provide a brief theoretical explanation for focusing on 
events in my analyses (Savransky, 2016a). My first case study examines the 
interaction between mundane housework and my participant’s conceptions of 
the connections between the endless cycle of housework and the energy saving 
and parasitical foodstuff Soylent. The second case examines the difficulties of 
planned travel and the actual event of travel in their spatial and interactional 
contexts, before turning to the balance of physical and technological social 
interaction. The third case study examines the temporal duration and 
breakdown of a planned set of activities co-organised by group members, 
providing a habitual analysis of these events. The final case study examines the 
interplay between detailed knowledge of a topic and ad-hoc decision making 
based on sensory management and negotiation.  
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Chapter 4 - “Autieethnography Part 1 - Methodological and Researcher 
Positionality”  
 
A different writing approach will be utilised throughout this chapter including 
multi-voiced vignettes and textbox asides. I explore the analytic and research 
usefulness of these devices through discussions of poststructural concerns with 
non-linear identity (Gannon, 2006). I address some prominent critiques that 
have been made of autoethnographic work around accusations of narcissistic 
navel gazing (Roth, 2005, Holt, 2003) and bring attention to the fact that these 
critiques may give weight to troubling conceptions of autistic being. This 
concerns the ToM approaches to autism that I argue reduce autistic self-identity 
and remove those with autism from the category of human (Yergeau, 2013). 
Although I subject this mode of thinking to poststructural critique, I acknowledge 
that this is not enough and does not fully reject the ToM issues that are raised. I 
thus develop an account of the ways in which autistic sociality challenges 
conventional modes of what it means to become a human being through 
developing social competency (Davidson and Smith, 2009). I specify how the 
posthuman condition of autistic sociality severely challenges a deficit account of 
autistic being. I conclude the chapter by considering the ways in which my 
nexus of support enables me to make the mundane strange and reveal hidden 
ways in which academic institutions can reduce potentials for inclusion.  
 
Chapter 5 - “Autieethnography Part 2 - PhD Labour Autoethnographic Writing 
Vignettes”  
 
This is an empirical chapter, but in an unorthodox sense. The approach in this 
chapter takes two different kinds of “writing vignettes”. One is a “working day 
vignette”. The other is the means through which my Asperger’s Syndrome 
impacts my writing and research practices. The working day vignette describes 
the challenges faced when writing is situated within a complex context of care, 
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disruption and habitual rigidity. I explore how my mum and I work with and 
against each other in allowing time to think and write. I note how my Asperger’s 
impacts these encounters through difficult emotional management and the 
unpredictability that my mum brings to the forefront. The second vignette 
concerns the affective, material and conceptual ways in which my autism 
impacts on the means through which I think and write academic accounts. I note 
the “languorous pleasures” and “glow” (MacLure 2013), of research writing and 
analysis that I experience and the strengths and dangers this orientation brings. 
I reflect on the parasitical habitual nature of the struggle between writing in 
chaos and the joys of theoretical and empirical writing and argument formation.  
 
Chapter 6 - “Affective Atmospheres: Perturbations - Haziness and Emplaced 
Affects”  
 
This final empirical chapter concerns itself with the notion of atmospheres. I 
introduce the notion of atmospheres and the concomitant term affect (Anderson, 
2009). I then go on to discuss the criticisms that have been made of reductive 
approaches to affect before developing a more nuanced account that 
incorporates both aspects of the dividing debates (Leys, 2011, Wetherell, 2012). 
I move on to connect this expanded definition of affect to atmospheres to 
produce the term “affective atmosphere”. I make explicit the connections 
between habits and affective atmospheres through discussions of the notions of 
“resonance” and “gestural semiosis” (Miller, 2015, Albertsen, 2012). These 
concepts serve as a means to ground the potentially ephemeral idea of affective 
atmospheres to the distributed material “perturbations” of modulated intensities 
(Ash, 2015). I then provide three empirical examples of how atmospheres were 
present during my fieldwork. The first case examines the negotiation of sound 
levels of a radio station and the mechanisms that underlie the continuation and 
background maintenance of an atmosphere. The second case explores the 
ways in which echolalia operates to generate and modulate atmospheric 
conditions. The third and final example looks at how the management of 
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sensory atmospherics in relation to spatial design and organisation impacts 
upon the interactions that are possible in the club space.  
 
Chapter 7 - “Conclusion - Sensory and Disability Futures”  
 
This final section will summarise the main arguments made throughout the 
thesis across three key topics of discussion. Having done this, I consider ways 
in which the thesis framework can be applied and used in policy, practice and 
autism research more generally. I identify several research programmes and 
interventions where the insights developed across the thesis may be fruitfully 
applied and developed. Secondly, I move towards more exploratory questions 
regarding the lack of sensory data in my research and provide an example of 
how multisensory data could be understood through the framework developed in 
the thesis. Finally, I identify theoretical and conceptual blind-spots that occlude 
important social factors within the framework developed in the thesis. Primarily, 
I focus on the exclusion of a discussion of social markers such as ethnicity and 
gender, which have historically been underexplored in autism research. Then, 
taking a more positive outlook, I identify several areas of “Critical Disability 
Studies” (CDS) in which the framework developed here can be productively 
thought with to begin conceptualising the blind-spots identified (See Meekosha 
and Shuttleworth, 2009, Goodley, 2014).  
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Chapter 1 - Sensory Habits as Pragmatic Quasi-Object Relations 
 
Introduction  
 
In this chapter, I will provide a brief exploration of some of the small, yet core 
material within sociology that has been dedicated to the study of the senses in 
society. I will be focusing in particular on how recent work on the senses as 
relational faculties of social conduct, impact upon how subjects relate to the 
world via their sensory capacities. This work accounts for the inflections of 
sensory experience that are shaped by embodied, ecological and divergent 
conceptions of self in relation to others, in order to explore notions of sensory 
understanding. These concerns will lead me to inquire more deeply into how 
such actions and conceptualisations are made stable and consistent and what 
conditions may lead them to be in flux and open to new possibilities. I use the 
notion of habit as a conceptual framing device to give theoretical and conceptual 
guidance on these matters. A pragmatist explication of habitual sociality will be 
worked through in order to develop a nuanced notion of habitual action, 
enabling investigation of the relationship between micro and macro dimensions 
of social life and how the environment and subject interact and intertwine. The 
central empirical example that will structure and thread many of the core themes 
in the thesis is the notion a “favourite”. A general discussion of what favourites 
are will be followed by an explication of a central conceptual, theoretical and 
empirical construct of the chapter and thesis as a whole, that of “habitual 
favourites”. I argue that by exploring the ways in which the process of 
habituation influences engagement with favourites, we can develop a novel 
social understanding of what it means to have autism.  
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I then provide an outline of what constitutes autism as a condition and the 
characteristics which will be the main focus of this research. My concern will be 
to critically explore the means through which the condition has been framed and 
whether they are adequate for accurately representing the broad spectrum of 
people who live and experience the totality of life via an autistic sensibility. 
These considerations will culminate in an in-depth outline of Michel Serres’ 
concepts of the parasite and quasi-objects. These shall provide unique and 
insights and opportunities to conceptualise autistic sensory experience and 
understanding, speaking to the complexity and apparent strangeness of social-
sensory engagements. This discussion will end with what I will argue is an 
“autistic” quasi-object par excellence, the favourite. A favourite can serve to 
anchor meaning in a confusing and disorientating world in which sensory 
experience and social events may go by with little understanding for those with 
autism. A favourite activity can help to give purpose and meaning to the world. 
Whether an object, person, activity or experience, the processes behind 
developing and cultivating engaging with favourites is an important aspect of 
autistic sociality and therefore serves as a powerful empirical lens from which to 
research the relationship between autism and sensory worlds.  
 
This chapter aims to set up the aims and stakes of this project that seeks to 
make an innovative, theoretically informed empirical exploration of an 
underexplored topic within sociological thought. It will develop a greater 
understanding of autistic sensory worlds for sociological theory and research, as 
well as contributing to the autism community through empirical inquiry and 
exploration of issues central to experiencing and moving through social life.  
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A Brief Sociological Trajectory Of The Senses 
 
The literature on the senses within sociology and social theory has a diverse 
history,  with early concerns relating to sensory matters found in Simmel’s 
(1950) reflections on the sensory nature of modernist urban subjects, to Mary 
Douglas’ (2002) classic work on the uses of sensory laden metaphors relating to 
“purity and danger”, to more recent concerns with utilising technology to capture 
sensory data and the political concerns with a focus on a “democracy of the 
senses” (Berendt, 1985: 32). Through the work of these thinkers, we can see 
the wide ranging impact sensory interaction has on social action and 
understanding, from the concerns of Simmel to relate the personal, micro 
interactions of individual and collective agents, to Douglas’ concern to map the 
connections between biological sensory processes and the symbolic and 
discursive interpretations given to these. Finally, Back’s (2007) interest in 
mediating sensory experience in ways that respect people’s accounts of them. 
Despite these studies showing the central place the senses have in social life 
and with key concerns of social theory in understanding the modern world, the 
empirical importance of the senses has often been limited to the bio-cultural, 
with the cultural taking the crowning spot for theoretical and empirical interest 
within sociological thought. This is not to discounting particular specialist areas 
in sociology such as figurational sociology, that draw upon Elias’ (2000) 
historical sociology  which documents changes in societies across the centuries 
regarding how customs and habits alter over time in a range of areas. This 
cultural focus has been, in part, due to the dominance within sociology of signs, 
language and discourse. This has been alongside a concomitant commitment to 
abstract theoretical concerns such as the relationship between structure and 
agency.  
 
As Turner (1999) argues, the reasons for sociology’s lack of engagement with 
embodied social processes and by proxy, sensory experience, can be attributed 
to the specific foci of the classical sociologists. They were concerned with macro 
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processes to explore and explain the differences between traditional and 
modern societies and this required an abstract and conceptually reinforced 
framework in which to do so. These were based on “social” processes and as 
such, the “natural” was demarcated into its own realm. Human agency, as 
conceived by Weber (1978) for instance, required cognitive capacities such as 
rational action and was not seen to require embodied, sensory or emotional 
context. In a similar vein, Simmel (1950) was keenly interested in how the 
processes of modernisation and urbanisation impacted upon the means through 
which everyday interaction took place among vast numbers of unknown 
strangers. As modernisation and urbanisation diversified potential actions, 
whether through opportunities for new experiences such as amusement parks 
and mass mediated shopping advertising, made possible by electrification, or 
the increasing pressures of spatial immediacy due to the clustering of urban 
housing settlements. Simmel began to consider ways that urban citizens could 
manage these intense and varying demands. This raised questions of cognitive 
and sensory management of these emerging means of association, within a 
temporal frame that privileged novelty and accelerated development, caused 
Simmel to question how social agents could best engage within this social 
system. 
 
Simmel argued that modern, urban social actors adopted a “blasé” attitude to 
adapt and cope with living with diverse sensory experiences and the proximity of 
strangers that we do not have a personal familiarity. This attitude can be 
summarised as one in which a disinterested emotional and behavioural schema 
should be developed by modern citizens so that they do not become too 
invested in relations and moderation of sensory engagements is encouraged. 
Thus according to Simmel, social intercourse should be kept to necessities only 
and attention must be trained and directed to those things that matter to the 
individual. This sense of unstoppable progress and increase in sensory 
stimulation in urban societies, following Enlightenment, modernist principles, 
developing from Simmel’s Neo-Kantianism (Turner, 1999), placed all of the 
substantive and social effort of actors on cognitive deliberation alone. If we must 
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direct consciousness to so many stimuli at once, little wonder that Simmel felt 
that not much could be done but to develop a set of attitudinal dispositions. 
Despite this somewhat subdued and flawed solution, Simmel’s work provides an 
entry point to begin thinking about the ways in which autism can be considered 
from a “sociology of the senses” perspective. Simmel’s postulation and set-up 
for his theories of the subjective conditions of modernity, in some ways describe 
a central problematic for autistic individuals and groups seeking to engage with 
modern, urban social life. Engaging in an overwhelming world of material, 
sensory and social intensification brings the core characteristics of autism into 
high focus. However, the aforementioned commitments to the liberal and 
humanist commitments of modernity meant that Simmel and other classical 
sociologists developed their theories in relation to an unrealisable ideal of the 
human being. As such, they could not develop their ideas in relation to what we 
now know and name as those who are “disabled” (Shuttleworth and Meekosha, 
2012).  
 
Unfortunately, this lack of application and theorising extends beyond the 
classical sociological period of the late 19th and early 20th centuries. Even within 
contemporary discussions, disability within the literature on sensory issues in 
sociology has been understudied in comparison to issues of class (Taylor, 
2010), ethnicity (Back, 2011, Taylor, 2010) and gender (Allen-Collinson and 
Owton, 2015). This may be, in part, due to the influences and theoretical tools 
utilised in research around disability within sociology that has been drawn from 
disability studies. Much of this work has looked at how social norms, institutions 
and physical spaces impact upon and disadvantage those with disabilities. The 
first of these relates to a materialistic analysis of disability that looks at the 
economic and political motivations and practices that negatively impact upon 
those with disabilities. A central thinker in this tradition is Colin Barnes (1991, 
1998, 2010), whose work has examined, from a primarily Marxist lens, how 
capital and labour relations impact negatively for those with disabilities (Barnes 
and Mercer, 2010). Materialist theories of disability also strongly subscribe to 
the conceptual and practical dichotomy established by the Union of the 
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Physically Impaired Against Segregation (UPIAS) (1976), and forms the basis of 
disability studies. This union was a coming together of disabled people and 
activists, who were being ignored in society and systematically discriminated 
against, joined together to form a political movement that sought to theorise and 
provide a political mandate to remove the oppression disabled people and 
communities faced in their everyday lives.  
 
The dichotomy in question comprises the paired terms of impairment and 
disability. Impairment refers to the physical or psychological condition that a 
person has that is medically classified and embodies an individualised and 
tragic deficit approach (Oliver, 2004: 19). Disability here points to the social 
dimensions that impact upon the impairments of individuals such as building 
design or social attitudes. This conceptual move draws attention to the socially 
constructed nature of disability and distributes the explanation of disability away 
from individual blame to showcase the collective responsibility socio-material 
worlds have in producing disability (Oliver and Barnes, 1998). However, it has 
been argued by Tremaine (2002) that a materialist approach does not pay due 
attention to the ways in which cultural practices and values shape how we 
understand disability. This discursive school seeks to examine the semiotic and 
discursive ways in which those with disabilities are constructed and portrayed 
negatively such as the stigma and prejudice that is inscribed through “staring” at 
those with disabilities (Garland Thomson, 2009). Within this work, the social 
construction of disability is shown through discursive analysis and attempts to 
bring positive representation to disability issues and showcase the biases and 
discursive resources that are used to reinforce disadvantaged positions. In 
return, those from the materialist tradition have argued that this focus on culture, 
discourse and language does not address the harsh physical and economic 
systems, within which those with disability are faced, especially at times of 
austerity (Barnes, 2012, Shakespeare, 2014).  
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Neither of these two schools of thought has fully managed to move beyond 
these binary understandings of disability and have been caught within a 
stalemate. Thus political/economic and semiotic/discursive/cultural analysis 
often takes precedence over bodily and somatic experiences of disability5. The 
contemporary nature of the study of the senses within sociology has meant that 
cross-over with disability studies has been underdeveloped. I return later in the 
chapter to think about an approach within the nascent Critical Disability Studies 
(CDA), framework which approaches disability from a different direction in 
relation to autism. For now, I wish to address a contemporary approach to the 
senses in sociology that has sought to breakdown boundaries between the 
embodied and discursive approaches to researching sensory experience.  
 
These challenges to engaging with sensory perspectives and orders within 
social life and sociology as an intellectual endeavour to understand society has 
been taken up by Vannini et al’s (2012) work on the “Sociology of the Senses”. 
In this wide-ranging work, the authors outline a framework that is sociologically 
informed to analyse and theorise sensory experience. They argue that much of 
our lives are given over to taking for granted sensory engagements with the 
world that we find hard to conceptualise or rationalise fully if we remain 
indentured to either a purely embodied or cognitive means to express them. Our 
senses can be awakened by disruptions to habitual means of action in the world 
or particularly overwhelming sensory stimuli that overtake our capacity for 
linguistic or symbolic response. In these situations, we experience the sensory 
in its “qualitative immediacy”. Drawing on Rochberg-Halton (1982), Vannini et al 
describe this as “sens(ing) certain objects for their immediate qualities and our 
                                                          
5
 However, see Garland-Thomson (1996) for a discussion of the way in which bodily, somatic 
differences as embodied by “freaks” helped to constitute the humanist, rational subject. Explicit 
physical differences were central to this process. This approach mixes the discursive and 
cultural approach to disability with embodied studies of physical and somatic difference. 
Furthermore, Erevelles (2002b) has pointed to the ways in which impaired bodies are not 
beyond social consideration, but are bound up in physical and material relations such as dietary 
regimes, therapies and the environment.  
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carnal affective knowledge does not depend on abstract associations” (Vannini 
et al, 2012: 20). To develop this argument further, they utilise the example of 
pain, which may begin with a sudden, sharp shock or slow rising, noxious 
feeling that, at first, cannot be adequately expressed rationally and in the case 
of the former, may even physically prevent expression as the body responds to 
internal and external stimuli. Such stimuli: “can be very fleeting-things as they 
are: unique in and of themselves. “ (ibid: 30). These sensations are, following 
Peirce (1931), described as “iconic”. Once we begin to make sense of our 
emotional and carnal feelings, we may go to others to try and make sense of 
what we are feeling. This expands iconic meaning to include connections via 
“token-type” resemblance, whether something is or is not present within the 
current situation, or via an “indexical” process that enables connections to be 
made to causal relations such as a sharp pain being caused by inflamed nerves. 
Finally, we can make meaning from a sensation at the “symbolic” level in which 
we relate to what sensations represent. Collectively, these activities are 
described as “somatic work”, “Performing these kinds of somatic work, we come 
to know our body in multiple, nuanced, and at times even contradictory ways” 
(Vannini et al, 2012: 30). This approach attends to the multiple processes 
through which we engage with our senses, through discursive and embodied 
domains of experience. Vannini et al do not privilege either domain in their 
framework and are thus attentive to the empirical particulars of sensory 
experience as they arise in social life.  
 
Key to this argument is the description and exploration of the “sensuous self”. 
This concept evokes the way in which humans are subject and object in sensory 
experiences, in which we are reflexively and materially engaged with the world 
with the self being “not only a knowing subject and the object of symbolic… 
knowledge, but also and more precisely a feeling and sensing subject and the 
object of somatic experience” (Vannini et al, 2012: 86). These concerns are 
brought together in two concepts: “reflexive rituals”, which comprise social and 
context specific reflection, and “somatic rituals” which incorporate sensory 
experience and the subsequent sense making activities that occur thereafter 
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(ibid: 87). By considering these two aspects together, the authors theorise a 
“somatic career”, whereby sensory rituals and sense making activities are 
implicated to produce meaning. Rather than being static habitual actions, 
following Dewey (2002), Vannini et al highlight the dynamic and embodied way 
in which social actors enter into cultural means of understanding. We learn, for 
example to take sensory hygiene such as shaving and washing to be part of a 
cultural habit that ties together personal idiosyncrasies and cultural norms.  
 
The concept of habits has emerged a number of times in the above passages 
without comment. The next section will go on to explore the ways in which a 
pragmatist notion of habit can bring nuance to an understanding of sensory 
experience. This conceptual discussion shall then be joined and related to a 
conception of habitual interaction, via social actor’s engagement with favourite 
objects, activities and people.  
 
Pragmatic Habits as Mediating Senses 
 
 
Habits, within everyday discourse, are often taken to be something that is at 
once a series of actions that have become stabilised, and routine responses to 
set events or dispositions to an act that does not require extensive reflection. 
They emerge over time and are often difficult to break down if they have 
endured across long periods of time. However, habits can and do become 
disentangled from their patterned creation and can lead to an immense sense of 
disorientation. A line of social thought that has sought to address the 
complexities of how habits as dispositions and actions are expressed is 
classical pragmatism. Drawing upon this school of thought, we can begin to see 
habits as part of a somatic career and also gain an understanding of how the 
discursive, material and sensual aspects of life connect to socially embodied 
issues. As Shilling (2008) argues, a key focus in sociological thought is between 
traditions that view the possibilities of social action as being construed by the 
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impositions of the external, structured environment, such as the Durkheimian 
tradition (1995). There is also a focus on the internal capacities and potentials of 
social actors that lead to social action. This is exemplified in the Weberian 
tradition (Weber, 1949, 1978, Shilling, 2008). Against these two views, is that of 
pragmatism which seeks to develop an approach that incorporates the key 
elements of each of the two sides of the debate. 
 
 
Shilling’s (2008) understanding of habits takes the work of John Dewey (1980, 
2002), as a key point of reference. Dewey was a central thinker for the late 19th 
to mid-20th century and contributed to a wide range of fields comprising 
philosophy, ethics, educational theory and practice. As an engaged thinker and 
public intellectual, participating in the civil and democratic development of 
American society, Dewey’s founding concern was to ensure that he engaged 
with practical problems that would provide empirical or theoretical resources 
that contribute to meeting the needs of the groups that the work is engaged with. 
In relation to habits, this meant taking into account the issues, substantive 
characteristics and consideration of the social, psychological and ecological 
factors that give habits their unique purchase and developing open concepts 
that can account for these unique processes and provide insight into social 
problems that may arise due to habitual relations and actions.  
 
Dewey offers a distinction between “routine, unintelligent habit” and “intelligent 
habit or art” (Dewey, 2002: 67). This distinction “dispenses with the conventional 
opposition between habit and reason” (Shilling, 2008: 14). Routine habit 
incorporates stabilised responses to specific circumstances that mechanically 
activate when a predetermined set of mechanisms are set in motion. Intelligent 
habit incorporates intentional thought and reflection that is mindful of the 
material, social and ecological nexus in which the actor is embedded. Hence, a 
degree of finesse or “artful” craft is possible to direct habits to specific ends. A 
further key concern of a pragmatic concern for habits relates to how habits can 
come to inflect and influence social and self-identities. As Dewey recognised, 
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central to human potential “is the capacity we have to manipulate things outside 
the topographical boundaries of our bodies” (Shilling, 2008: 10, emphasis in 
original). 
 
Dewey describes how our senses are “a means of connection”, to:  
 
 
what lies beyond (our) bodily frame […] [The senses] unfold 
themselves onto, connect in their particular ways with, and gain 
information from, the environment […] Embodied subjects combine, 
utilise and deploy these senses in ways that give rise to multi-
layered perspectives on social and physical situations (Dewey, 
1980: 13, 237 in Shilling, 2008: 10). 
 
 
To expand upon this, Shilling connects Dewey’s work to that of George Herbert 
Mead (1934). Drawing upon Mead’s definition of the “I”, which denotes a 
continuous: 
 
 
mutual relationship between the individual and the community; [this] 
describe[s] the creative source of “the constant reaction of the 
organism to its socialised selfhood […]. This […] provides the 
capacity to react to and depart from, the socialisation processes 
and cultural norms (Mead, 1934: 215, 202, in Shilling, 2008: 11, 
emphasis in original).  
 
 
Complementary to the I is the “Me”, which is the sum of what we learn from our 
social environment and structures, and can be usefully related to the concepts 
of reflexive rituals and somatic rituals in which the interior and exterior 
processes of sensory socialisation occur. The Me incorporates external 
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influence and experience into our self-perception and is required so that the 
means to adhere or break away from social norms is grounded in particular 
cultural norms and values. These two processes entail that, as humans, we do 
not have a dominion over the environment or full, autonomous control over our 
agential capacities, but instead, have a form of interconnectedness that results 
from adjusting to and integrating these varying factors and dynamics. This 
theme is then developed into a matrix, of character positions from the highest 
form of connection between internal and external environments or the 
“integrated subject”, to the worst possible connection or a “fractured subject”. 
These are end points in this matrix and should be seen as describing a 
processual phenomenon (Shilling, 2008: 21-22).  
 
 
Dewey connected his views on habitual relations to a moral and aesthetic sense 
of social interaction and norms. Moving beyond the view of habits as 
mechanical repetitions of actions, thoughts and behaviours do not absolve us 
from a moralistic discussion of whether habits are good or not. Dewey was not 
simply moralistic, however, and took a more ethical view of how creative habits 
and stabilised habitual structures of acting can best be co-ordinated, so as to 
provide the best conditions for allowing agents to express their agential 
capacities and for the environment to enable as many affordance possibilities as 
a situation allows. This dynamic co-constitutive relationship is important 
because it does not place an emphasis on either the individual/agential or 
structural/environmental capacities of social thought. Instead, it requires us to 
understand that habitual and, for that matter, sensual, action and being is “most 
fully funded where the transactive individual-social relationship happens – in 
places… of experience” (Cutchin, 2007: 511).  
 
 
It is apparent that the above discussion on habitual relations remains at a 
certain degree of abstraction. In the context of this thesis, it is important to 
anchor any discussion of habits to a defined set or sequence of actions and 
behaviours in relation to a specific social or object relationship that promotes 
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mutual emergence, or stability. This anchor will be the “favourite”. A favourite 
can take the form of an object, person, activity, location or set of routinised 
actions/activities, they begin to give the forces of habit something to focus on 
and allow sedimentation and exploration to occur, as the need arises.  
 
What is a Favourite? 
 
For the time being, the notion of what a favourite is will remain on this 
abstracted plane, but will become more specified in the context of how 
favourites relate to social actors in specific milieus. I will begin with an outline of 
what favourites are in general before relating these insights to how those with 
autism may interact with and alter a more focused conceptualisation of what a 
favourite is in relation to the aims of the research. Favourites as a topic in their 
own right are relatively unexplored and the closest proxy regarding a discussion 
of potential favourites is as markers of identity or places formation (Proshansky, 
1978, Schultz et al, 1989, Abbott-Chapman and Robertson, 2009). This 
research project, however, hopes to be more exploratory and inclusive of what a 
“favourite” can mean in terms of potential social interaction with the world.  
 
 
What a favourite is cannot be defined absolutely, because a key feature of this 
term is specific to the participants, whether they relate to a relationship such as 
a favourite friend, a favourite object such as a medal, a favourite experience 
such as sky diving or favourite activity such as playing video games. A common 
conception related to favourites is that they are positive events or interactions 
that people experience and engage with. This is often further extended into 
claims regarding social self-esteem and brings a stronger form of connection 
between the object, person or event that provides emotional, physical, 
intellectual or spiritual nourishment. Favourites are also cyclical in nature in that 
they are often sought after in order to reconnect, re-experience, revisit, 
strengthen, renew or regain the positive social, physical and emotional valence 
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they have for social actors (Korpela and Ylen, 2007). Favourites are also difficult 
to define because the term in everyday use is relatively broad and non-specific. 
It can refer to a cultural event or experience such as films that capture the 
collective imagination of the audience, a collection of “old favourites” such as a 
collection box of biscuits, to more recent interpretations of the conceptual idea 
of favourites with digital services utilising favourite collections to sort and store 
“favourite” videos, articles, photos, screenshots and any other kind of digital 
artefact or process.  
 
 
All of the above has so far related to the more individualistic aspects of 
favourites. Returning to favourites as cyclical, a question that occurs in everyday 
talk often will refer to “what is your favourite X?” These questions require the 
person to reflexively and performatively consider why this is their favourite and 
thus alters any stable notion of what a favourite means. Because such a 
question can be considered part of the mundane, everyday small talk stock 
(Garfinkel, 2006, Sacks, 1992) there is an expectation that social actors will 
have favourites and that it is expected that reasoning can be provided. If this 
question is asked amongst groups of people who share the same hobbies, 
interests or tastes, this simple question can offer a means for people to further 
bond with this interest group and also serve as an anchor in which to explore 
value differences. Questions regarding normativity, or what the discourses and 
historical background of a specific inquiry make possible to think of as a “norm”, 
(Foucault, 1972) come into play here as comparisons of what is acceptable in 
terms of a particular group of people who share a hobby will be defined or 
policed in some way.  
 
Dewey would frame these kinds of matters around whether favourites provide 
the resources to develop wholesome relations that are positive for the 
individual, the group as a whole and the context they are located within. The 
anchor must remain stable in order for the group to remain coherent. We can 
extend this to a wider concern with activities that are frowned upon as deviant or 
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“weird”. Weird in this context is “a particular kind of perturbation. It involves a 
sensation of wrongness: a weird entity or object is so strange that it makes us 
feel that it should not exist, or at least it should not exist here” (Fisher 2016: 15). 
This sense of being out of place and being wrong can take a number of forms 
including: being slightly weird or “a little funny, but essentially harmless”, 
interests can also be strange such as a quirky person having a fascination with 
and keeping a large number of catsm, those that are “a little sad”, such as 
collecting stamps or other, seemingly non-beneficial items that provide a non-
worthwhile investment in connection to the amount of wealth or effort that is put 
into them and the resulting sense of satisfaction that is to be gained from such 
activities from an outside perspective. Finally, there are those whose hobbies or 
interests are dangerous to themselves or others and are often subject to highly 
guarded and affectively charged social taboos which encourage adherence to 
these boundaries. Fisher has argued that the weird forces us to accept that we 
are in the presence of the new and that our old forms of reference and meaning 
are unhelpful (Fisher, 2016: 13). Those with seemingly odd habits are, in the 
dynamic sense outlined by Dewey, adapting to and making their own habitual 
engagements in connection to the resources available to them. Thus, I do not 
take a moralistic stance regarding the favourites of autistic individuals. Rather, 
they are seen as being means of managing and coping with the context in which 
they are located. As such, they should be investigated empirically and not 
assumed in advance.  
 
Habitual Favourites as a Concept 
 
In giving some beginning orientations to both the notions of habit and favourites, 
I will now begin to offer a preliminary outline of a core concept in the thesis that 
will develop over the course of this project. The central contribution of the thesis 
will be to demonstrate how a pragmatist inflected understanding of habits can 
be understood alongside how those with autism interact with their “favourites”. 
The conceptual short-hand that I will use to bring together the insights drawn 
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from pragmatist conceptions of habits and favourites is “habitual favourites”. 
Initially, this describes the ways in which those with autism come in contact with 
a favourite, and then enter into habitualised relations with this favourite through 
a number of different social processes, actions and events. I will explore the 
ways in which the notion of habitual favourites is inflected through discussions 
of the sensory dynamics at play in developing, defining and maintaining 
sufficient levels of engagement with a favourite so that it remains present within 
specific spatio-temporal contexts, I will argue that the dynamic interplay of 
sensory experience management is impacted significantly by the personal 
experiences of each person with autism and the specific modalities of the 
means of engaging with said favourite’s forces us to consider a multi-faceted 
exploration of what makes autistic favourites. Further, I examine how I, as a 
sociological researcher with Asperger’s Syndrome, is impacted by the very 
same dynamics I describe from my research participants, raising important 
methodological and theoretical questions regarding identity and self-expression.  
 
Within a pragmatist inspired lexicon, the enfolding and interconnected relations 
between sensory experience, subjective experience, object interactions and 
environmental affordances is Dewey’s concept of transaction. This concept 
begins from the recognition that the social world and social agents’ responses to 
it are a “combination of continuity and action in the world… Dewey’s 
transactional view means that elements seen as separate… are really part of 
each other… person and environment are considered co-defining and co-
constitutive” (Cutchin, 2007: 507, emphasis in original). These transactions are 
further seen as functional in that they rearrange and adjust the uncertainty and 
instability in a dynamic world that actualises for the benefit of entities that exist 
in a particular milieu for particular ends (Garrison, 2001). In order to refine and 
focus our attention to the sensory dimensions of social life, we can expand this 
transactional conception of social interaction through considering what Sarah 
Pink has termed an “emplaced” methodology. Pink, quoting Howes (2005b), 
argues that whereas “the paradigm of “embodiment” implies an integration of 
mind and body, the emergent paradigm of emplacement suggests the sensuous 
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interrelationship of body-mind-environment” (Howes, 2005b: 7 in Pink, 2009). 
Embodiment sought to examine how the body can itself be source of knowing 
independent and intertwined with the mind. Emplacement seeks to account for 
the relations between bodies, minds, materiality and sensuousness of the social 
and environmental milieu (Pink, 2009: 25). The concept of emplacement can 
then further be productively linked to the concept of “milieu”.  
 
The notion of milieu describes:  
 
 
the specific patterns of relevance that constitute a space of 
independencies in relation to which connections may take hold […] 
[where] the world is not only open and dynamic, but it is also plural, 
that there is a relative outside to every milieu and that that these 
interactions between milieus may have a bearing upon the success 
of a connection (Savransky, 2016a: 135). 
 
 
“Milieu” as such describes the way in which causes and effects interact with 
each other to influence the world in decisive ways. Instead of deciding in 
advance what matters, we need to attune our inquiries to the affordances and 
specificities of the event or phenomenon in question and to accept that we 
cannot influence or know what these connections will entail. As such, our 
emplaced body-mind-environments are open, dynamic and plural; they interact 
in ways that may reinforces some modes of action and prevent effectiveness in 
others. Here, causality is complex, emergent and divergent. However, I want to 
temper the use of the term environment in this context. Savransky argues along 
with Serres (1995a) and Canguilhem (2008) that environment is too static a 
term for the ecological relations of emplacement. Environment, for Serres, 
insists that other objects, subjects and events be situated and maintained 
around it, whereas a milieu refers to “a pure system of relations without 
supports” (Canguilhem, 2008: 103). As such, the centre ground is composed by 
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the relations that compose it and are intertwined with it. A milieu is thus a 
“debate” (ibid: 113), which denotes “a fragile, precarious and metastable 
negotiation between elements that are brought into contact” (Savransky, 2016a: 
136). I will draw from these processual and pragmatist notions of emplacement 
and milieu to refer to the complex and inter-woven relations and specificities of 
mind-body-milieu events. Because these events are relational and depend on 
the specific elements through which they are constituted to persist and exist at 
all, the topics through which they are brought to bear will alter their constitution 
to reflect the demands they place on thinking. For example, thinking about 
Autiethnography Part 1 and 2 (Chapters 4 and 5), means attending to the ways 
in which the autoethnographer and their relationships to others is affected by 
how they observe, react and write about and react to diverse experiences. 
Specifically, particular forms of emplacements that are inflected by autism 
impact and interrupt autoethnographic challenges of narcissist navel-gazing.  
 
I now return to the discussion of “dynamic” and “diagnostic” modes of 
understanding disabilities to argue that we need to move beyond them. To do 
this, we need to alter our perspective by considering the ways in which those 
with autism blur the binaries between reason and emotion, systematising and 
creative cognitive styles. By performing this complexification of systematic 
modes of thought, we begin to see the diverse modes of engagement that those 
with autism embody. This alternative mode of thinking enables a more diverse 
and nuanced sensual appreciation of the emplaced experiences of those with 
autism. This approach simultaneously enables us to see how a transactive, 
milieu focused perspective highlights the distributed notions of sociality that 
mainstream autism theory fails to capture. 
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Beyond Dynamic and Diagnostic Definitions 
 
Neither dynamic nor diagnostic modes are adequate to fully conceptualise and 
explain what autism is or how it can be lived without recognising that their 
interplay is central. We need new ways to think with and about autism to remove 
the static burdens of the diagnostic mode and the conservative moralism of the 
dynamic mode. I now want to explore some divergent ways of thinking about 
what autism is beyond the general DSM-V lists of characteristics.  
 
Rather than having an innate or intuitive grasp of human social conduct, many 
people with autism relate to and understand animals and their modes of being in 
the world in more in-depth and attuned means than many NT groups. A famous 
example of such a phenomenon is Temple Grandin’s (1996, 2000, 2015) 
interventions in the development of humane treatment methods for animals bred 
for food. She notes how her mind works much like several machines. In 
“Thinking in Pictures” (1986), she describes the way in which her brain operates 
like a tape recorder or video tape, where words and ideas are processed and 
imprinted on tapes and could be filled into relevant storage areas in her mind 
that could be accessed when required if she was calm and focused. Over the 
years, in a later article, Grandin (2000a) adds that additional processes, akin to 
a web browser also operate in her mind. She describes how when asked to 
come up with ideas, she searches through files for images and their many 
resonant associations, which are not necessarily related to the concern at hand. 
This requires cognitive intervention and she can visualise a 3D picture of a 
device she is designing and utilising processes similar to digital editing 
technologies to explore different affordances and capacities of such a device. 
(Grandin, 2000a).        
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Grandin utilised this capacity for attention to detail and systematic thinking to 
attend to the ways in which cows, when heading to slaughter, would panic and 
create chaos. She sensed their emotional and affective distress, apparent in 
their grunts, uptight bodies and manic attention switching. Having studied the 
way in which cows visually pay attention to the world, she devised two 
innovations that revolutionised the industry a series of lights to guide cows in the 
right direction based on their kinaesthetic affordances and herd behaviours, 
alongside the “hugging machine” (Grandin and Johnson, 2005). Based on 
Grandin’s own tactile experiences where intense pressure helped to stimulate 
her and relieve stress of dealing with intense stimuli, she translated her 
emotional responses into logical thought procedures and searched for ways to 
design a machine that could provide the same level of comfort to cows. This 
meant visualising and searching for material that would suit cows’ tactile and 
pressure tolerance, as well as the ways in which the kinaesthetic and haptic 
dimensions of the slaughter process intertwined.  
 
Following Despret (2004) and her analysis of Little Hans, a horse who was 
thought to be able to compute mathematical problems due to an understanding 
of counting, because when asked mathematical questions, Hans tapped his foot 
to the number required for the answer. This analysis, however, on closer 
inspection, was flawed and a more complex answer was proferred. Researchers 
found that Hans attended to human body language and intentional gestures to 
gauge if he got the correct answer. In other words, Hans and the human 
handlers were communicating via bodily, gestural and linguistic affective 
processes that showcased a union of rational and emotional structures, where 
the boundaries mingled and waned depending on the scenario in which Hans 
and the humans were located. We can argue that in addition to the video/tape 
recorder and web browser logical processes of her brain, Grandin was also 
learning to be affected (Latour 2004)6 by the cow’s emotional and affective 
                                                          
6
 Also see Despret (2004) and her account of being affected in relation to Hans which she in turn 
draws from James (1890, 1958a), another founding pragmatist philosopher.   
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responses and transduced these into a more rational, systematic means to 
solve the issue. She brought her own, self-emplaced knowledge of tactile 
comfort into designing a similar device or object that could be used to bring the 
cows into dialogue. The cows gave off certain affective cues that caused 
Grandin to consider how to best “become-cow” and figure herself as a member 
of the species and use her emplaced strengths. Again following Despret, the 
cows were not mere objects or non-agential subjects these categories were 
redistributed depending on the situation. Grandin learnt from the cows that her 
own solution to her problems could be used to transform the bodily states and 
kinaesthetic and haptic character of cow’s movement to the slaughterhouse. 
 
The combination of rational, organisation processes of video recorders and web 
browsers and the emplaced and situated nature of tactile/haptic comfort 
showcases the interlocking rational, cognitive, emotional, affective and 
embodied processes that were mobilised for a person with autism to be 
“affected” by an event. Grandin is posing a direct challenge to medical 
definitions of autism that categorise the senses as a matter related solely to 
repetitive actions and not a domain to be considered in communicational 
spheres. For her, the encounter between autistic modes of experience and 
animal experience is “immersed… into a world populated with sensorial ebbs and 
flows, intensities of touch and pressure, agitations and anxieties” (Todd and 
Hynes, 2017: 10). Sensory engagement was engaged with creatively here and 
was a highly social event, albeit, one that incorporated animals more often than 
humans in many stages of the process7. The social is thus not separate from the 
sensorial. Further, Grandin demonstrates the potential of neurodiverse ways of 
thinking. She takes the metaphors of the brain like a computer literally, with the 
attendant associations of mechanistic, unfeeling process and yet, sought to 
understand the cows as beings-in-themselves with desires, motivations and 
non-human modes of interaction with their environment, rather than assuming 
                                                          
7
 I will return to this observation in Chapter 4 in exploring how this intimate connection to animal 
sociality affects our conceptions of what it means to be human.  
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purely human, rational thought alone could solve the problems in the encounter 
between animal and human.  
 
However, it is important to temper the idea that Grandin offers a “model” for 
going beyond representational modes of recognition. As Todd and Hynes argue, 
“In her rush to identify with animals, she performs her own abstraction… she 
reproduces the commonsense presupposition that to think is essentially to 
recognise” (ibid: 11, emphasis in original). This recognition of moving between 
representational and emplaced modes of engagement requires a framework in 
which distributed forms of relationality are allowed to co-exist and influence 
each other. Later in the chapter, I will argue that the concepts of the quasi-
object and parasite provide such opportunities.  
 
A key recognition by Grandin however, is that while she is able to: 
 
control the rate at which pictures come onto the “computer screen” 
in my imagination. Some people with autism are not able to do this 
[…] images explode into a web of […] pictures that are interrelated. 
The decision-making process can become “locked up” and over-
loaded with pictures coming in all at once. (Grandin, 2000a, no 
pagination).  
 
The process is liable to break down or be disrupted by too much stimuli, 
whether cognitive, sensory, emotional or social. The numbers of possible 
disruptions and the increased impact they have on those with autism may be the 
central characteristic that separates autistic individuals and those without.  
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I will explore these ideas more in Chapter 4 and also explore in-depth the idea 
of “being affected” in Chapter 6. These chapters will consider an exploration of 
the nature of a distributed subjectivity in self-expression and affective 
interaction. I now want to turn to how we can combine sensory sociology’s 
insights with the concept of habitual favourites developed above to get a sense 
of how they relate to and connect to those with autism.  
 
I now return to the notion of habits and their connections to favourites to apply 
some of the notions I have developed above in relation to pragmatism and 
sensory sociology to autistic ways of being explicitly. In doing so, I add detail 
and depth to abstract concepts in relation to the key study group, those with 
autism.   
 
Reassessing Sensory Sociology and Habitual Favourites With Autism 
 
As I noted earlier, the concepts of transaction, milieu and emplaced location 
help to underscore a relational and social-ecological approach to sensory 
experience and habitual relations. The transactional emplaced understanding of 
social action to describe how our senses can occupy multiple scales and can 
affect our bodies’ capacity to expand senses of selfhood can be further 
considered from a philosophical position. Jean Luc Nancy states: 
 
to listen is to enter that spatiality by which, at the same time, I am 
penetrated, for it open up in me as well as around me: it opens up 
inside me as well as outside and it is through such a double, 
quadruple or sextuple opening that a self can take place (Nancy, 
2007: 14).  
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This statement points to the interweaving of the multiple and overlapping 
senses of interiority of the self and of the external environment. Just as we can 
have many scales of local transactions in the external social world via objects or 
relations to other social groupings, we can experience many kinds of different 
perceptions of our own sensuous sense of selfhood via a number of scales and 
relations to the sensory object or experience transaction. I will demonstrate 
below how such diverse considerations for people with autism can be explored 
with the concepts and literature I have already reviewed.  
 
Returning to disability, we can understand disability as something that impairs 
people from engaging with social life and can be caused by divergent workings 
of the mind or body from what is considered “normal”. When understood in this 
way, a favourite activity then is, to a large degree, shaped by potential 
boundaries and difficulty of engagement alongside concerns with personal 
satisfaction and identity expression and building. Abbott-Chapman and 
Robertson (2009), focusing on how adolescents engage with their favourite 
places spatially, note that if we utilise the concept of affordance to explore 
connections possible between a social actor and their environment, it is possible 
to show the number and potential of connections for affordances is constrained, 
beyond a poverty of affordances, by barriers to access and engagement (Abbot-
Chapman and Robertson, 2009: 421). For those with autism, focusing on the 
sensory domains of engagement, an example would be of how a favourite 
communal place to hang out, such as pubs or clubs, may be highly 
uncomfortable for autistic individuals due to intensity in both sound levels and 
the concentration of people.  
 
If we think of how sensory identities are constructed for those with autism, 
difficulties related to sensory perceptions and experiences whether internally via 
misunderstanding or lacking the tools to interpret and make sense of 
sensations, or, externally via a confusing torrent of images, sounds, smells, can 
cause social life to be highly problematic. This can lead to many idiosyncratic 
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practices and an increased attention to particular modes of sensory 
engagement. Taking a shower and getting ready in the morning, is hyper 
contextualised and hyper-focused, causing the person with autism to break 
down the components of the process into minutely detailed steps. Can I cope if 
the shower does not warm up as fast as usual today? Can I cope with the tag on 
the back of this shirt, or will I need to cut it out? These kinds of questions relate 
to and extenuate reflexive rituals outlined by Vannini et al (2012). Such an 
intense focus on these reflexive rituals can then cause problems for somatic 
rituals, because a sense of dislocation is established.  
 
If such varied and intense considerations can occur for stable and mundane 
habits, to alter habitual actions can be a task filled with difficulties for those with 
autism. Dewey argues that in order to change our habits, it is imperative to not 
attempt to immediately break away from the rituals that sustain the actions and 
patterned behaviours of such habits. Instead, a series of careful considerations 
is required, to view the “means and ends”, of a goal, we must: 
 
take our mind off from it and attend to the act which is next to be 
performed […] To think of the end signifies to extend and enlarge our 
view of the act to be performed […] to look at the next act in 
perspective, not permitting it to occupy the entire field of vision… 
Means… are intermediates […] for the same series [of actions] taken 
distributively (Dewey 1922: 26-7).  
 
To change habits requires us to see a divergent pathway, to note a similarity to 
a connected, yet not identical means of acting that enables the possibility of 
altering our habitual engagements. It allows us to see the multiple, 
“interpenetration of habits” and the means by which they “overlap”, and thus 
draw comparisons, which find their ground in stable socio-bio-psychological 
formations. These questionings and the intense confusion that may come from 
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processes of reflexive and somatic ritual disruption can thus be translated into 
Dewey’s concern for how individuals sustain a sense of identity. For those with 
autism, a fractured identity may be one that takes its toll on their physical, 
psychological and social well-being. Sensory or other forms of overload may 
result from not being fully in tune with or able to adapt to their surroundings and 
as such require intervention. On the other hand, integrated subjects may have 
moments of epiphany or flow, where the connection between internal or external 
environments and the tasks at hand are synchronised to such a degree that a 
state of pure calm, affective pleasure and a sense of wholeness may arise. If 
fractured, reflexive rituals are not structured around a habituated, stable 
grounding of actions, the iconic or pure experience of sensory data overwhelms 
capacities to form indexical relations. If a key feature of autism is difficulty in 
understanding self-feelings and others’ perspectives, indexical processing is a 
core problem in conceptualising autistic sensual experience in this way. It 
should be noted that these two dimensions are the extreme ends of this 
continuum and require very specific social, spatial and material conditions in 
order to become a reality. The vast majority of social actors will oscillate 
between these two extremes and will often occupy a centre or just left or right of 
centre position.  
 
Michel Serres, The Parasite and Quasi-Objects  
 
 
Michel Serres is a wide ranging and prolific author who has spent much of his 
life engaging with questions related to science, nature, ecology, information, 
language, connections between literature and scientific concepts and, most 
relevant for us, the sensuous nature of human existence. He has sought novel 
and nuanced conceptualisations of the mechanisms that connect humans to 
each other and the wider world. Serres is a complex thinker who is difficult to 
summarise cogently without losing some of the eloquence and subtly of his 
writings. His work on the scientific developments on complexity, topology and 
literary poeticism go back on themselves, reorient to new foci and place almost 
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no boundaries on what can be drawn upon to conceptualise the question at 
hand. I have attempted to do this in this chapter by going back to my earlier 
arguments and supplementing them with the new material considered.  
 
 
In “The Five Senses” (2008), Serres’ key concern relates to how western society 
has divided conceptions of the senses and become “drunk” and “addicted” to 
language. This has occurred to such a high degree in modernity that we 
abstract from the environment and become embroiled in the conflictual and 
divisive notions of language that seek to separate out the world into discrete 
blocks of experience. We seek to go beyond sensory experience and convey 
everything in language and informational terms; we seek to turn the “hard” world 
of material and physical sensations that seem so fixed, into the “soft” world of 
language and symbolic meaning, which we can play with through interpretation. 
Against this view, Serres argues that we should think of the senses as 
topological and the skin as a locus of a space of boundaries and weaves of 
interconnected dimensions such that we at once touch ourselves, touch others 
and others touch us. This also works for the other senses so that we can divide 
what we hear into our own internal bodily machinations, the external 
environment and the medium between such structures and experiences. In a 
surprisingly “autistic” means of describing sensory experience, Serres 
understands kinaesthetic and proprioceptive elements of mist and fog, such that 
they at once coat the skin with a light, thin film that produces an ephemeral and 
uncertain sensory landscape, or a thick, viscous material boundary that  
obscures our vision, disrupts our sense of smell, muffles our hearing. Serres 
points to the disruptive boundary crossings of not quite material, not quite 
ephemeral, not quite informational. Such a process describes a number of 
sensory confusions and difficulties in autistic individuals where light from strobe 
or fluorescent lighting can feel as though they are physically bearing down on 
their bodies, or, where hyposensitive individuals move through life not being 
able to get an intense enough experience to truly “feel” anything.  
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Serres can be utilised to further this innovative conceptualisation of sensory 
experience and the many kinds of mediums or connection vectors that bridge 
the gaps between structure, agency, language, and emplacement and so on. 
This process is denoted by Serres to be the quasi-object, which extends social 
constructionist arguments with the claim that social relations to objects are not 
“objective”, but are always mediated and thus are always constructed by social 
individuals. Objects can also construct social groups (Brown and Stenner, 2009: 
56). Quasi-objects enable human groups to slow down their social connections 
to others and the world by referring social meanings, roles and attachments to 
objects. Thus, creating and connecting individuals and collectives to each other 
and the object and subject positions taken could not exist without this intimate 
comingling. This can be demonstrated by games of “It”, where the person is 
designated by a touch, or object icon to be “It” whereas the other chasers are 
anonymous until they are designated the status “It”. The game of football or the 
like also serve as demonstrative; the ball in these games mediates the social 
relations between the players, crowds, viewers and so on. The types of relations 
between them, the spatial configuring of the players, as a team and individually 
in formations to bring the ball to the goal, are inscribed and distributed in and 
through the actions of the ball. The ball becomes object when it is kicked with 
the disregard one might have for inanimate objects. It also becomes subject 
when it produces agentic change in human conduct and action, producing new 
forms of intermingling relationality and social interaction. Thus, the ball draws 
attention to itself as a kind of subject, able to be filled with meaning and 
intentions. These formulations can also be conceptualised to operate for autistic 
special interests. While these do not necessarily have to be objects, the intense 
and pleasurable, on specific subjects or sensory phenomena such as visual 
patterns or tactile sensations, serves as an autistic individual’s means of 
slowing down social relations. They bring together a diverse array of factors, 
into a manageable “quasi”-object of interest and use these to enter into the 
social world. Furthermore, the favourite becomes both subject and object in 
allowing those with autism to learn the social, material, temporal and spatial 
transacted affordances of the world through the qualities present in a specific 
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favourite. I explore these themes and further explore the quasi-object concept in 
Chapter 3.  
 
 
The need for such a conceptualisation is given, for Serres, in his view that all 
social interaction is mediated by “third” terms that, while they are consciously 
excluded, such as emotional or affective responses in scientific work, are 
inescapably constitutive and so always remerge and shape the process. This 
phenomenon is thought through in the understanding of “the parasite” (Serres, 
2007). The concept of the parasite is a multivalent one that Serres explores 
through La Fontaine’s fable of the farmer and the rats to introduce the 
practicalities and conceptual themes at stake. In brief, a country rat is invited by 
a city rat to dine at a tax farmer’s house. They are interrupted when the farmer 
senses his goods are being tampered with and flee, only to return when the 
disruption is gone. The country rat is a guest of the city rat, parasitising the 
hospitality of the town rat, both parasitise the food of the farmer, and then they 
are disturbed by the noise of the farmer who breaks the emergent parasitical 
relation. The farmer is himself a parasite as his food is based on tax levies and 
not produced by him, this relationship being disturbed by the rats. Brown and 
Stenner refer to this process as a “cascade” of relations where objects and 
events flow down the chain or relations (Brown and Stenner 2009: 47). The 
specific contexts are important here as Serres notes the key feature of the 
parasite is its specificity. The tax farmer is just like the produce farmers, rats can 
slip into houses relatively undetected and noise disrupts their raids. Parasitical 
relations are about taking without giving and thus prevent a system from 
reaching equilibrium until a disruption or “noise” distorts it, only for the original 
relation to remerge. By viewing a set of social relations in this way, parasitical 
relations force us to recognise that we never exist in an unmediated relation to 
our internal worlds or external structures. If communication between two objects 
or subjects were immediate, then it would stop being communication and 
become the exact opposite, immediacy (Brown and Stenner, 2009).  
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This is termed a third space in which we are open to expression and permits 
mediation to occur. A further intermediary is required: 
 
 
a third who may have no relation to the two stations but who only 
relates to their relation. To parasite in this sense is to branch onto an 
existing channel and hence to intercept or interrupt that existing 
relation. (Brown and Stenner, 2009: 45)  
 
 
Each relation in turn is attempting to reach the position where they do not have 
to parasitise others and stands above the chains of relationality.   
 
 
How does this relate to autism? Autism as a neurodevelopmental condition 
which incorporates biological, genetic, physiological, environmental and social 
factors can itself be viewed as a parasitical problematic. For Serres, the parasite 
which in French refers to three, interconnected modes of reference: biological 
parasites, social parasites and informational parasites or a disruptive noise, is 
something that encompasses each of these domains and creates disruptive 
effects. Autism parasitises the brain, physiological and neurological pathways of 
the body, this in turn parasitises self and other understandings of social 
interaction which in turn parasitises the meanings and information that is 
conveyed through social and biological processes. This is not a linear process 
as Serres reminds us; space, time, matter and information are topological in 
nature (Abbas, 2005). This refers to the way in which biology, culture, sociality 
and meaning interweave and fold into each other so that they are 
interdependent, co-becoming entities. What matters are the specific ways in 
which these topological folds interact and become with each other (Savransky, 
2016a). In summary, we could say that it is parasites all the way up and down 
for those with autism.  
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In a practical sense, and in a very interesting allusion to how an autistic 
individual who is hypersensitive to audio and proprioceptive sensation might 
experience such a scenario, Serres dissects a scene where a telephone call is 
made in the middle of a banquet: 
 
 
At the feast everyone is talking […] There is a ringing noise, the 
telephone. Communication cuts conversation, the noise interrupting 
the messages. As soon as I start to talk with this new interlocutor, the 
sounds of the banquet become noise for the new “us”. The system 
has shifted. If I approach the table, the noise slowly becomes 
conversation. In the system, noise and message exchange roles 
according to the position of the observer and the action of the actor.” 
(Serres 2007: 68) 
 
 
The noise or third position in relations must be suppressed or somehow 
accounted for if the border crossings and management of the noise at each role 
is to be somewhat successful. Additionally, Serres refers to the telephone 
ringing as a kind of taunt that no matter how repressed, will always return to 
parasite the individual. For autistic individuals, this process is even more fraught 
with the intense sociality of the dinner table already performing a parasitic 
function with the potentially overwhelming combination of smells, sounds, tastes 
and colours. Because autism parasitises itself in this context, it is at once a 
disruptive and negative force, but also one that enables unique kinds of 
mediation as noted with Grandin’s work. This tumultuous intermediate nature of 
autistic being is what the quasi-object and parasite concepts can help us to 
examine.  
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I will explore these conceptual themes in Serres in this chapter further in 
Chapter 3 (Habitual Favourites) on empirical manifestations of habitual 
favourites. This chapter serves as an introduction to my concerns and gives the 
context in which they have been framed.  
 
 
Habitual Favourites as Quasi-Objects – Through the Sensory Autistic Manifold 
 
 
If habits are responses to and actions on the internal and external domains of 
social existence, then we can now outline what a favourite object/experience 
consists of in theoretical terms and connect the discussion to Serres’ conceptual 
matrix. We could say that such favourites serve as quasi-objects that strike a 
relationship between slowing down social life for those with autism and finding a 
means to balance degrees of social integration that are based on specific life 
experiences and external conditions. 
 
 
Habits can be summarised as: 
 
 
incorporat(ing) within themselves social expectations, physical 
objects, tools and technologies in the natural and social environment. 
Habits are modes of connection to the world, shaping us and the 
environment according to their specific logic and affordances” 
(Shilling 2008: 15 emphasis in original).   
 
 
This means that habits can be transferred to objects, environments and 
inscribed as affordances to act and also constrain actions and thus are crucial to 
shaping the conditions of the possible. If, a favourite cannot be adequately 
defined in a general sense as an experience, object or person, this is because 
the formation and structuring of what a favourite is and what activities it entails 
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depends on the favourite in question. If they are media related, then replays and 
remixing may be important. If the favourite is a particular physical object, the 
spatial, temporal and material dimensions can be important. However, my 
argument is that the theoretical tools of quasi-objects and a pragmatist 
understanding of habit can be useful means to give parameters for research to 
focus upon. A favourite object/experience can then be described as an activity 
that is formed over time and serves a form of stabilisation. They are quasi-
objects in that they slow down and mediate between conjoint intersubjective and 
interobjective relations to orient our attention and structure our capacities and 
potential for interaction. Via the myriad processes outlined above, these quasi-
object relations, in duration, come to embody habitual routines, norms and 
practices, extending and constraining the kind of affordances we can seek to 
employ via our emplaced cognitive and embodied potentials. They also embody 
our relations to external structures and the ways in which we imprint our habits 
onto the environment and how they become incorporated back into subjects. 
This can take many forms such as a material object like a blanket that can serve 
as tactile, reliable comfort with a pleasurable texture. For those who are 
hyposensitive this may be a rough texture to stimulate them and for those who 
are hypersensitive, a soft texture to prevent excess sensory stimulation from 
external sources and force a singular focus for the person.  
 
 
The parasite should thus not be viewed in a simplistic negative light, as noise is 
constitutive of the complexity of social systems. Without parasitic relations, the 
universe would be composed of simple, one-dimensional cause and effect 
patterns that would not allow for a world constantly on the fringe of the probable 
and possible (Serres, 2007: 127). Autism can thus be best seen through this 
lens if we view the parasite as one that “interrupts at first glance, consolidates 
when you look again” (ibid: 14). Autism can be viewed at “first glance”, in 
Serres’ terms, as the country rat, which is hesitant to return after the farmer’s 
noisy disruption. They “could live on simple and easy chains, but… is horrified of 
the complex. (They do) not understand that chance, risk, anxiety and even 
disorder can consolidate a system” (ibid 14). However, when viewed through the 
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lenses provided by Hacking’s notion of the autistic manifold, the spectrum is 
replaced by the metaphor of the manifold as “Varied or diverse in appearance, 
form or character, having various forms, features, relations and applications… 
Manifolds are not simply linear; they come in any number of dimensions” 
(Hacking, 2010: 635). The possibility of multiple manifestations has the 
important implication that autistic behaviours, characteristics and issues, are not 
solely confined to the people with autism as a bounded subject. Rather, they 
emerge in relation to specific contexts and thus, habitual sensory relations are 
relational domains. The concern to view parasitic relations as at once negative 
and disruptive, a neutral mediating force of social and natural systems and as a 
positive force that can lead to novel conceptualisations and ways of being, is 
important for thinking about how to conceive of autism in the context of being a 
disability or as an extension of human neurodiversity.  
 
 
One way we can relate Serres’ insights into disability studies of the senses more 
generally is from the perspective of “dis/ability” studies (Goodley and Runswick-
Cole, 2014). This approach to dis/ability acknowledges that many disabled 
people want and desire to engage with modernist, liberal and humanist ideals 
and identifications such as human rights, independence and equal employment 
opportunities. At the same time, the means through which this is made possible 
often requires us to think again about the kinds of relations necessary in order to 
achieve these aims. In other words, disability “disses” (disrespects) ideas of 
ability such that we can think of “discapitalism”, “disindependence” for example 
(Goodley and Runswick-Cole, 2014: 2). Dis/ability requires us to accept the fact 
that for people with disabilities, the relations of wage labour, for example, are 
inherently ableist in their assumptions of a healthy, flexible and forever self-
improving neoliberal subject8. Dis/ability “does some troubling work to the 
                                                          
8
 See Gunaratnam (2013) on the intersections between race, disability and forms of care 
enacted in increasingly neoliberal health care settings. Also see Berger and Mohr (2010) 
photographic portrayals of migrant labour conditions and motivations for striving to be 
increasingly flexible in the face of discrimination and humiliation.  
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register of the normal and the condition of the human” (Goodley and Runswick-
Cole, 2014: 5). Dis/ability constantly asks us to think again about what we know 
and keep the contradictory tensions of norms of human and disability in 
constant flux. As such, they should be “viewed as frictional: rubbing up against 
one another in interesting, dare we say, desirable ways” (ibid: 5).  
 
 
This friction-like desire precisely captures the positive, neutral and negative 
aspects of parasitical relations I have highlighted. Dis/ability both works the 
parasitical boundaries of the positive, neutral and negative modes of address, to 
make us aware of the fact that not even neurotypicals achieve the ideals of 
modern, liberal humanism. These virtuous abstractions parasitise our 
conception of what being human is. Goodley and Runswick-Cole refer to this as 
“the seductive nature of (hyper)ability” (Ibid: 5). Autistic modes of being rub 
against neurotypical notions of humanity and ask us to consider, in specific 
milieus, when desires for normative modes of relating are relevant and when the 
non-normative is most applicable for flourishing. I will return to these questions 
in the concluding chapter of the thesis and expand upon how the habitual, 
quasi-object and parasitic framework developed here can complement the 
dis/ability studies approach.    
 
 
As discussed, Serres is concerned to displace what he viewed as an over 
determining focus on language that reduced our embodied and conscious 
attention towards the sensory aspect of life. However, as Connor (1999) has 
noted, this almost vitriolic attack on language is a surprising exception to his 
overall intellectual strategy of breaking down dichotomies and showing how they 
imbricate and co-constitute one another rather than being mutually exclusive 
and opposed. His formulations uncharacteristically reify language as removing 
us from sensation. Autism troubles this formulation in the imbrication of 
language and sensory experience and can be precisely formulated in Serres’ 
terms of variegated folds. The use and deployment of special interest 
frameworks in social settings take varied forms, but can be shaped around the 
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following guiding principles. The first of these is the interplay between cognitive 
and sensuous capacities of discussions and re-enactments of particular aspects 
of a special interest. This might involve quoting a particular line from a film, 
which will often be in the stylised manner of the actor who spoke it. To what 
extent are these cognitive capacities aided by sensual, perhaps haptic 
memories of the emotions and contexts in which the event and utterance 
occurred. The utterance should not just be taken in a linguistic sense, but the 
affective capacities inflected in the tone, pitch and other factors of voice impact 
on the meaning and effect of given utterances.  
 
 
This relates to another known autistic trait of the difficulties and pleasures in the 
use of language. The former revolves around the literal understandings of 
metaphors, aphorisms and locally context bound statements that convey a 
group’s social and cultural knowledge and dynamics in linguistic codifications 
(Motamedi-Fraser, 2015). Autistic individuals often display a love of word play 
and this can further extend into playful experimentation with grammatical forms 
and semantic structure. Some key examples include repetition of a particular 
word that may be fixated upon due to confusion, curiosity or the pleasurable 
sound or, more crucially, the touch of the tongue and mouth movements in 
combination with the aural utterance. The arbitrary nature of language is 
revealed as words are taken from their contexts in sentence structure and come 
to form a life of their own in an affective and symbolic mode of autistic sociality.  
 
 
As Kanngieser (2012) notes, this capacity for tone, rhythm, timbre and other 
semio-affective phenomena, portrays a particular way of engaging with the 
political and performative dimensions of social life. Silence, for example during a 
conversation that has a momentum of turn taking, can abruptly distort this flow 
and bring attention to the fact that the aural and gestural atmosphere of the 
group takes on a life of its own. If we take a dialogic view of interaction as 
outlined by Bakhtin (1981), we can begin to note the senses of anticipation, 
preparation and co-construction of both listener and speaker positions. This 
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precisely concerns linguistic and material concerns given in a situation and thus 
cannot be abstracted purely to linguistic criteria. These examples showcase 
how the linguistic and sensory intertwine, but do not degrade from a sensory 
understanding of the world.  
 
 
Conclusion  
 
 
I wish to end this chapter by reminding the reader of the importance of 
integrating the social, biological and cultural in comprising a rich and nuanced 
account of sensory experience. The concern to encapsulate and develop such a 
framework is underscored by Serres approach to his work and the inspiration 
that it can foster. There are two ways in which his work relates to this project. 
First, his analytical strategy of searching for connections across the domains of 
natural and social sciences, humanities and arts, captures some of the 
background forces that inspire and drive this thesis. This is informed by a 
topological understanding of social relations and time in which the past, present 
and future all blend together in a topological space of intensities and boundary 
conditions. Serres famously uses the image of a crumpled handkerchief to 
demonstrate such a proposition where the creases and folds interrelate and 
weave each other’s connections and possibilities of existing and collaboration 
(Abbas, 2005: 3). Abbas further notes that for Serres’, the senses themselves 
are topological and quasi-objects in that the senses fold into each other and we 
can touch ourselves, be touched by others and thus involved in an active 
dynamic relation.  
 
 
Serres’ writing style is one that combines elegant prose consisting of poetry, 
myths, scientific facts and theories, creating one segment of rich imagery and in 
the next section, paragraphs of analytical insights that underpin his descriptive 
dimensions. As Johnsen (2005) comments, his work produces philosophy in the 
broadest possible sense and, does not write about philosophy as in 
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commentaries on ontology or metaphysics. While this chapter has followed a 
conventional academic style of outlining the literature concerning the thesis, two 
further chapters (Chapters 4 and 5), will begin to explore my own, embodied 
and sensual academic practice. Then, taking the lead from Vannini et al (2012), 
the empirical chapters will contain pertinent vignettes of sensory ethnographic 
events that serve to not only set the scene for the analytical context, but attempt 
to provide an entry point for the reader to gain a sense of the atmospheres, 
sense-scapes and dynamism that occurs with an emplaced methodology 
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Chapter 2 - Research Design and Methodology 
 
Introduction 
 
In this chapter I will discuss, describe and explore the methodological issues 
that were raised and put into practice during my research. The first section of 
the chapter will provide a breakdown of my research design, how I gained 
access to the field-site and the research methods employed, including open 
movement focus groups and participant-observation. Secondly, I will outline 
some methodological and practical challenges that arose from structuring my 
research in these particular ways. I will then go on to consider some 
representational concerns that arose from my sample that reflect on issues in 
autism research in general. I will then go on to describe my use of 
autoethnography in focusing on methodological issues in my research design. I 
will assess the potential of analytic autoethnography in thinking about my status 
and positionality. I will conclude by briefly introducing the next chapter.   
 
Gaining Access to The Field and Negotiating Research Design   
 
This section will outline the processes of setting up the entry into the fieldwork 
sites and the practices that were pursued during the fieldwork.  
 
To begin with, the researcher contacted the head of the charity and the 
organiser of the clubs. The research was outlined to the gatekeepers as an 
exploratory and open-ended project and some of the practical activities that 
would be undertaken were outlined. My field site consisted of two clubs run by 
the charity, the Youth and Social Clubs. The details of each club are listed 
below:  
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1. Youth Club – Run each Wednesday from 6:00 – 8:00 at a local college in the 
Sixth Form common room, during school term times, with a one week break 
during half term, a 2 week break over each of the Christmas and Easter holidays 
and a 6-week break over the summer. The Youth Club is for young adults with 
autism aged 18-25 who attend independently. The group is primarily a leisure 
and social group, where the young members play board games, Wii console 
games and pool games and take part in time specific activities such as outdoor 
football during June and July.   
 
2. Social Club – This club runs fortnightly on Tuesdays from 6:00 – 8:00 at the 
same local college as the Youth Club. This club is for adults over the age of 25 
and has a similar role for members as the Youth Club. Many of the same 
activities take place and the same breaks over the school term apply to this 
club.  
 
A number of pragmatic and boundary setting issues arise from the above 
arrangements. The first is that once members of the Youth Club reach the age 
of 25, they can no longer attend the Wednesday Youth Clubs and must attend 
the Tuesday Social Clubs. This age boundary does not apply however to special 
events such as Halloween and Christmas parties or to club trips to external 
locations such as museums. As such, my presence in both clubs did not have 
an overlap of participants and I thus could attend to the age specific differences 
between the two clubs. The primary difference that I noted was the preference 
of the Social Club members for more sedentary activities like trivia or board 
games or extended conversations, whereas the Youth Club members preferred 
more energetic activities such as ping pong or football and were more physical 
and excitable than the older members of the Social Club. The age range of the 
members of the Youth Club extended from 18 to 25 with the members 
comprising around 18 males and 5 females. The Social Club members were a 
mixture of people aged in their mid-twenties, early thirties, mid-fifties and early 
sixties, with the members comprising around 14 males and 3 females.  
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Gaining access to the fieldsite required careful negotiation with the Outreach 
Coordinator and Club Leader, who headed both the Youth and Social Clubs. 
Electronic correspondence was sent to the Head of Outreach Services at the 
charity during the summer of 2014 that led to a number of face-to-face meetings 
being held. This period of interaction was crucial in shaping the research 
design, which required compromises on both sides. I will first deal with the 
practical decisions during the negotiation and gaining access phase of the 
project. These gatekeeper meetings were held to establish the parameters of 
the research, for the researcher to gain a sense of the expectations and 
knowledge of the club staff on the habits, personalities and suitability of the club 
members and for the Outreach Staff to assess the level of suitability of the 
material developed for the research such as the information sheet and consent 
form. The Outreach Staff pointed to the diverse range of abilities, interests and 
motivations of the members who attended the clubs and were concerned that 
the research would disrupt these motivations. The clubs where viewed as 
places were members could go for leisure and to interact with other members. 
The other members were often their friends and they had often known each 
other very well over a number of years. Staff also raised the question of how to 
negotiate the boundaries between the participants in the research and members 
of the club who were not involved. The researcher sought to explain the role of 
consent in a long-term, open-ended project and discussed the possibilities of 
creating a fluid boundary between these two groups. The concern around 
disruption was also inflected with considerations around how those with autism 
prefer routine and familiarity and that the research process would disrupt a 
familiar and “safe” space for the members (Wick and Reason, 2009). A further 
temporal dimension was brought to my attention, as the club staff noted that due 
to the short duration of the clubs, around 2 hours, outside of special trips and 
events, and their weekly or bi-weekly occurrence, to have the research sessions 
too close together would be difficult for members. I address each of these 
concerns throughout this chapter.  
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Based on these factors, we decided that it would be best to space the focus 
group sessions to be one per month, so as not to be too disruptive to the 
members club activities. My participation within the club would be in relation to 
the activities and discussions that emerged naturally and this is where the focus 
on favourites became central. This allowed me to take part in these activities 
without needing to ask “awkward” questions about their activities. As a new 
member of the club, I could ask about and observe the ways in which existing 
members interacted with each other and engaged in activities in a naturalistic 
way.  
 
When I initially introduced myself to the clubs via a brief, five-minute overview 
presentation of my research, I was unsure how the club members would react, 
let alone whether they would be in any way interested in taking part. However, 
in discussions with several interested members, some of whom would later go 
on to become participants, I discovered that the emphasis I placed on the use of 
qualitative and exploratory approaches was reassuring. Furthermore, this 
reassurance was also one of renewed interest in research requests as it differed 
from certain kinds of research projects some older participants of the Social 
Club took part in the past. This was research that involved filling in 
standardised, quantitative, psychology focused surveys that left little space for 
personal experience or exploratory expansion on the questions being asked. 
For many of the club members, this type of uniform, static and stultifying 
research was something they took part in because they were accustomed to this 
type of research. However, they often did not feel that much was gained from 
such research as the results were measured, codified and disseminated often in 
ways that were not immediately relatable to their own circumstances. They were 
either presented in near inaccessible form in academic journal articles or made 
to fit policy initiatives or agendas that were obliquely mentioned in information 
regarding the context of the research. In such research, discussions of the 
conditions of how the research was produced or which demands it was being 
tailored to meet could not be discussed. This led to a greater sense of rapport 
with the members as they viewed me as just another member with an interest in 
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their habitual and sensory experiences rather than my presence being solely 
defined by my academic interest. My long-term involvement in the clubs helped 
me to establish and maintain this awareness and conversations about my 
research entered into group discussions in a casual way rather than being 
marked as an “outsider” topic that was separate from the ordinary activities of 
the club space.  
 
The next two sections will break down my use of ethnographic participant 
observation and focus group methods in my research. I will outline the factors 
that shaped my appreciation and framing of the club space and the focus group 
dynamics that I considered in developing my research.  
 
Ethnographic Fieldwork and the Club Space 
 
My participant observation comprised partaking in and observing activities, 
including: discussions about topics of the week such as school work, job issues 
or progress in hobbies such as drawing or favourite games. A storage cupboard 
in the club room housed a number of board and other games that were often 
used by members for spontaneous play. These were complemented by more 
permanent fixtures in the club room such as air hockey, snooker and ping pong 
tables. Here, members challenged each other and set up friendly rivalries, in 
which no money was involved, and they recorded their wins and losses. On a 
more mediated front, a TV screen had been installed at the back of the room 
and on occasion this used to watch events like football matches, if enough 
members were interested, or to screen DVDs of films or sitcoms, for instance, 
that the members had brought from home. A further role the TV served was to 
stream digital radio stations. Playing music could also be handled by a sound 
system in a separate room at the back to play custom music tracks. Another TV 
in the back right corner housed a Wii games console, which was often used in 
tandem with the central TV to play multiplayer games such as Wii Sports or 
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Mario Kart Wii. In the light of these observations, the fieldwork activities 
included participating in these activities and noting the ways in which sensory, 
spatial and temporal dynamics were handled by the individuals and groups. I 
took note of the different ways in which the members negotiated their different 
sensory thresholds and the means through which they sought to solve problems 
with regard to intensive positive sensory interaction. My field-notes were thus 
full of sensory detail including the smell of food brought in, the interaction of the 
two TV’s sound levels and how different tempos of music and visual activity 
interrupted other activities like board games or faded into the background. I also 
went beyond the classic five senses by, for example considering the different 
modalities of movement in which the members engaged such as maintaining 
conversations while keeping track of their points and turn taking when playing 
pool. I also kept notes of the different personalities of the club members who 
were part of the focus groups and signed consent forms to take part in the 
research.  
 
While I kept notes of non-participant club members, as much as possible, I have 
not used these observations in the thesis because of a lack of explicit consent. 
These “extended” field-notes were to remind me of the context and relationships 
between members and their relational interactional dynamics. For those who 
signed consent forms to formally take part in the research, once initial consent 
had been given, I with the club leader at the start of each focus group whether 
consent was still applicable for each participant. We thus enacted a form of 
“negotiated consent”; where attitudes towards consent can change over time, 
based on participants’ engagement with the research, and where negotiation is 
not based on a deductive code of ethics, but rather considers discussions of 
what consent means across the period of research (Moody, 1992). Because the 
participants attended independently, without a designated carer, or parental 
supervision, I did not seek to gain consent from these parties. However, I did 
seek informal secondary consent from the club leader by corroborating with her 
several times over the course of the research to confirm that members were still 
happy to take part in the research. In ethnography, consent is negotiated and 
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reconfigured over time (Adler and Adler, 2002) and is relational and sequential 
rather than a pre-determined contract (Katz and Fox, 2004). In order to reduce 
the number of foreseeable risks (Corrigan, 2003) in the research such as 
subjecting participants to unpleasant sensory or social situations, I made explicit 
to members that topics related to favourites would be emphasised throughout 
my research.  
 
A further central activity of the clubs is the numerous trips that are held 
throughout the year. These were to places within South East England and 
featured a number of different activities from visiting theatre shows or zoos, to 
seaside trips and theme parks. These events are funded by the charity and 
places are given out on a first-come first-served basis. Members who come 
along often meet at the nearest local public transport location, often a train 
station, for a specific time, travel together to the nearest stop and walk the rest 
of the way. These events allowed the research to incorporate a further mobile 
dimension, whereby the individually, routinely and habitually planned out routes 
of travel could be complemented by more unstructured situations. However, this 
unstructured nature was only in regard to the fact that the routes and personal 
comportments performed on them required more rigorous attention to detail. 
The routes are outlined in detail for service users by letters or emails to allow 
them a large amount of preparation time to adapt to how this might alter their 
everyday routines and to organise for these events. Nonetheless, these trips 
enabled me to compare a relatively “bounded fieldsite” (Candea, 2013) of the 
club space to several multi-sited ones. My research and note taking priorities 
remained the same as on the club site, but incorporated how the habits and 
routine engagements uncovered during the club sessions compared to the open 
nature of public places. I will explore the dynamics of the urban locations in 
which these trips took place in Chapter 3.  
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This is not to say that I fully engaged with a multi-sited ethnographic project as 
there were multiple practical and time management issues that arose. During 
the course of my research, the charity was expanding its services to include 
other boroughs aside from the one where my fieldsite was located. Just before I 
contacted the charity about the possibility of undertaking the project, the central 
administrative office for the organisation moved location to a better, centralised 
location to manage and develop more boroughs in which to provide services. 
This altered my perception of the boundedness of the project with my initial 
perception of the Youth and Social Clubs and evoked a sense of spatial and 
contextual renegotiation in terms of my own cognitive and spatial map(s) of the 
research. This expansion and foregrounding of previously distant institutional 
relations speaks to the multiple layerings of spatial and temporal scales that 
takes place, even within “single-sited” ethnographies.  
 
As Candea (2013) reminds us, even small, tightly bound communities have 
members who develop and inhabit these spaces who have a variety of partial 
connections, where: “every encounter, every story, spoke of a different vector, a 
different temporal and spatial direction” (Candea, 2013: 252). As such, while my 
research focuses on two different groups within the same “site”, this site was 
over the course of my research, ever-expanding with new boroughs and groups 
attempting to be integrated into the charity’s infrastructure. In tandem with this, 
new services and locations were constantly being introduced to members with 
many anxiously inquiring into “project updates” across my research period. A 
primary example of this was the in construction “Hub”. This hub was to provide a 
centralising locus of services such as information, diagnosis, recreational 
activities and clubs. It was also open to being potentially reconfigured due to 
members interests. From my perspective as a researcher, I was also being 
introduced to these new initiatives in much the same way as the members. I, 
however, had no ethnographic interest in following these up as they would serve 
to complicate and expand the research into institutional and networked 
phenomena to which I could not do justice to. I have simply provided these 
details to give ethnographic and methodological context and not as an object of 
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study in and of itself, as part of a “multi-sited” ethnography. The location I chose 
is thus not an “arbitrary” one, in that it evacuates itself of meaning so that a 
study of an abstract, theoretical entity can take place (Candea, 2007: 179-180). 
Despite the partial connections of the members and the institutional networks of 
my research site, I want to keep the bounded specificities of the club space in 
mind as a distinct and real entity that has effects and does not allow space to 
cut through meaning (ibid: 180). This is in order to highlight the ways in which 
habitual and sensory favourites are shaped in a defined location so as to reveal 
their contextually specific dynamic complexity (Candea, 2007: 179, Savransky, 
2016a).  
 
As Fine (2010) argues, the key to studying local communities ethnographically 
is to focus upon the contextually spatial, temporal and relational dynamics of 
specific cultural and social groupings. Fine further argues that the spatial 
context of where a social group meets is important in structuring the kind of 
tempos of interaction that emerge and either become routine or are 
spontaneous. At the clubs, it was often the case that some members would 
utilise the common room’s music player and speakers or the television screen to 
watch events such as football or play music via digital TV stations. As the clubs 
were held in locations not owned by the club members or the charity itself, they 
were bound by the regulations of the institutions in which they were held, a local 
college Sixth Form common room. The capacity for the club members to 
structure and utilise the space in the way they wished was limited to some 
extent. However, this did not prevent members and staff from rearranging 
furniture and items within the club space. In the terms of Evans and Boyte 
(1986), the participants and members created a “free space” in which they could 
establish their own forms of communicational and spatial structural and micro-
interactional social logic. The staff gatekeepers positioned the space during the 
negotiation process as one that was primarily geared towards recreational and 
leisure based activities. However, if a club member wanted to discuss an issue 
related to personal anxiety or social transition such as resolving or getting 
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support around employment or education issues, they could take a staff 
member aside and discuss the topic and develop strategies to resolve it.  
 
This did not mean that the group’s structure or members became undone; nor 
did the routines and habits that made up the interactional rituals of the group. 
New staff members and organisers were introduced to the club members. They 
asked them how things have been structured by other staff and treated 
members as experts in the process. One new staff member, who was 
introduced to the group during a trip to a seaside town, brought up the annual 
tradition in the club of a day trip to Thorpe Park, which many of the participants 
looked forward to and which was enshrined and recognised in publications sent 
to members from the charity. These factors point to a number of key features 
that sustain and constitute a social group, a recognition and application of the 
power of “knowing into telling”, or entangling the past into the present to 
demonstrate group bonding, membership and recognition. The second key 
feature refers to what Goffman calls a group’s “referential afterlife” (1981: 46). 
This refers to the capacity of social groups to develop a specific” idioculture” that 
marks them out as a specific socio-cultural group and goes on to develop into 
recognisable values, routines and norms that enable a shared understanding. 
This historical process is not perfect and is as infallible and biased as the 
group’s memory practices and actions make it out to be, although the core 
dynamics remain intact and traditions continue as new members are introduced 
and old members leave. Having knowledge and understanding of these shared 
references is crucial to interpreting and understanding the place and importance 
of the chosen favourites of the participants and serves as a reminder that the 
group meetings are part of a continuum of activities within the duration of the 
club and the boundaries between these two dimensions are interlocking and 
affect each other.  
 
I now turn to the use of focus groups in my research and the issues I worked 
through in their utilisation.  
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Focus Group Methodological Considerations 
 
Focus groups, being a method that engages with group dynamics, brings with it 
issues of power in negotiating the terms of how interactions should take place. I 
will engage with these more localised forms of power relations below. First, I 
want to address some of the wider structural issues that impact on the use of 
focus groups with disabled and vulnerable groups.  
 
Some researchers have argued that structures and institutions of power 
relationships enacted in classrooms and border control and arguably disability 
monitoring regimes, are reproduced in social research that utilise interviews in 
the standard structured or semi structured format. This can be found in interview 
research that tries to bracket off the dynamism of social life by conducting 
research in quiet rooms with dominant researchers probing participants for 
information (Sinha and Back, 2014). The sociality of research interactions is lost 
in this context. Sinha and Back argue that these sterile conditions are related to 
a form of “ethical hypochondria” (Sinha and Back, 2014: 484), where 
researchers fear and desire to maintain and enforce dominant and conservative 
ethical codes of conduct in order to keep professional standing and prevent 
negative repercussions on their careers or the institutions they are associated 
with. In this research climate, not wanting to reproduce these dominant research 
relationships of power is very much welcomed, but poses a problematic 
relationship to working with autistic individuals. Producing interviews that are 
imbued with sociality, as Sinha and Back have done, serves to reproduce power 
imbalances via intense socialities and sensory ambiences. However, the 
practicalities of not wanting to demarcate participants from other club members 
meant that I did conduct the focus groups within the activities of the club space. 
I shall return to this below. Thus, could not reliably audio record the discussions 
and thus do not have a one-to-one transcript. I did not want to codify my 
participants responses by recording them and relying on the crutch of audio 
recording. As Back (2012) has noted, sociological reliance on the audio recorder 
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has left other senses neglected and provided the spoken words of research 
participants with unwarranted solidity. This then leads to wanting to stay true to 
the words of respondents without allowing for interpersonal dialogue between 
participants and researchers. In order to combat this sense of sensory reliance 
on verbal responses, I only made a note of the most important quotes from 
members and participants, which contributed to a sensory analysis, rather than 
rely solely on words. My field-notes included, as I have noted above, sensory 
descriptions and interpersonal negotiations. This meant that I could vividly 
recapture the sensory dynamics unfolding across my field-notes via what Myers 
(2016) has termed “energetic” or “gestic” data analysis. This refers to the 
capacity of the body and mind to trace and remember lines of movement, 
gestures and other sensory modalities to transduce social and material actions 
in research. This can be combined in tandem with the senses’ capacity to recall 
and invoke memories (Vannini et al, 2012) of interactions, along with bodily 
memoires and movements of thoughts and actions to develop a sensory 
engagement with my research.  
 
Nonetheless, it is still necessary to take into account the very real power 
imbalances that such a static and linear notion of research relations entails. As 
a vulnerable research population, the autistic adults in this research have been 
scrutinised and subjected to discursive and material disciplinary techniques 
such as Annual Reviews, diagnostic assessments, support workers and 
assistants at school, and as such, this research did not want to place upon the 
group an additional burden that did not incorporate their interests. The use of 
exploratory and open discussions serves to get away from relying upon what 
Gallagher and Gallagher (2008) term “schooled docility”, where tasks such as 
filling in worksheets that reinforce the dominant and institutionalised power roles 
of schools where student and teacher are arranged in hierarchical and unequal 
power relations. Some of the participants attended college or Sixth Form and so 
this aspect became more pertinent and drew more attention to this dynamic in 
the consideration of the research relations and tasks. Equally, as I have already 
noted, the standardised psychological research which the members had taken 
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part served to reproduce these unequal forms of power relations and I did not 
want my research to be another forgettable and inconsequential event in my 
participants lives. I thus sought to view my participants as co-researchers who 
could reframe my conceptualisations and allow them to reframe my research 
concerns and aims.  
 
As I have noted thus far, my research was based on the sensory and habitual 
experiences and relationships of autistic favourites. The participatory emphasis 
allowed me to develop an informed and co-constituted analytical practice.  
These empirical observations initially underwent deductive analysis by 
considering how my general terms such as the parasite, quasi-object, favourites 
and atmospheres, impacted on my empirical data. This led me to confirm that 
the notions of parasite and quasi-object were applicable to many of the 
empirical examples I discuss in the thesis. For example, Chapter 3 showcases 
the centrality of “habitual favourites” to the idea of parasite relations, structured 
by the logic of the quasi-object concept. This framing then underwent a further 
process of analysis where I sought to inductively work through my core 
concepts in relation to my empirical data. In relation to chapter 3, I realised that I 
needed to specify and make the concept of the quasi-object more specific by 
developing the notion of the “social” quasi-object to explore the specific 
modalities of action specific quasi-objects. Rather than emphasising my own 
researcher centred development of technical and abstract hypotheses away 
from my participants responses (Grbich, 2012: 87), I paid attention to the ways 
in which my interactions with the participants and their spatial, temporal and 
value positions impacted on my analysis in a co-constructed manner (Charmaz, 
2006). For example, the concept of social quasi-objects arose to do justice to 
the empirical detail of my participants engagement with me. I will explore these 
positionalities in detail in the autoethnography section of this chapter.  
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A number of issues arise from the development of a participatory approach that 
can be raised and made directly relevant to this research project. The first of 
these, outlined by Holland et al (2010), points to the ethical and moral agenda of 
many participatory projects with children and young adults which posits that the 
power relations between adult or more senior researchers and participants, 
understood as emerging through agential processes and structures via their 
own voices. This creates a research relationship that assumes a focus on these 
power relations that is too static attributes static qualities to the concepts that 
participants receive and possess and which are given to them via the 
researcher. This emphasis on “participation”, per se, is paradoxically very one 
sided in that this participatory focus is not expanded to include the researchers 
capacity to be affected by the participants. As Thomson argues (2007), 
participants and researchers, whether children, young adults, vulnerable, skilled 
or amateur, should be positioned as “becomings”, which posits subjects as 
relational and enacted performatively in specific social and cultural contexts. 
When framed like this, it is possible to examine relations of vulnerability in 
relation not just to the socio-structural position of the participants, but also to 
that of the researcher. Being a sociological research with autism means that 
some of the sensory pleasures and problems of social interaction with club 
members will be familiar to me at a level of personal experience not possible for 
non-autistic researchers. As such, returning to Holland et al’s work, the 
researcher is just as susceptible to sensory cycles and disruptions as the 
participants, thereby the boundaries of vulnerability are relationally distributed. 
Power relations cannot then be simply conceived as one group having power 
over another, but are seen as a process that does not exist unmediated 
(Holland et al, 2010: 362-363). I again return to these issues in the fieldsite later 
in the chapter.  
 
In this case, I wanted my participants to be seen as “peer researchers”, 
exploring and showing me what factors matter most to them in relation to their 
sensory experiences and favourite activities. Such a move was not 
unproblematic, however, and required a responsible consideration of the 
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consequences, benefits and drawbacks. Those with autism are likely to be 
socially withdrawn and as such they are more likely to experience isolation and 
loneliness (van Roekel et al, 2010). This is often reinforced through peer 
victimisation and a lack of access to supportive peers (Cappadocia et al, 2012). 
It is thus important to conduct focus group research in settings that are 
supportive and with people that the participants know and are comfortable with. 
One particularly relevant point when working with a group in which potentially 
not all of the members will become participants or peer researchers is to how 
they go on to deal with their “participation capital” (McCartan et al, 2012). In 
other words, the position of being a researcher participant or co-researcher 
reworks the boundaries, expectations and roles of the said relationships. This, 
paradoxically, reinstates the researcher/participant or adult/young person 
relation, as, by being a part of the research they gain insights, skills and 
interactions that their peers may not possess (Connolly, 2008). It may be the 
case that such participants do not need empowerment or a degree of influential 
power relations, as their willingness to step forward to take part in the research 
already indicates a certain degree of skills appropriate for the task decided by 
themselves, or relevant gatekeepers (Jones, 2000). I sought to avoid these 
problems by reassuring the participants that whatever modality of expression 
was best for them to convey their thoughts was OK, no matter what this 
involved. This attitude was present amongst the participants. For example, 
participant Josh encouraged Julia to display her affection for toy dolls by rubbing 
their hair to express her pleasure through bodily and verbal stims or sporadic 
and spontaneous bursts of movement, emotion or verbal noise. She thus 
conveyed the pleasure she got from the tactile sensations this brought her. No 
judgement or disapproval was shown and Josh and the other members were 
happy that the usually shy, non-talkative Julia was communicating an important 
sensory experience to the group in her own terms. Equally, I utilised gestic 
sensory recording to recall the tactile and vocal pleasures that Julia displayed 
and became affected by her displays.  
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The use of a focus group-like structure for the research supports the statement 
made by Cambridge and McCarthy (2001) that focus groups enable those with 
disabilities to engage in safe places, develop confidence and experience peer 
support and recognition of the issues and challenges, as well as the positive 
aspects that come with social interaction. Barr et al (2001), outlines some of the 
practical aspects of carrying out research with disabled people. The first of 
these is the importance of utilising spaces where the group of interest meet up. 
The use of the public space of the Youth/Social Clubs was central in this 
respect. As a consequence of this production and reproduction of spatial and 
temporal interactional spaces, Barr et al (2001) note the importance of 
established friendships as well as the understanding and reciprocal knowledge 
of the difficulties and quirks of living with shared disabled characteristics, which 
leads to an emergent feedback from each other rather than the researcher. This 
led me to develop a free-movement focus group structure in which the 
participants could move in and out of the focus group space depending on their 
interests or whether they were being called to take part in other activities in the 
club. This prevented me as a researcher from creating an absolute boundary 
between the research activities and the club activities. I did not wish to encroach 
upon the creation of “free spaces” (Evans and Boyte 1986), and, allowed me to 
keep a sense of the idiocultures of the members in the club space. Being 
engaged with other members and the club space in this way enabled 
participants to engage in focus groups within a context that was recognisable to 
them. Because the interactional framework was familiar, sensory thresholds9 
were kept within manageable limits and the ambient background sensory 
experiences were comfortable for participants.  
 
 
 
 
                                                          
9
 See Chapter 3 for a discussion of sensory thresholds for those with autism in Smith and Sharp 
(2013).  
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Furthemore, I recognised the differing levels of attention required in a formal 
focus group setting and I could work with this notion rather than resisting 
potential disruption. It was important for me to not see these disruptions as 
negative but rather see them as a part of working with and expanding how 
disability impacts on the focus group requirements of equal and open 
communication and fixed time sessions (Kaehne and O’Connell, 2010: 135-
136). In order to keep the rapport and not deprive them of their leisure time 
unnecessarily, I gave pause to the discussion if the participants were asked 
something by other members and I did not “discipline” them to engage. This 
integrated and shared sense of understanding enabled a performative 
understanding of focus group communication where meaning and 
understanding were transformed (Markovà et al, 2007). I sought to respect and 
incorporate the idiocultures and free spaces that members and participants 
created during each club session and this in turn helped create rapport and 
respect. A problem that arose due to the club members knowing each other for 
many years was that the group power dynamics were simply reproduced and 
redirected in a focus group context (Baker and Hinton, 1999). In this case, much 
of the discussion could be centred on a consensus of group opinion or guided 
by the researcher or moderator to fit with the specific aims of the research rather 
than allowing for “off-topic” talk. (Caretta and Vacchelli, 2015). Again, I did not 
wish to redirect these tangents and found that participants, particularly the 
Social Club members, were respectful of the research group set-up. This was a 
result of the emphasis on integration of research and participatory activity 
developing rapport with members.  
 
The club leader was very generous in offering to be a moderator for the focus 
group sessions. This was done so that the participants would feel more at ease 
when the “formal” aspects of the research situation were undertaken. Members 
had a friendly relationship with the club leader, but, disciplinary action was taken 
when necessary to resolve conflict or work through concerns. As such, light-
hearted teasing and joking was mixed with disciplinary authority and reassuring 
confiders. This also had the effect of giving the appointed moderator a sense of 
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importance in ensuring that the focus group sessions were productive. It has 
been seen that moderators, who are not the main researchers, want to give 
relevant and useful data back to the lead researchers in order to maintain 
existing power relations of status and reputation (Baker and Hinton, 1999). 
Caretta and Vacchelli sought to avoid these biases impacting on their research 
by appointing two moderators for each group to collaboratively and reflexively 
explore any issues that arose (Caretta and Vacchelli, 2015). In my case, my one 
moderator was not given theoretical context or an outline of what I wished to 
discuss during each group. Therefore, they did not seek to corroborate findings, 
they made sure that participants were comfortable and could detect any 
imminent issues that might arise due to anxieties participants might have. I felt 
this role was more important for my participants. Rather than me going around 
and asking each club member to come together for the focus groups, the 
moderator gave brief reminders a week before and during the evening of the 
focus group. I return to the ambiguity of the disciplinary and friendship 
relationship of members and staff later in the chapter. Fraser and Fraser (2001) 
suggest that the often recommended size of focus groups of between 6-10 
participants should be revised downwards when engaging with disabled 
participants, as being able to follow along and communicate effectively is more 
important than the type of communication utilised. However, the aforementioned 
familiarity and production of a safe space for the participants allowed for a group 
of 6 to effectively work together to ensure that each member of the group 
participated and was comfortable in doing so. Indeed, the group dynamics 
between the participants helped corroborate and nuance my ethnographic field-
notes in regard to these same, dynamics specifically in relation to their habitual 
favourites.  
 
A central issue with participatory approaches that I have sought to expand with 
discussions of the parasite is the idea that a “safe space” for research is 
required in order to create a productive and comfortable working environment. 
The notion of a safe space, seen through the light of Habermasian 
Communicative Action theory, assumes that if enough discussion and 
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interaction occurs, then, eventually, some form of consensus will emerge. “Ideal 
Speech Acts”, refer to the outcome of these processes in which the testing out 
and interactional debate leads to a form of consensus requiring 
“comprehensibility and its claims to objective truth; its normative rightness; and 
its expressive sincerity” (Wick and Reason, 2009: 245). This process is 
problematic within the framework of the parasite as it privileges consensus and 
clarity when these qualities in social interaction are the exception, not the rule. 
However, Wick and Reason go beyond this to suggest the setting up of safe 
spaces within the context of a communicative space:   
 
is embodied in networks of actual persons […] A communicative 
space is constituted as issues or problems are opened up for 
discussion, and when participants experience their interaction as 
fostering the democratic expression of diverse views” (Kemmis, 
2001: 100).   
 
Safe spaces require recognition of the fact that such processes are indeed ideal 
in the sense that the investment required to create such spaces is fraught with 
material, political and cultural challenges. The question of creating a safe, 
communicative space means: 
 
being in that delicate place where lifeworld meets the system, a 
liminal, in-between space where two opposing qualities meet... 
these are not restful places but continually changing and offering 
new possibilities and challenges (Wick and Reason, 2009). 
 
The lifeworld and system are concepts explicitly drawn from Habermas’ “theory 
of communicative action” (1984). The lifeworld references the symbols used by 
individuals and groups to represent society. This forms the ground from which 
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communities develop shared notions of who they are and what kinds of values 
they wish to embody and express (ibid: 245). These are qualitative processes 
that are developed through communication. The system, in contrast, refers to 
institutions that seek to reproduce social order through efficiency, predictability 
and control (ibid: 246). These are economic and bureaucratic and operate via 
hierarchical and dominating power structures. In modernity, the system has 
removed itself from the lifeworld so that the values developed in communication 
are not congruent with the system (Frank, 2000). In Serres terms, the system is 
trying to break the chain of parasitism but in so doing, is creating its own form of 
“third” relation by “colonising” the lifeworlds through economic and political 
processes of neoliberal capitalism and the politically invested interest in 
redistributing wealth and power to those with already immense wealth and 
power (Kemmis, 2001).  
 
Habermas’ strict demarcation of these two domains does not account for the 
fact that the lifeworld and system can embody their opposite’s characteristics 
and thus the processes that enable these phenomena are often underplayed. 
This inherent tension has led to differing descriptions and conceptions of what 
communicative, safe spaces are in practice and methodology. Wadsworth 
(2005: 431) describes creating participatory research spaces as offering 
“containers” for developing democratic, non-biased and open discussions. 
Hence, ignoring the ways in which the research impacts on this contained space 
leak out into the vectors of differentially distributed times and spaces of 
individuals in local communities, as noted by Candea (2013). Other researchers 
have noted that in supporting women in maximum security prisons to: “craft the 
research questions, challenge each other to assure that varied standpoints 
(were) represented…, work(ing) through the specific of design, data collection, 
analysis and products” (Fine and Torre, 2006: 257), is to recognise that, as bell 
hooks notes, these are “space(s) of radical openness… a margin - a profound 
edge. Locating oneself there is difficult yet necessary. It is not a “safe” place. 
One is always at risk” (bell hooks, 1984: 149). Risk here should not be 
understood as being made to feel uncomfortable or distressed and my desire to 
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focus on favourites and not negative interactions is a direct response to this. 
Rather, researchers and participants should be willing to share, discuss and 
resolve dilemmas that arise during the research.   
 
The research and participant communities that are created in this liminal nexus 
are thus dynamic and open to both “ideal” communicative development and 
tense, disruptive and contradictory relations of unease, personal and structural 
divides and power inequities. While I did not utilise a fully participatory action 
research approach in this project, this question of communicative spaces 
speaks to several issues that I pre-empted and discovered whilst doing the 
project. On the positive side, there were many moments where members 
reinforced a focused and unfaltering commitment to accepting the ways in which 
each member’s autism manifested itself. This helped in facilitating a comforting 
and familiar ethos from which any discussion or topic could be framed. 
Furthermore, this commitment to diversity enabled more honest and open 
discussions of favourites and sensory experience, including discussing 
emotional outbursts and engagement in activities that might be deemed deviant. 
Participant Phil, for instance, spoke of his unsocial approach to anger in which 
he sometimes felt that he wanted to destroy the Jobcentre building he visited.  
Participants were able to explore and in some cases recognise the way in which 
the parasitical relations between the lifeworld and system played out for them. 
For example, Josh saw structural inequalities in which those with criminal 
records could get job interviews, yet his social and emotional difficulties, due to 
his autism, prevented him from getting the same kinds of interviews.  
 
The conflict between the lifeworld and system can further be specified in relation 
to wider institutional issues concretely in these interactions. As I came to learn 
over the course of my research, staff members were not allowed to interact with 
members as friends outside of the club or charity spaces. This meant that no 
phone numbers could be shared; no interactions could be had such as following 
or liking on social media sites like Facebook or Twitter. Furthermore, no meeting 
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up was allowed with members outside of the formal institutionalised spaces of 
the charity offices or locations where the activities and clubs were run. This was 
done in order to maintain a level of professional detachment and to remain 
value neutral when discussing and enacting medical, economic and political 
decisions and initiatives. On a structural level, this created difficulties with staff 
members being detached from management level decisions and simply being 
asked to enact them despite personal disagreement. On top of this, some of the 
staff and older Social Club members were dissatisfied with the neoliberal 
emphasis on marketization forced onto the charity sector by the coalition and 
conservative UK governments. With a lack of funding to make up the shortfall of 
these new directions, staff could only try to mediate the introduction of costs and 
fees for activities through exemptions for those with little money. On a local 
level, staff developed friendly relations with members that developed and 
matured over the course of my research period. The most prominent example 
was a staff member guiding, teaching and introducing a member who was an 
artist to new techniques, materials and styles of drawing to hone and develop 
his skills. This culminated with him presenting his work at art exhibitions within 
and beyond the charity’s events line-up. Specifically in relation to the focus 
group dynamics, the tension of authority and friendship was caught in the 
attachment and detachment logic of charity regulations and friendship norms.  
 
I did not seek to challenge this relationship of unequal power from the 
perspective of both sides. For the club leader as moderator, I relied upon their 
negotiation of the friend and authority roles they had to balance without me 
having to truly engage with the difficulties involved. Equally, I did not wish to 
engage with the staff and member frustration with the financial difficulties of the 
charity. I quickly realised, talking with another staff member, that engaging with 
these issues would lead my research onto an entirely different path. I did not 
have the theoretical resources or framing to consider the infrastructural 
concerns of the charity and staff members. In addition, it would place my access 
status in a difficult position in seeking to question administrative decisions and 
make my relationship with the club staff uncomfortable and take away from the 
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sensory and habitual focus of the research. I took part in discussion related to 
these issues when staff or members explicitly asked me, but I did not directly 
inquire into them. I did not want to create conflict or create “third” relations by 
adding conflict to the situation at hand. As such, my discussion here serves as a 
grounding context for my research practices.  
 
Methodological Challenges and Solutions 
 
The way in which my research design developed and emerged raised a number 
of challenges that I sought to work around. The desire not to disrupt the 
activities of the club, as I note in the focus group discussion, was driven by 
issues of power and openness in terms of movement during the focus group 
sessions alongside concerns about not wanting to disrupt the leisure activities of 
the club members. This led me to make a number of difficult decisions regarding 
taking field-notes and taking focus group transcripts. Conducting the focus 
groups within the club space itself prevented me from audio recording due to the 
high and unpredictable levels of background noise. I also wanted to prevent an 
unnecessary codification of the responses of my participants so as not to 
reproduce the standardised, quantitative responses to which my participants 
had become acclimatised. I include quotes from members that came from my 
“headnotes” (Ottenburg, 1990) in my empirical chapters where they are 
relevant, but I do not have verbatim transcripts of my focus group sessions. My 
memory of conversations was jogged by detailed records of how members 
interacted with each other, the mood and tone of a situation as well as notable 
body language and negotiations and conflicts between members. This situation 
was further compounded by the fact that I waited until the next morning in order 
to write-up my fieldnotes.  
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At first, I was unsure as to whether I should take breaks from my participatory 
engagement with the club activities and record my observations, or whether I 
should wait until the next morning to formally write up my notes from my 
memory of what had happened during each session. I made up my mind very 
quickly on this matter. During the first three weeks of my fieldwork, during one 
session, I decide to write down some observations in my notepad. Within five 
minutes, a club member came up to me and asked me, puzzled: “You’re not 
doing research now are you?” They were obviously distressed by me taking 
time out of the naturalistic activities of the club to act as a detached researcher. 
My transition from “insider” to “insider researcher” (Hodkinson, 2005: 136) had 
been disrupted in this moment and my participatory status was at risk. However, 
I found that acute attention to detail and taking part in the activities of the club 
allowed me to observe and track nuanced data much more empirically. As I 
moved around the club space, taking part in and watching different activities, I 
gained an enhanced sense of the sensory and habitual dynamics that 
underpinned the actions of the club members and my participants. Stepping 
away from the club activities to write down research notes would have meant 
missing important events and prevented the development of ongoing, 
theoretical and empirical categories. Some authors such as Roseneil (1993) 
have taken extended breaks after their research period. In Roseneil’s case, she 
took a break of four years in order to develop a critical distance from the political 
investment she had made with her female participants. Given the structure of a 
PhD thesis, I did not have the luxury of taking such a long period of time out 
between my research and write-up stages. I, like Hodkinson (2005), found that 
the practical elements of taking field-notes, conducting focus groups and 
comparing and redeveloping my theoretical questions in relation to my empirical 
data allowed me to develop from an insider to an insider researcher (Hodkinson, 
2005: 146). 
 
  
A more practical element of the focus group sessions, concerning the 
participatory idea to encourage the participants to bring in favourite objects, did 
not come to fruition. Many of the participants forgot about this aspect despite 
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keeping track of the dates we agreed for the next focus group. This can be 
attributed to me not wanting to keep reminding the participants a week before 
the session to bring something, which could have made it a disciplinary 
imperative, rather than a personal and independent action. The time gap of a 
month between focus group sessions was also detrimental to maintaining a 
sense of group participation and engagement with these group objectives. I 
explore in more detail in Chapter 3 the habitual mechanisms that broke down 
and were misaligned across a specific project in which several of the 
participants were engaged.  
 
This is not to say that my explicitly participatory and exploratory focus did not 
lead to positive interactions with my participants. They were very happy to wait 
for me to make adequate notes about their experiences. Participant Phil in 
particular, was anxious for me to get “good notes” for my research and to ensure 
that I got what I needed. To this end, he was even considerate enough during 
one focus group to draw me a diagram of his spatial mapping of the different 
routes he took and the meanings and emotions he had regarding the people 
and places he came across. (See Image 1 below for a scan of this diagram and 
my write-up of the many meanings it had for Phil when describing the diagram 
to me).  
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Image 1: Phil’s diagram of the routine, day to day activities he undertook in the 
year 2012. Below are some notes taken from my focus group sessions I made 
of the discussion I had with Phil regarding the meaning attributed to each 
section of the diagram:  
 
“Phil explained to me that the different “tabs”, as he called the bounded, named 
sections were important constellations of temporal and spatial meaning for him. 
The reason they are spaced out as they are is congruent with Phil’s notion that 
the people and activities inside of each tab should be kept separate from each 
other. If he encountered a person who was “supposed” to be in the Jobcentre 
“reality” and he met them at the volunteering building, he did not know how to 
act or make sense of these interactions. He described this crossover as akin to 
“strange TV crossovers”, where each tab represents a different TV channel. In 
order to be attentive to a tab, Phil needed to bracket off the other tabs and focus 
on the social and structural dynamics of his immediate spatial and temporal 
location. In addition, the barbed wire and explosives around the Jobcentre tab 
indicated his distress, pain and depression at being forced to go and 
represented his desire to completely eradicate the building so that he could let 
go of his negative associations” (From Fieldnote Journal).  
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Phil was happy to give me this diagram as he said that he kept files at home for 
each year of these kinds of spatial diagrams to help him visually and spatially 
record his routine movements and interactions. My use of gestic recollection 
was bolstered by this intervention. I believe that the emphasis on the exploratory 
and open aspect of the research contributed to Phil’s generosity in drawing a 
diagram and working through it with me. I got to gain a multimodal expression of 
habitual and routine engagement as well as the corroboration of Grandin’s 
(1986, 2000a) metaphors of files and tapes to bracket off information and 
meaningful interactions10. More than this, I gained a spatial appreciation of the 
kinds of relationships between the key locations in Phil’s day-to-day activities 
beyond just verbal or written description. Because I expressed a genuine 
interest in the different ideas and experiences of my participants and did not ask 
for answers to stick to pre-determined criteria, I found that my participants were 
more willing to enter into dialogue with me about these experiences.  
 
A Comment on Representational Bias  
 
A central issue that should be raised in relation to questions around research 
power relations and engagement comes from the composition of the focus 
groups and the clubs in general. The Youth and Social Clubs were both 
primarily dominated by male members with only 2 female members in the Social 
Club compared to 15 male members and 4 females in the Youth Club compared 
to 18 male members. While female members were part of the focus group 
sessions, the key examples I draw upon for my empirical chapters and their 
analysis and discussion are confined to the 4 male members who took part. I 
realise that this raises a number of important issues in relation to gender and 
autism that have foregrounded discussions on issues of diagnosis and the ways 
in which the diagnostic criteria are based on traits that are masculine biased. 
Depending on how you study and measure the gender differences in autism, the 
                                                          
10
 See Chapter 1 for a discussion of this point.  
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results can vary quite dramatically. Lorna Wing (1981) found that for young 
children with Asperger Syndrome, males were 15 times more likely to be 
diagnosed than women. For those with a form of learning difficulty and autism, 
the ratio was 2:1. More recently, Brugha et al (2009) found that the percentages 
of young adults with autism living in households in England was 1.8% for men 
and boys and 0.2% for women and girls. Returning to the original studies that 
defined autism and Asperger’s Syndrome, in Leo Kanner’s (1943) study, he 
observed that the male to female ratio was 4:1. Hans Asperger, who 
documented a similar yet different diagnosis of Asperger’s (1944), initially 
believed that females could not have autism of any form. He later had to revise 
this notion when empirical and clinical evidence showcased female diagnoses 
of autism and Asperger’s. These vast differences in diagnoses suggest that the 
diagnostic criteria and ways in which the behaviours and characteristics of 
autism are represented and shaped by cultural, social and gender norms, 
impact on what is counted as autism rather than the condition itself being 
inherently genetically determined by gender (Runswick-Cole et al, 2016). While 
this thesis cannot go into the intricacies or history of these debates regarding 
diagnostic criteria and gender in autism, I do feel that some points should be 
clarified in regard to the way in which my research took shape in relation to 
these issues from a methodological and specifically representational context.  
 
For example, some of the issues I go on to address regarding humour and in my 
empirical chapters (See Chapter 3) often took on a male-focused gaze in regard 
to sexuality and incorporated machismo elements of tongue-in-cheek 
knowingness in terms of objectifying and sexualising body parts. Group 
affirmation granted these forms of reference degrees of acceptability so that 
they were never questioned. Furthermore, while the special interests of the male 
members of the focus groups were based on repetition and routinised 
engagement such as playing with LEGO, the special interests of the girls were 
based on personal sensory interaction such as a sensory blanket providing 
comfort or female dolls wearing distinctive colours and exhibiting unique tactile 
responses. As Gould and Ashton-Smith (2011) argue, the focus on repetition in 
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special interests is based on male responses and behaviours which emerge 
from fact gathering and active learning. Girls are often more open to letting the 
world come to them and learn from observing from other people.  
 
In many respects, I can only speak of a “masculinist” version of autism in my 
research. My focus on favourite activities and their cyclical engagement 
reinforces and perhaps exaggerates the repetitive aspect of habitual 
engagement, without adequate attention to the learning to be affected by the 
emplaced milieu. This, unfortunately, has the effect of reinforcing the above-
mentioned gender stereotypes and does not provide a way to think about how 
structural and interactional norms and values around gender shape how we 
know about autism. Furthermore, I cannot speak in any informed or empirically 
focused way about ethnic differences or issues in relation to autistic 
experiences or diagnosis. This is something that is also lacking in the wider 
writing about disability, which has emerged from a primarily white, 
Euro/American context of writing, research and theoretical practices and 
development (Meekosha, 2011)11. The question and controversies around 
gender and in particular the male bias in both research and the very constitution 
of what autism is as a condition stemming from ideas of an “extreme male brain” 
(Baron-Cohen, 2002) have caused ethnic and gender differences to be an 
understudied area. I will speak again of these issues in the conclusion of the 
thesis and discuss ways of rectifying this neglect in my thesis for the future of 
the framework developed in this thesis. In doing so, I will show how the 
framework of “Dis/ability Studies” can serve to highlight the importance of, and 
theoretical nuance that can arise from intersectional disability analysis 
(Goodley, 2014). For the purposes of this chapter, I want to make readers aware 
of the biases inherent in my research sample and subsequent analyses.  
                                                          
11
 However, see for example Brezis (2012) and Shaked and Bilu (2006) for studies of ethnic and 
religious experiences for those with autism beyond the Global North. This can also be 
productively read alongside discussions of the importance of an “intersectional” analysis of 
class, gender, ethnicity and disability (See Goodley, 2014 Ch. 3, Meekosha and Shuttleworth, 
2009 and Shuttleworth and Meekosha, 2012). 
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Autoethnography and Complete Member Research 
 
Having outlined some of the practical issues that contributed to forming my 
research design, ethnographic practice and focus group organisation, I now 
wish to discuss some issues that arise when a researcher shares a social and 
cultural marker with their participants. Although I am dedicating two chapters of 
the thesis (Chapters 4 and 5) to autoethnographic concerns, I wish to introduce 
some elements here that pertain to methodological issues in connection with 
participant observation in an institutionally run club space.  
 
Autobiographical methods within sociology have been used and theorised most 
explicitly within a feminist perspective. I will now provide a brief outline of some 
of the key debates and features in this literature, before going on to relate these 
to the specifics of this thesis, autoethnography and incorporate my own position 
in relation to these questions. It can be argued that incorporating 
autoethnographic components in this research is, at a very simplified level, 
attempting to undertake what Stanley (1993) terms a combination of 
“sociological autobiography”, derived from Merton’s (1988) outline of the 
concept, which uses autobiographical accounts as data to engage in a form of 
participant observation to which the researcher has “privileged” access. This 
process is then filtered through theoretical and analytical social scientific 
practices and procedures, linking these to wider sociological themes in relation 
to individual actions and structural social and cultural domains (Davies, 2008: 
222). The second approach “rather than understanding the social through its 
influence on the individual” sees the two levels “as actually symbiotically linked: 
the social and the individual, the personal and the political” (Stanley, 1993: 44, 
in Davies, 2008: 223). Drawn from feminist perspectives, this conceptualisation 
challenges how individuals understand and relate to the world in order to 
change their actions and potentially effect change at a wider, structural level. 
The word privileged has been placed in quotation marks to emphasise the fact 
that this should be viewed with critical scrutiny. As Stanley (1993) has further 
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argued, the dichotomy between autobiography and biography is a false one in 
that each is influenced and cannot exist without the other. I cannot conceive of 
my relation to myself without others to reflect upon and through and I cannot 
write about others if I do not reflexively engage with writing, researching and 
explicating a person’s life and experiences. This reflects the pragmatist, George 
Herbert Mead’s (1934) emphasis on the I and the Me discussed in Chapter 1.  
 
If we take these debates as our backdrop to autoethnography, a more formal 
definition will now serve to begin explicitly underlining the means by which these 
method impacts on my research. Ellis and Bochner (2000), usefully break down 
the portmanteau of “autoethnography” to point to the central components that 
comprise such an activity:  
 
autoethnographers vary in their emphasise on the research process 
(graphy), on culture (ethno), and on self (auto) […] different exemplars 
of autoethnography fall at different places along the continuum of 
these three axes (Ellis and Bochner, 2000: 740). 
 
Chang (2007) refers to this as a triadic model and argues that autoethnography 
should be “ethnographical in its methodological orientation, cultural in its 
interpretive orientation, and autobiographical in its content orientation”. (Chang, 
2007: 208-9). This has led the field into two different and divergent directions, 
characterised by Anderson (2006) as between “analytic” and “evocative” 
autoethnographies12. The latter of these, primarily developed and promulgated 
by Ellis and Bochner (2000), contend that emotionally driven and narrative 
forms that seek to merely describe rather than generalise via theorisation better 
facilitate representation of others via emotional connection and subjective 
                                                          
12
 In this chapter, I will focus primarily on analytic autoethnography and I will give detailed 
attention to evocative autoethnographic commitments in Chapter 4.  
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fidelity to participants’ accounts. Analytic autoethnography, in dialogue with this 
field of thought, embarks from a symbolic interactionist/pragmatist realist 
position in which emotional and subjective insights are tempered by 
methodological and theoretical reflexivity and a more balanced approach 
between emotional and critical argument (Anderson, 2006). 
 
Analytic autoethnography stems from an approach outlined by Leon Anderson 
(2006), a realist ethnographer who is concerned with connecting evocative 
accounts of autoethnographic experience to theoretical and empirical 
frameworks. Anderson suggests that there are five main criteria for 
autoethnographic work that places the researcher as a full member in the 
research setting and thus observes and participates in a dual role, explicitly 
makes this identification within their writing and analysis and seeks to develop 
theoretical understanding of broader social phenomena (Anderson, 2006: 375). 
Anderson considers five main elements as central to analytic autoethnography. 
These are: (1). Complete Member Research (CRM), (2). Analytic reflexivity, (3). 
Narrative visibility of the researchers self, (4). Dialogue with informants beyond 
the self, and (5). Commitment to theoretical analysis (Anderson 2006: 378).  
 
A few qualifications need to be made in relation to these remarks. As Anderson 
reminds us, it should be taken that CMR status does not give the researcher an 
all-knowing understanding of the fieldsite. Automatic identification with other 
members should not be viewed via a matching methodology as such a position 
eliminates in-and-between group differences and thus essentialises multiply 
expressed subject positions. (Rapley, 2004: 26). In other words, my own 
Asperger’s diagnosis does not give me a privileged perspective on sensory 
experiences of my participants. I had to disrupt my own “sensory biases”. In 
order to do this I sought to undertake sensory exercises outlined by Howes and 
Classen (1991). They suggest that we take “some object from one’s 
environment and disengaging one’s attention from the object itself so as to 
focus on how each of its sensory properties would impinge on one’s 
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consciousness were they not filtered in any way” (Howes and Classen, 1991: 
260). The beginning of Chapter 4 explores my own perspective on such an 
exercise. I focus on how autoethnographic reflexivity enabled me to account 
how a focus on sensory interaction biased my perspective on activities taking 
place in the club space.  
 
 
Together with Vannini et al’s (2012) sensory sociology framework, the focus on 
habitual sensory engagements, as I discuss in Chapter 1, allows us to 
document the ways in which: “Distinct types of sensory perception take effect at 
different times in people’s lives” (Desjarlais, 2003: 342). I thus was attentive to 
the ways in which our sensory interactions are “continually resituating ourselves 
and remaking ourselves in relation to others” (Pink, 2009: 55). My CMR 
involvement was thus open to a more apprenticeship based approach where I 
allowed myself to be affected (Latour, 2004, Despret, 2004) by my participants 
modes of interaction. I did not assume my experiences were shared between 
participants and altered my interactional disposition in order to better engage 
with the activities and routines of the club space. I recognised and 
acknowledged how sensory experience were “related to our changing social 
environments and encounters… to the intersubjectivity between persons and to 
the way that our notions of self are continuously negotiated and reconstituted” 
(Pink,: 54).  
 
 
Adler and Adler (1987) suggest that CMR roles can be divided between 
opportunistic and convert CMR. Opportunistic CRM refers to identification that 
comes through birth, group affiliation via leisure or other activities or entering via 
accidental circumstances. Convert CRM begins from a more detached data 
gathering phase before “converting” to immersion and membership during 
research for pragmatic, methodological or analytic reasons (Adler and Adler, 
1987: 67-84). Referring to my field-site and participants, this thesis occupies a 
kind of middle ground as I am a disabled researcher with autism, a condition 
that people are born with and continue to “be” in for their lifetime. Sharing similar 
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interests, dispositions and hobbies with my participants made my entry into the 
field-site an opportunistic one. On the other hand, I had had previous 
connections with the charity organisation in multiple roles, mainly as a service 
user attending Youth Clubs, a voluntary support worker at the main office 
assisting with the administrative running of the organisation, alongside 
collaboration with the charity as an undergraduate and Master’s student. I 
conducted research where the charity assisted in recruiting participants and 
running sessions for interviews and a focus group. This placed me in a more 
covert position as I had some understanding of the institutional dynamics of the 
charity and its relationship to its members. This places me in quite a complex 
position if we take these ideal type concepts into account. It places me in an 
ambiguous position in relation to staff members. Was I a service user or 
researcher? When do these labels apply and in what circumstances? What 
expectations are imbued into these categories and to what extent will they 
impact or produce performative effects on subsequent actions and meaning 
making?  
 
 
Impression management (Goffman, 1959) was central to these questions, in 
that if I portrayed myself as a researcher, in a way that was authoritative and 
emotionally controlled and separated this from my involvement as a service 
user, that would have created a false dichotomy between participant observer 
and PhD student. However, emotional engagement, understanding and 
communication with others and oneself create major difficulties for those on the 
autism spectrum and thus the researcher needs to be aware of such 
complexities. As Strathern (1987) argued, the autoethnographic researcher 
must always bear in mind that they are both CMR’s and members of the social 
scientific community, who are more than likely to require different orientations to 
participants that they view as secondary concerns. Note-taking, both 
observational and analytical, can raise significant tensions if participants do not 
share and hold the values and dispositions of a social scientist. Explicitly 
Strathern points to the fact that anthropological ethnography seeks to 
conceptualise and report on “others”, whereas the ethnography of a researchers 
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“own” culture serves to share and contemplate our self-understandings of social 
life. As such, descriptions always contain analysis and analysis always involves 
a degree of description.  
 
 
I should note here that I will be utilising more evocative forms of description, 
presentation and autoethnographic writing in Chapters 4 and 5 due to issues 
that arose when trying to develop analysis of my fieldsite relations in an early 
version of Chapter 5. After discussing this with my supervisor and reading Ellis 
and Bochner’s (2006) commentary on Anderson’s (2006) seminal article, I have 
removed the emphasis on CRM dynamics in Chapter 5. This is due, as I now 
recognise, to analytic autoethnography’s desires to reduce the: “unruly, 
dangerous, vulnerable, rebellious, and creative, and bring it under the control of 
reason, logic, and analysis” (Ellis and Bochner, 2006: 433). This “taming” of 
autoethnography also seeks to reduce “struggle, passion, embodied life” (ibid: 
433). As such, my account was very dry and descriptive, offering little in terms 
of showcasing research vulnerability or openness or incentives for the reader to 
care, be empathetic or act (ibid: 433). As such, the account did not contribute to 
developing an awareness of the relationships between researchers and 
participants, only serving to highlight the empirical, observable events in the 
situation, without broader emotional or contextual elucidation. Focusing on 
following the CRM blueprint meant that the unique and specific insights that 
could be gained via a focus on the habitual and sensory dynamics at play were 
lost. I was unable to make a case for why such relationships and concerns 
developed in this now deleted section were made and sustained by practices of 
care.13 On reflection, analytical autoethnography, as I have described above, is 
useful in posing methodological questions and considerations when undertaking 
research that utilises techniques such as participant observation ethnography or 
interviews, alongside autoethnographic writing. It is less useful in accounting for 
the messy, uncertain and disruptive potential of non-normative ways of being in 
                                                          
13
 See Autieethnography Part 2 (Chapter 5), for an in-depth discussion of the importance of care 
when discussing intersubjective relations in autoethnographic writing. 
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the world such as autism. Again, I will expand on these concerns in Chapters 4 
and 5.  
 
 
Given this critique of Anderson’s approach, this is not to say that the CMR 
framework was not useful in allowing me to critically and reflexively consider my 
insider status as a young adult with Asperger’s Syndrome. For example, while I 
identified and agreed with the political stances of the Social Club members, I 
was careful not to involve myself too heavily with their activities in regard to 
questioning and critiquing the clubs neoliberal policies and agendas. I sought to 
develop a form of critical distance from my ideological agreement with the club 
members, in order so that I did not become a kind of “subcultural spokesperson” 
for the group (Bennett, 2003). This role was adequately taken up by other 
members of the club, such as Josh from the Youth Club, who was part of an 
ambassador organisation advocating for autistic rights and support that 
engaged with the needs of autistic people and their communities. My lack of 
engagement with the increasingly diverse networks of borough divisions with 
which the charity engaged also discounted me from giving a fully informed 
contribution to these issues.  
 
 
Furthermore, a focus on analytical autoethnography enabled me to account for 
and be more aware of the shared social, emotional and meaning making 
processes that occurred and developed during my fieldwork. For example, 
growing up in a working-class, consumerist driven home meant that I am 
emotionally and ideologically captured by the commodity chains of 
entertainment in the realm of games, books, cartoons, TV shows and films. This 
facet of my upbringing enabled me to connect with members of the Youth Club 
who shared many of these interests and often brought up new games and 
cartoons in casual discussion. This enabled me to gain a point of purchase and 
thus entry into their social worlds and discussions and connect my own interests 
with theirs. My sociological training and training enables me to take a critical 
perspective on these activities. Equally, for those older members and 
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participants in the Social Club, a sense of connection was established through a 
sustained discussion and critique of the British Coalition government and in 
2015, the majority Conservative Party government’s policies. These 
discussions, pragmatically, often revolved around the neoliberal processes 
being implemented throughout the charity sector and the negative impact it had 
on their financial affairs. The resulting impact of this forced the charity to utilise 
strategies oriented towards consumer logic rather than a charitable ethos. My 
education and sociological awareness provided me with ways to relate to and 
discuss these issues with members and my own political beliefs and leaning 
became something I could share to members in discussions. I was able to 
simultaneously embrace and share my enjoyment of popular culture and my 
critical, distanced sociological insights to gain a well-rounded understanding of 
the club members and my own academic interests (Hodkinson, 2005).  
 
These shared points of engagement and connection infuse the empirical 
examples, alongside the focus on the habitual, sensory, atmospheric and quasi-
object relations I focus on theoretically. Some of the analyses offered in 
Chapters 3 and 6 are based on these interactions and account for the varying 
ways in which my CRM status allowed me to develop accounts that are based 
on shared, empathetic and sensory modes of engagement with the world. 
These forms of analytic reflexivity and visibility enabled me to following 
Anderson, showcase forms of “mutual informativity” (Anderson, 2006: 383), 
where the researcher shows how their visibility in the text and the experiences 
described are influenced by their participants in reflecting back on the 
experiences and theoretical frameworks they develop. I show this in Chapter 5 
when discussing how a participant’s frustration with housework mirrors my own 
frustrations with my working environment at home. In addition in Chapter 6, the 
members and I shared our appreciation of the comedy of Blackadder, which 
enabled a more nuanced and engaged discussion of the atmospheric 
importance it had for a scenario I examine there. In this example, I develop 
ways of developing theoretical insights into the atmospheric importance of 
Blackadder to club members in developing certain kinds of social moods and 
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interactions. These factors can all be considered as contributing to my status as 
an “insider researcher” which is common amongst researchers at doctoral level 
of youth and social clubs (Hodkinson, 2005). Following the notion that 
autoethnography is a triangulation method between the self, culture and the 
study of these relations. Montelli (1999) argues that because focus groups 
enable participants to question and challenge each other, the data can be more 
reliable as it is triangulated by other participants. CMR understandings can thus 
be developed from these accounts as they enable the researcher to converse 
with respondents based on their interpretative interactions with others. 
 
In developing ways of accounting for the different levels of analytical reflexivity 
in my research, an approach that seeks to recognise the ways in which 
autoethnographic “data are situated within (a researchers) personal experience 
and sense making” (Atkinson et al, 2003), I have sought to account for the 
different ways in which my participants may be represented in this thesis. 
Different forms of autistic writing, by and about autistic individuals, groups and 
organisations have led Hacking (1995, 2010) to identify several “genres” of 
autistic writing that have emerged over the last few decades. Such genres form 
a “looping” relationship with the condition and the discursive and embodied 
practices of autism co-emerge and co-mingle together in reconstituted and new 
constellations. The ways in which we describe autism as a condition go on to 
structure and provide conceptual and symbolic resources for those with autism 
to see themselves within these looping genre constructions. This thesis serves 
as an academic genre of writing and creates its own forms of genre looping 
effects. This self-reflexive process of articulation cannot remain outside of the 
modes of speaking and discursive formations that allow the researcher to speak 
and present new ideas and data on autism. This does not mean that caricatures 
that emerge from these genres, such as the autistic child as “alien” or a 
detached rational being, will be reproduced or wholly denied and avoided in the 
writing. The concept of looping prevents such clear cut possibilities as a 
definitive end result, but rather serves as double backdrop for both the 
researcher and the reader. In the former instance, this awareness allows the 
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writing to be formulated with care and attention to the accounts and experiences 
given by the participants within this framework.  
 
  
This mode of thinking also ties into ethnographies that have utilised the impact 
of fieldwork experiences on their data collection, analysis and wider embodied 
and conceptual categories (Briggs, 1970, Okely, 1992, Grimshaw, 1992). Of 
particular note is Okely’s study of Gypsy culture, in which she sought to dress 
and adapt her bodily comportment to better understand and achieve a greater 
rapport with her participants. However, she found that these adaptations led to 
new disruptions and movements between social worlds when on extended 
fieldwork breaks and returning to academic social fields and cultures. In 
academia, she was subjected to particular norms that required conforming to 
dominant, middle class values that the Gypsy women themselves felt they were 
exempt from the wider culture they were a part of. From this, Okely concludes 
that this emplaced reflexivity led her to gain a conceptual as well as embodied 
understanding of the stereotypes imposed on Gypsies, but also, of how 
academic practices and values impact on research (Okely, 1992: 15).  
 
 
From my perspective, because of the sensory difficulties around loud music, 
strong smelling food or the disorganised placement of the club furniture, I often 
experienced the same difficulties as the club members. In the immediacy of the 
moment, I struggled to maintain a degree of “sensory reflexivity” (Vannini et al, 
2012). My “iconic”, immediate sensory experiences dominated and the 
discomfort they engendered prevented me from developing “symbolic” 
meanings in regard to my sensory experiences. This is the way in which our 
iconic sensory experiences are developed through symbolic, linguistic and 
discursive meaning in relation to our internal sensory experience and others 
reactions and perspectives. My autism temporarily closed down my awareness 
to help me deal and cope with the oncoming sensory danger and discomfort. 
This problem was countered when I developed my field-notes the next morning. 
I had time to process and work through the events of the previous night’s club 
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session and was able to work through the ways in which my sensory 
experiences and those of other club members were mediated by technologies, 
objects, spatial relations and interpersonal meaning making. I took what has 
traditionally been excluded in ethnographic field notes, the “unscientific” 
domains of emotion and personal experience (Van Maanen, 2011) and used 
them to help process and make sense of my sensory shut-down episodes. 
These potentially “disastrous research episodes” (Michael, 2004), when I 
became too stressed to try to make field-notes and observe club activities 
during times of sensory difficulty, were mitigated by my delayed field-note 
writing.  
 
 
Conclusion  
 
 
Researching groups with autism is a challenging yet rewarding process that can 
provide insights into not only their lives and experiences, but also question the 
basis on which research methods are grounded. I have sought to document and 
account for the methodological and practical reasons for how my research 
developed. In so doing, I have explored the competing ways in which my use of 
ethnographic participant observation and focus groups have been utilised to 
explore sensory habitual favourites in the best way I can with my skill set. I will 
address criticisms and potential different approaches I could have taken in this 
project in the conclusion of the thesis. The next chapter will be an empirical 
investigation of the importance of parasitic and quasi-object relations in 
understanding how those with autism relate to their favourites.  
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Chapter 3 - Habitual Favourites – Modulated Thresholds and Parasitical Quasi-
Objects 
 
Introduction – An Outline of The Chapter  
 
This chapter will investigate the relationships between favourite activities, 
people, objects and places and the formation, breakdown, stability or dynamism 
of habitual engagement and activity. The motivations and potential reasons for 
autistic people to engage with favourite activities and the mechanisms that may 
drive this will first be defined. The remainder of the chapter will take the form of 
a series of empirical scenarios and examples that occurred during my 
participant observation fieldwork with a local charity running Youth and Social 
Clubs that highlight core themes in the relations between habits and favourites. 
The four examples developed will focus on the modalities that the favourites in 
question utilise and how they make sense and meaning to the participant 
involved. Each section will also consider the mechanisms and processes that 
enable a continued investment in the favourite(s) and how and why they were 
stabilised or broke down. My goal is to expand on the notion of quasi-object(s) 
to “social” quasi-objects by exploring habitual engagements of people with 
autism.   
 
Factors Impacting The Relationships to Favourites in Autism  
 
In Chapter 1, I outlined a number of different aspects of how habitual favourites 
and sensory engagement could interact within the theoretical framework of 
Serres’ theory of the parasite and quasi-object relations. The elements explored 
here will build upon these insights to give them more specificity within the 
framework and concerns of the research that this chapter draws upon.  
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Here, I want to begin to systematically think about favourites in a theoretical 
register to enable the empirical material to be given a wider context. In order for 
a person to engage in an activity over and over again, and to feel the level of 
connection that they do when they interact with a favourite, there must be 
powerful socio-psycho-ecological reasons. As Dewey (1922) argued, humans 
possess a core need to maintain a degree of stability and control within their 
lives and if this breaks down, severe, destabilising and distressing 
consequences follow. This process of establishing a stable sense of social 
being, in connection to personal, social and environmental needs, is found in 
many areas of life and forms a central activity within them. Think of the amount 
of time we spend repairing misunderstandings with others, or evaluating what 
we did. Those with autism, who have difficulties in interpreting multiple modes of 
social communication from linguistic to embodied gestures, must undertake a 
greater amount of performative work in these modes in order to ensure they are 
understandable to others and themselves. The point being that such a concern 
for forming a sense of stability is central to social and personal life and is not 
isolated to one sphere or domain, but interpenetrates with each of them. The 
fact that many of these performances of stability are temporary or often must be 
renewed, highlights the important relational and indeed, cyclical quality to these 
processes.  
 
This does not, however, mean that these process are inherently worthless or 
meaningless habits instead bring light to how complex and nuanced we must be 
in order to account for the myriad ways in which stability is brought into our 
lives. As Serres has argued (2007), dysfunction and destabilisation is as central 
to any social system or sociality as stability is and is thus productive in its own 
right. This dynamism of stability and instability enables a conception of novelty 
and emergence within the ongoing performance of interacting with our 
favourites. We can take in and integrate new elements, whether they are new 
objects, persons, materials, ideas or explanatory frameworks and fold them into 
our already formulated habitual favourite engagements. The analytical 
questions then become, what kinds of habitual favourites serve these purposes? 
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Why do social actors choose certain habitual favourites? What are the different 
modalities that these relationships take and the effects they have?  
 
As I have noted, questions of stability are central to those with autism and yet, 
they remain problematic in a pragmatic sense as we also have noted. I will now 
provide some insights to the importance of favourites for those with autism and 
their use and dependence on notions of habituation and routine. At the core of 
the need for routine and stability for individuals with autism is the necessity and 
yet fundamental difficulty they have in understanding, filtering and managing 
social, emotional and sensory experiences, whether they be internal or external. 
As Park (2010) notes, in reference to autistic primatologist Dawn-Price Hughes 
reflections on how her emplaced relations with autism impacted her:  
 
 
Most autistic people need order and ritual and will find ways to 
make order where they feel chaos. [They] instinctively reach for 
order and symmetry [For example] they rock back and forth, cutting 
a deluge of stimulation into smaller bits with the repetition of their 
bodies' movements. (Prince Hughes, 2004: 25 in Park, 2010).  
 
Therefore, sense making and bodily, kinaesthetic, proprioceptive and haptic 
modes are thoroughly intertwined with emplaced intersubjectivity. This process 
also points to the noted autistic ability to perceive the world in intense, local 
detail, but then to subsequently have difficulty placing these perceptions within 
the global or larger picture of the situation (Bogdashina, 2003). Such intense 
relationality can be found in both human and non-human relations with a great 
sense of connectedness shown for books, animals and abstract systems 
(Davidson and Smith, 2009). Rather than beginning from pre-formulated notions 
of what is important researchers must be attentive to the emerging perspectives 
of the phenomena under study within the given context. We must give empirical 
depth and breadth to what is before us and in order to do this effectively and 
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with precision, the stakes for the group or phenomenon in question must be first 
identified and conceptualised.  
 
Smith and Sharp (2013), in their grounded theory study of the sensory 
experience of adults with Asperger’s, found that the degree of “abnormal” 
sensory experiences for their participants depended upon a number of factors, 
which together formed a matrix of modulating components that greatly 
influenced the degrees of social functioning of those with Asperger’s. These 
“moderating factors” included: low intensity versus high intensity, single versus 
multiple inputs, order against chaos and being stressed against being calm. The 
lower sensory end of these dimensions was manageable if they were minimal 
and not continuous so as to overwhelm the participants. However, if participants 
were stressed, each sensory dimension was overloaded, causing pain and 
discomfort, this then led into a self-fulfilling vicious cycle whereby sensory 
perceptions themselves cause stress, further increasing the discomfort of 
sensory perceptions and the emotional toil and anxieties they provoke. This may 
lead to being overloaded and withdrawing cognitively, or physically (if possible) 
from the event to recover. The deployment of coping strategies such as 
manipulating the environment to block out sensations via earphones or pulling 
blinds will be compulsively undertaken in order to escape from the stressors as 
quickly as possible. It should be noted that the use of order, routine and 
planning could also contribute to anxiety and stress as some participants also 
explained how traumatic events made them wary to head out due to busy 
streets causing visual and mobility issues. The notion of thresholds is important 
for this model, as Smith and Sharp’s participants noted that the tolerance of 
stressful stimuli was connected to how much previous encounters had affected 
them and whether they had time to recover and process this stimuli. The 
management of these thresholds was central to their overall constitution and 
required a high degree of internal management. 
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The interconnected and interwoven dimensions of Smith and Sharp’s model 
adds further clarification and depth to the question of Dewey’s fractured and 
integrated subjects as a performance. In order to achieve an integrated subject 
position, the degrees of each of the moderating factors needs to be on the very 
low end of stimulation in order for this to be even possible and very often 
requires a tightly controlled environment, such as described by Park’s (2010) 
rocking autistic individuals. As Serres (2007) again notes, noise is central to any 
form of social life and this harmonious state of affairs can only but be temporary 
as some form of sensory/social input will disrupt this integrated state of affairs. 
We can then also speak of different degrees of fracturing that autistic subjects 
may experience, from complete mental and physical withdrawal, to perceptual 
disorientation, whether attentional, proprioceptive or any other form of sensory 
perception, to a constant sense of light anxiety and unease that makes the 
subject question if they are acting “normal” or they cannot identity the 
sensory/social source of this unease.   
 
The mediating process that structures these domains, I want to argue, is the 
quasi-object. I contend in this thesis that quasi-object relations are central to 
what may be termed an “autistic sociality” or the actionable practices, objects 
relational, emotional, cognitive and affective ways in which people with autism 
understand and relate to the world. Key to an autistic sociality and the 
components that go into constituting and influencing this sociality are favourites. 
For a favourite activity to be able to be engaged with in an effective way, each of 
the factors contributing to anxiety needs to be on the low end of the sensory 
continuum. In this way, favourite activities require a degree of emotional and 
social management that contributes to and performs a sense of self-identity. 
When fractured, the possibilities of engaging with favourites on a complex level 
become reduced and may be as simple as rocking or clutching a soft blanket or 
repeating a set phrase until the situation passes. Favourites can thus be said to 
be a quasi-object like concept in that they serve to mediate between personal 
and collective self-identity, emotional and psychological well-being and stability 
and bring different domains and social worlds into recognisable and self-
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generated means of understanding and experience. In this regard, I want to 
bring a central abstraction motive of the quasi-object, to slow down and move 
our relations from a universal principle, to an applied, empirical one that helps 
shed new light on key dynamics and characteristics of autistic sociality.   
 
Developing The Quasi-Object Concept  
 
If we can take favourites as a “social” object, we can, following Simon (2010), 
further account for the specific qualities of quasi-objects. Social objects can be:  
(1) Personal, (2) Active, (3) Provocative and (4) Relational.  
 
1. Personal social objects are familiar objects that have unique and intimate 
connections to the people who are involved with them, provoking and instigating 
social interaction to share. An example could be an object such as a teddy bear 
that bore the memories of a person’s brother.  
 
2. Active objects can insert themselves into spaces and force our attention to be 
drawn to their presence. This can either be forced or spontaneous and depends 
on the context of the situation, whether an event is routinised or whether 
unpredictable actions emerge. An example in this vein may be, in relation to the 
club space, finding a catwalk like stage in the middle of the room that is 
completely unexpected (discussed below).  
 
3. Provocative objects engage interaction in their own right and serve as 
spectacles that require discussion in order to resolve social shock, excitement 
or produce clarity. This may refer again to the stage in the clubroom and 
requires explanation, otherwise people would obsess with it due to troublesome 
levels of ambiguity and lack of clarity regarding the situation.  
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4. Relational objects are objects which require intervention to be utilised and are 
compulsorily social as they cannot fully exist or function without social 
engagement. An example here would be an institution such as a charity, which 
cannot exist without being a result of human, material and discursive 
construction and maintenance (Simon, 2010: 127-132).  
 
These categories are helpful in sorting out and highlighting the role played by 
different favourite objects or practices, as they speak to different forms of 
relations that constitute on-going, co-constitutive relations between quasi-
objects and quasi-subjects. They also help us in understanding how people with 
autism may relate to different events and situations in the social world that is 
grounded in the activities, objects, environments or people and their 
favourite(s), in a way that is important and meaningful. These also arise from 
their own interests, perspectives and experiences, rather than externally 
imposed criteria of relevance.  
 
The above framings that I have detailed shall now be developed, expanded and 
interrogated through recourse to some of my empirical material collected 
throughout my participant observation and focus group interviews. I will focus 
upon four moments that occurred throughout my research that shed light on the 
different ways in which habits, favourites and sensory engagement is 
experienced by those with autism. Each section will outline the scenario to give 
context to the cases which occurred during my fieldwork that points to a highly 
interesting, curious or puzzling incident. These scenarios will also represent the 
sensuous and affective processes that occurred to give the reader a more 
embodied sense of the research encounters presented.  
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Some Comments on Using an “Events” Based Analysis 
 
The reason for utilising events as a method of analysis is because the concept 
works in synergy with the notion of “social” quasi-objects (discussed above). My 
thinking here is drawn from the philosophical-methodology of Savransky 
(2016a) on events. An event is, in the most basic terms, something that 
happens which causes a difference to occur. In a more nuanced fashion, an 
event is caused by something that happens, but is not reducible to the 
occurrences which bring it into being. It instead is a sustainable transformation 
that ““subsists or inheres” as an incorporeal effect in the actions and passions of 
bodies and their practices” (Deleuze, 2004: 7 in Savransky, 2016a: 155). 
Because of this secondary separation from the original occurrence, the event 
can connect to other milieus, objects or persons that may be already receptive 
or open to becoming receptive to what the event opens up. It creates novelty in 
what occurs and is not the occurrence itself (ibid: 155). Because of these 
features, events create space and time around them, rupturing known 
understanding and causality, throwing them “out of joint” (Deleuze, 1993: 89) to 
create new fields of possibility (Savransky, 2016a: 155).  
 
In quasi-object terms, they serve to provide novel anchors to the new 
possibilities inherent in social life and redistribute our knowledge of what a 
space and time means for a set of people. The different forms of social quasi-
objects pertain to the certain ways that the spatial, temporal, material, social and 
interpersonal processes of events can emerge in concrete and practical ways. 
To draw out my empirical examples from the flux of the ethnographic research 
encounter betrays a reservation that must be kept in mind when talking about 
events in this manner. I, as researcher, do not have complete authority to 
dictate what an event is or what it means for the beings they emerge from and 
go on to affect. To do so would be to discount how events make certain things 
matter and others not, irrespective of human intervention or the mediums 
through which they emerge and how they are presented. In keeping with 
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thinking about the notion of habit, researching events should be about devising 
and creating ways in which to remain open to events and what possibilities 
emerge from them. What is the balance between solidified, routine and tacit 
knowing and acting and when does the novelty, spontaneity and uncertainty of 
developing and maintaining habits in the face of eventful happenings occur? 
This means that my examples are looking to explore not only when things get 
out of joint, but also the ways in which members sought to work through their 
concerns and develop mechanisms to cope and thrive with what life presents 
them.   
 
The scope of the events in question is important in this regard, as Serres has 
put it, an events novelty “is proportional to the length of the preceding era 
concluded by the event” (Serres, 2013: 2). I have therefore been careful in 
drawing out examples that explore different spatial and temporal delimitations 
which explore and help elaborate on how different configurations of event and 
milieu impacted the habitual responses of club members. For example; the 
shock of a provocative object is dependent on the specific qualities of said 
object and the milieu which it is part of. The catwalk was a brief, one-time-only 
occurrence, but the impact it had on members in the club was highly noticeable, 
re-orienting routine activities and the means of navigating the club space around 
the object. However, the next week, the catwalk was gone and members acted 
as if it had never been there to begin with. The event inhered only for one 
session and can be contrasted with longer term alterations such as repainting 
the club walls which took a number of weeks, but did not receive as much 
interest as the changes were gradual and easy to digest. My reasoning to 
incorporate event-framed examples is to utilise a method that expands upon the 
social quasi-object concept I develop in this chapter.  
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The Different Modalities of Habitual Favourites  
 
During the ordinary running of the club, people discuss in groups, engage in 
board and table games, set up and play with the Nintendo Wii console, head out 
to get cakes, chocolate and coffee/tea from the nearby student café, play ping 
pong or pool or organise one-off meetings and events for inside and outside the 
club space. These more structured activities were punctuated by specific, 
habituated activities that served to connect participants to their own senses of 
identity and familiar bodily and cognitive modes of engagement and attunement. 
This section will explore some examples of the different mechanisms that 
participants utilised in order to form habituated connections to favourites and the 
mechanisms that mediate their relationship to these favourites. Each example, 
focusing on a specific participant will provide a brief description of their 
personality, characteristics and how they interacted with other club members in 
engaging with club activities.  
 
14Doug – Cats, Technological Quasi-Objects and Soylent as Parasite  
 
Doug is a participant from the Social Club whose interests in cats, technology 
and the mundane routines of home life, showcase different dimensions of his 
relationship to a habituated mode of relating and acting. Doug is a young man in 
his late 20’s with a kind and caring nature. This disposition meant that he was 
reserved and quiet when speaking and undertaking activities. He did not 
communicate in a extravagant manner, preferring hushed and muted tones of 
voice. Doug possesses high levels of curiosity and this often revealed itself in 
mildly obsessive interests in tracking the development of various projects. The 
most prominent of these was his interest in the development of the “Hub”, a 
                                                          
14
 All names in this chapter are pseudonyms and all locations are referred to in abstract detail so 
as to not reveal specifics.  
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centralised building that was being built during my fieldwork that planned to host 
activities, leisure events, support services and information through a dedicated 
library. Each week, without fail, Doug would ask the nearest available staff 
member how the Hub was coming along. They were happy to inform him and he 
was satisfied with the updates. Until he received this information however, he 
was restless until he found an opportunity to ask about the Hub. Doug also had 
many quirky traits that allowed the group to engage in friendly teasing and 
banter about his seemingly bizarre actions. The first of these was his brief 
interest in Soylent, which I will address in the analysis below. The second 
concerned his acquisition of a hhippet dog early in my thesis. In response to 
this, he decided that he should wear what he termed “northern English” attire. 
This consisted of a tartan jacket with a chequered flat cap, complete with price 
and brand tag still attached to the hat. The other club members teased and 
joked with him about these dress choices, but Doug took it in his pride, joining in 
the banter. This convivial atmosphere inspired me to take part in this teasing 
much of the time as I had observed that Doug was comfortable with it. Early on, 
this factored as an important part in building rapport with club members.  
 
Doug’s interest in cats was nurtured at an early age and has stayed with him as 
he grew up and remains with him today. His engagement with them was a very 
intense and sensual one. He noted that he particularly enjoyed how they felt, 
their visual appearance (both their physical structure and fur colourations) and 
the different sort of sounds they made such as purring and meows. These 
different indicators of engagement for Doug did not point to a disparate or 
fragmented sense of what a cat was (breaking down cats into different, separate 
components) but he wished to talk about an essential “catness” that he found 
great comfort in. When he became older, he continued his affiliation with cats by 
volunteering at a local farm that housed cats. His appreciation of the cat “form” 
so to speak, has been widened as part of this ongoing engagement as he now 
appreciates the different personalities of the cats present and how they relate to 
his presence and how he could best interact with them. For him, the presence of 
cats was a very relaxing and reassuring experience that promoted a sense of 
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familiarity and allowed him to connect with another, sentient species that, in 
some manner, presented him with a set of behavioural and attunement relations 
to the world that he could relate to and understand to a greater degree than 
people. Cats are highly social and have sets of behavioural gestures and 
actions that refer to and indicate specific interests, feelings or orientation to an 
activity in question. The interactional rules were much simpler to relate to and 
understand, partly because specific intentions that lead to action can be more 
easily read with cats, as they possess less social complexity than humans. They 
also provided a highly pleasurable set of sensory relations for Doug, which 
appeared to contribute to a sense of security and stability. The most important 
of these sensory relations for him was the softness of their fur, that allow, or 
affords, a snug means of cuddling up to cats and promotes a tactile means for 
humans and cats to interact.  
 
In this case, cats serve as a potent quasi-object for Doug, in that they serve to 
bring together a set of characteristics that enable him to enter a calm and 
relaxed frame of mind and bodily comportment. This sense of connection is not 
left as a free-flowing emergent relation. Doug has put much affective work into 
learning to be affected (See Latour, 2004) and affecting the cats that he has 
encountered. Like Grandin (2000a, 2015), who worked with and developed 
humane ways of dealing with cattle (discussed in Chapter 1), Doug has a 
profound respect for the capacities and properties of cats and appreciates their 
company. Due to the ways in which he was able to understand and relate to 
cats via sensory means when he was young, this familiarity has led him to 
connect back his later interests, such as researching and learning about 
technology related to ecological solutions and sustainability in productive ways. 
Doug had an interest in keeping up to date with the latest developments in 
technology and had a tempered faith that technology could provide solutions to 
many problems, including the aforementioned issues of environmental 
technologies. In this vein, he has begun to conceive and develop his project of 
the “cat toilet”. This device, he posited, would combine his love of cats and 
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technological solutions to issues of waste by funnelling urine and excrement into 
different sections and cutting them off to simplify disposal.  
 
In this way, the cat toilet could be views as Doug’s own self-conceived quasi-
object. He wants to develop a device that is attentive to the needs and 
capacities of engagement that cats possess, but also contribute to the human 
endeavour for creative, technical solutions to social issues. The potential 
complexities around the environmental challenges faced by humanity are 
immense and cannot be conceptualised without an equally immense ensemble 
of collective human endeavours and technological action. In connection with 
this, the micro dimensions of this issue, that of on the ground, local 
developments, such as the development of individual or local group technical 
solutions such as the cat toilet, allow social actors to find meaningful 
engagements with such seemingly abstracted and large objects of concern. 
Doug’s cat toilet forms the quasi-objective link between these two domains such 
that he can contribute something that is meaningful to him, but will, if the project 
comes to fruition, provide a means of engaging with technological development 
and ecological issues that draws upon his experiential expertise and sensory 
entanglements with the world.  
 
I wish to stay with Doug to consider some of the ways in which his habitual 
engagements with more mundane routines and practices in his life showcased a 
contrast to this positive, quasi-object relation to one that was more based on 
parasitical relations. By this, I mean that there are attempts to exclude certain 
relations from consideration, only for them to remerge in new and debilitating 
ways. During a conversation with other members of the club, he expressed his 
frustration that the everyday domestic tasks he performed took place, in a 
circular loop. For instance, when he did the washing up, he would soon need to 
do it again, without really getting anything out of it, as the washing would get 
dirty again in a very short space of time and this continuous cycle distracted him 
from other, more preferable activities. He then imagined that technological 
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advancements may negate some of these issues and thus resigned himself to 
wait for the future. However, he took this concern for the incessant recurring, 
parasitical practices into other domains. This conceptualisation captures the 
sense in which Deleuze understands Nietzsche’s concept of “eternal 
recurrence” not as “a repetition of the same, but on the contrary, to a 
transmutation. It is the moment or the eternity of becoming which eliminates all 
that resists it. It releases, indeed it creates, the purely active and pure 
affirmation” (Deleuze, 1983: xii). Over the course of a few weeks, Doug, having 
undertaken some research and “transmuted” his ongoing household chore 
recurrences into a new affirmation, shared with the group a product named 
Soylent, developed by a Silicon Valley engineer. The product, designed for 
cosmopolitan, middle-class professionals who did not have time to prepare full 
meals or stay in one place for too long, was promoted as having all the nutrients 
you need for each day with sufficient liquid intake.  
 
Doug was not so interested in Soylent itself, but the potential it offered to not 
stop his other activities so that he could eat throughout the day and be in a 
continuous flow with what he was doing. The socio-psycho-sensual relations of 
food, such as the social meanings given to smell that speak to the historical, 
embodied and familial relations that speak to the formations of identity and 
remembrance (Vannini, et al, 2012), Doug eschews for convenience. The other 
club members and participants, who were present in this discussion, were 
relatively amused by this and asked for him to provide justifications and clarity to 
his enthusiasm for the project and product. Member and research participant 
John remarked that Doug was “a marketer’s dream!” due to his naïve 
enthusiasm and interest in the product. Equally, they took Doug’s 
aforementioned straight-faced approach to things and removed the “allure” of 
Soylent for him by noting that “Soylent is a verb for soiled”. A month later, John 
asked Doug how his use of Soylent was proceeding. Doug responded with he 
felt “super-powered for a few days”. These exchanges showcased that the 
group were not convinced that the product would deliver and that his 
motivations were not necessarily wrong, but the group posited that the issue 
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was essentially a non-issue and proceeded to joke around with him in a friendly 
way.  
 
Doug’s fascination with Soylent can help extend our understanding of the nature 
of parasitical relations when they are open to scrutiny from others. Soylent 
proved to be an intensely provocative social object, in that it served as a highly 
effective means for Doug to express his views and how he would rectify the 
everyday “problems” that he had. Its status as a quasi-object is interesting in 
this regard in its intersection between social norms of eating, questions of time 
management in relation to preparing food and the correct degrees of 
enthusiasm for a product that questions the taken-for-granted aspects of these 
social norms. Soylent can also be considered as a relational object in that the 
unique and perhaps bizarre combination of food/nutrient material that comprises 
Soylent needs to be accounted for in order for people to be happy to accept it as 
something that is edible. It will take some time before Soylent becomes a readily 
available food stuff that will be eaten without conscious consideration as to 
whether it is edible or even food in a habitual manner. These considerations for 
Doug were not central in factoring into his self-motivated frustration at mundane, 
cyclical repetitions. The above, socio-cultural and bio-ecological issues were left 
to one side and personal preference was given full rein. In this case, the 
contradictions between the ecological and social sensibilities of the cat toilets 
and Soylent may come to an ugly clash one day for Doug.15 For now however, 
these concerns were lingering third elements that threaten to emerge and 
complicate Doug’s understanding and connection to his ideas and habitual 
emplacement.  
                                                          
15
 In more familiar terms, this disconnection between Doug’s two interests could be interpreted 
utilising mainstream autism theory as displaying difficulties in global/local processing (Happé 
and Frith, 2006). However, the social quasi-object framework deployed in this chapter 
demonstrates the reductionist impulse contained within autistic theory that prioritises and 
elevates one characteristic of autism as “the” factor to explaining autism as a complete 
condition.  
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In summary, Doug’s interests in cats, technology and parasitical routine tasks, 
were mediated by different concerns and considerations that were geared 
towards being affected by cats, integrating future hopes and developments for 
his interests in technology and getting frustrated with the boring, repetitive 
nature of everyday living. The most ironic aspect of Doug’s engagement with 
Soylent is the way it serves to reduce the complexities of eating into a single, 
simple act. These singular interactions, Doug hoped, would then become a 
habitual part of his everyday routines and fade into the background. In doing so, 
he was not solving the problem of eternal recurrence of tasks, but attempting to 
reduce the parasitical burdens on his time. He was working away at the 
symptoms of the problem rather than the source.  
 
The next section will concentrate on Garry, another member of the Social Club, 
and how he dealt with anxiety and an emergent problem of computer mediated 
interaction causing him difficulties.  
 
Garry – Multi-Modal Anxiety Relief and Social Management  
 
Garry is a man in his early 60’s who was very forthright in his views and 
opinions on topics. If something was bothering him or if he wanted to contribute 
to a conversation, he would make sure that he interjected and disrupted the 
conversation or activity flow in order to make his point. His compulsion to 
engage sometimes led to him making comments that were inappropriate and 
reflected his own personal interests, rather than necessarily the context of the 
discussion or activity in which he made a contribution. These disruptive 
comments were just as often counterbalanced by his penchant and affinity for 
picking up on wordplay, puns and innuendo in discussions. This was often 
greeted by groans by other members, but also recognition of the speed in which 
Garry caught onto the joke. His example often spurred the rest of the group to 
notice wordplay elements faster and reciprocate each other’s wordplay prowess. 
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Garry has very low tolerance in distressing situations, whether they were 
sensory or socially inclined. Thus his lack of patience often led to frustration and 
his distress thresholds were very low, for example causing him to leave a busy 
and noisy cafeteria area on a museum trip due to the high pitched voices of 
schoolchildren present. He was the only member who needed to remove himself 
from this situation and showcased to me the importance of humour and being 
the centre of attention that I address below.   
  
The central interest and favourite activity in Garry’s life, was being a part of 
groups that provide services, entertainment, support and community to those 
with disabilities. This ranged from autism, ADHD, depression, anxiety, Downs 
Syndrome, hearing and visual impairment. He is proactive in a number of charity 
and wider autism committees and meeting groups that assess and develop 
services for disabled individuals and groups in the wider (and growing) 
communities that the charity serves. Alongside these concerns, Garry’s 
favourite activity was to take part in and plan out the entertainment activities run 
by the organisations he was affiliated with. These included quizzes, stand-up 
comedy nights, talent shows and information sessions. The most enjoyable 
activity though was stand-up nights as he took pleasure in making puns and 
jokes and ensuring that people had a good time. Garry is particularly fond of 
winding up the crowd and getting a buzzing atmosphere, in a similar vein to the 
entertainer Bruce Forsyth. At other events, he would come on in-between 
sections of the event and do some stand up. This formed an important part of 
his general behaviour as he was very quick to catch puns, innuendos and 
wordplay.  
 
This affinity for the performative dimension of joking around was important for 
Garry as he utilised it as a means for him to reduce his anxiety and to focus 
attention. He disliked multiple people talking at once in different streams on 
diverse topics, because he could not follow these multiple streams. (This is a 
common feature of autistic auditory processing (Bogdashina, 2003)). He would 
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use jokes to focus attention on him as a singular person or entity in the space. 
The whipping up of the general good natured atmosphere of joking and 
conviviality also appeared to be a way for him to reduce tension or to 
remove/displace uncomfortable or unfamiliar social atmospheres of discomfort, 
unease, uncertainty or the unknown in general. For the members and 
participants in the club, the use of jokes and wordplay was an enjoyable activity 
and appreciated and recognised via laughter, grins and echolalia like repetitions 
of lines from shows such as Blackadder and Red Dwarf. There was also 
recognition that this was an “autistic thing”. In other words, the eccentric 
behaviours of Garry in relation to his obsession with making cheesy and corny 
jokes was accepted, but also made fun of on its own merits, a “here we go 
again” mentality, registered in sighs and a rolling of eyes. This routine in the 
more mundane setting of the club, rather than on stage or at an event, did not 
discount Garry’s enjoyment of making jokes as the conventions and rules of this 
activity were very clear to him. He noted during a focus group session that this 
strategy was a way for him to control the auditory sources and space around 
him and direct them to him in ways that are more manageable than the 
spontaneous and uncontrolled sonic domains of everyday life.  
 
Garry’s performative capacities can usefully be seen in relation to the concept of 
somatic careers identified in the literature review. The sensory ritual of 
controlling auditory and atmospheric attention towards one of comedy and 
laughter is a direct strategy that counters the unpredictability of life. This then 
went to infuse his everyday interaction with others and his reliance on the 
conventions and rules of comedy such as timing, wordplay and the different 
tones of comedy such as cheesy comedy or shock humour. This was 
highlighted to me during a discussion of Russian Communism; Garry’s first 
thought was to the “beautiful long legs” of a Russian tennis player!16 This led to 
                                                          
16
 This objectified sexual desire speaks to latent heteronormative and able-bodied desires that I 
observed amongst my participants (Goodley, 2014). In the thesis’ conclusion, I will complicate 
this perspective to begin developing critical attention to gender and race categories through 
Goodley’s (2014) analysis of dis/ability detailed in Chapter 1 - Sensory Habits. 
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friendly teasing of his preference for East European women. It is possible to 
theorise this from Mead’s (1962) analytical framework. Garry was here 
integrating the I, or, his affiliation for comedic interaction and performance in 
front or people and the un/successful integration of the genre conventions and 
social norms of comedy. In the capacity of the I, this integration further enables 
the person to reflect on them and generate new ideas and interactive 
frameworks based on their own experiences. The Me, in this case, includes the 
external influences, receptivity and response to the reaction and general mood 
of the audiences in which he presented, as well as the nature and status of the 
event in question. However, in order for this Me process to be undertaken 
successfully, the levels of anxiety and sensory disruption must be kept to a 
minimum, lest they remove the capacity to fully focus on social interactions to 
cope with them. If these conditions were in place, Garry could gain a controlled 
sense of social expectations within the genres of comedy, stand-up and social 
function entertainment.  
 
When Garry felt anxious about an activity, he would turn his anxieties into 
different modal forms in order to gain different perspectives. He cited stories and 
poetry as the two most commonly used literary forms that he formulated his 
thoughts into. He has sets of routines that he would follow that he had 
established and if and when they were disrupted, he would become very upset. 
These activities required him to find a quiet time and place to put his thoughts 
into words and from what I observed and noted during my research, he did not 
find much time to do so and often had to express his feelings to the club 
organiser and leader or members of the club to express them. When he was 
stressed, he would often become emotional, and on occasion, physically 
threatening to prevent any further stress.  
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This is not to say that Garry lost his ability to formulate more literary reflections 
on events that he cared about. Indeed, when I inquired into why he had a 
fondness for caves and majestic buildings when discussing plans for the annual 
club summer holiday, he replied that you could just feel the sense of wonder 
and the impact of time on them. For example, you could see and touch rocks in 
caves that would show you, in their ruggedness, the forces of time and nature. 
Garry noted, “this timelessness was intriguing to him and wanted to go back and 
experience it again”. The darkness and range of spatial organisations from 
cramped tunnels to open, expansive caverns gave a sense of mystery and their 
seemingly stable and solid foundations gave qualities of timelessness that 
piqued Garry’s interest and he wished to experience this sense of wonder and 
captivation more often. These locations brought out evocations from Garry and 
allowed him and compelled him to express himself and share his ideas with 
others. This compulsion was not just from the exquisite qualities of these 
evocative places his anxieties and stresses equally compelled him to talk about 
his feelings and concerns.  
 
This aspect emerged most clearly during two different scenarios that occurred 
throughout my participant observation. The first of these was when we were 
heading into a major city centre for a club trip to a museum. The vast majority of 
members travelled in a large group with the charity organisers and staff. Some 
of the older social club members, who were more independent, made their own 
way via public transport, rather than meeting at a predetermined train station as 
a group. Garry, making his own way for this particular trip ended up being late. 
We waited for him and some others in the group outside the main plaza 
entrance of the museum. After around 10 minutes of waiting, the head of the 
charity received a call on her mobile from Garry, saying that he would be 
arriving soon and was lost on the platform. He arrived a little while later and was 
visibly anxious and talking haphazardly. The club organiser sat him down and 
they discussed what had happened. Garry noted that he had outlined two 
separate routes to the museum on an online journey planner, but, throughout 
the trip, there was a disruption at each turn and when he tried to move to the 
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other journey outline, that too was cancelled. Having his thought-out and 
planned routes disrupted, compounded by the fact that the idea of pre-
preparation, to counter as many unexpected events as possible, did not mitigate 
them in this case, causing a great deal of anxiety and stress. Garry also felt guilt 
as he, in his haste and stress, had pushed someone on the platform in order to 
get away from the crowded areas as soon as possible. 
 
Following Smith and Sharp (2013), the compounding effects of the spatial 
disorientation, cognitive planning and route mapping disruptions and ad hoc 
relocating and mapping, present a distinct difficulty for those with autism. In this 
case the automatic reflex of shoving people away and the disorienting feelings 
of anxiety and stress themselves, all came together to pose difficulties for Garry. 
The spectre of parasite relations in this scenario would not be suppressed and 
the threshold level for each subsequent trigger, from the route disruption, to 
taking an unfamiliar train, to the disorienting spatial, kinaesthetic and auditory 
overload of the train station, was lessened as time went on. However, the telling 
of the story to the club staff, and having them work through it, helped to reduce 
this stress. Staff helped Garry to step back from the immediacy of the situation, 
to remind him that in the cramped and rushed process of moving through the 
train station, people being hurriedly shoved out of the way was a common 
occurrence and that no one would remember it after reaching their final 
destination. As such, Garry should not obsess over it and condense the layers 
of anxiety stimulating events into this one situation that would haunt him via 
guilt. This could be described as an emplaced quasi-object, distributed 
throughout Garry’s mind-body and influenced and refracted through the 
environment in which he found himself. The scenario could have been played 
out over and over in his mind, the feelings of anxiety returning, with vivid 
memories of the shoving event. Regardless of the severity of the impact, these 
events will most likely go on to inform Garry’s future use of journey planners and 
trains.  
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This event showcased the degree to which the blasé attitude suggested by 
Simmel (1950) is not tenable for autistic individuals as anxiety, spatial 
immediacy and diverse movement patterns do not allow for a passive approach 
to sensory experience. The modulating triggers cascade and exacerbate the 
sensory disorientation Garry was experiencing, producing autonomous reflexes 
and a need to remove himself from the situation. As Fitzgerald et al (2017) have 
argued, Simmel, as a late 19th and early 20th century figure, was focused on the 
organic and “proto-psychology” of the “nerves”. This coincided with thinking in 
Victorian psychiatry of “degeneracy” and the lack of moral constitution and fibre 
brought by commercialised distractions and the indoor nature of life (Lawrence, 
2009).  
 
A better way of framing Garry’s distress that does not attribute such negative 
conceptions of sensory and environmental interaction is the concept of the 
“neuropolitan citizen”. This:  
 
describes an organization of physical spaces and social lives, of 
interpersonal exchanges and chance encounters […] simultaneously 
lived and transacted through the embodied lives of Neuropolitan 
citizens (Fitzgerald et al, 2017: 223, emphasis in original).  
 
This takes the distributed quasi-object point that the material, social, sensory, 
spatial and temporal domains of experience are based on interactive pathways 
of interaction. As such, the modalities of sensory and social stressors are woven 
throughout the emplaced bodymind of Garry and his distributed surroundings. 
Against conceptions of a “neurological city” that reduces urban stress to brain 
activity in connection to linear and topographic relationships to the environment. 
(ibid: 228), Garry’s encounter is replete with “chance encounters” and material 
and sensory exchanges that leave durable traces of their encounters. They then 
go on to form quasi-object anchors that force those with autism to slow down 
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and take account of their surroundings and interaction. Garry’s social and 
sensory encounter was not a linear, cause and effect type relation, but comprise 
what Vannini et al (2012) describe as “com(ing) to know our body in multiple, 
nuanced, and at times even contradictory ways” (Vannini et al, 2012: 30). 
Therefore, physical distress and guilt coincide and lead to complex traces of 
sensory and social meaning.  
 
The second scenario I want to draw upon here relates to Garry’s ongoing and 
developing relationship with the organisations he is engaged with and how the 
large number of obligations caused him problems. During a meeting in the 
student café, he was explaining to me and other club members that he was 
having trouble with a large number of members contacting him from one 
disability activity group where he as a member. He was caught up in a dilemma; 
he was being overwhelmed by the number of people messaging him and 
friending him on his Facebook page, not being able to keep up with what was 
happening and getting disorientated. He, however, did not want to appear as 
antisocial or rude by rejecting people or removing them from his page. Not 
having the requisite time to think through the situation, he was not able to fully 
explore or inquire as to the different settings on Facebook, along with not being 
fully aware and competent with modern internet processes. Garry was thinking 
of devising a story in which he would state that he got a computer virus, which 
deleted his Facebook account and so he would make a new one in which he 
would make it private and would accept people one at a time, at his own pace. It 
took the club organiser around half an hour working with him on the club room 
computers to go through with him the different settings on Facebook and alter 
them to his own preference and to manage the amount of information available 
to him at once. For Garry, the desire to make a bold move and remove his 
account in one action was the initial best possible scenario he could envision for 
himself. The situation had threatened to unravel an integrated sense of 
subjectivity that would overwhelm and engulf his passion for performance and 
engagement.  
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He could not integrate the use of Facebook as a personal social object with their 
relational object component. In trying to delete his account, he would have 
turned it into a provocative object that would have caused more questions and 
confusion for all parties involved, causing discomfort. The sensory and social 
thresholds (Smith and Sharp, 2013) cascaded preventing clarity in Garry’s 
thoughts and responses to the situation. The compulsion to withdraw from the 
situation as fast as possible sought to prevent negative, parasitic relations from 
encroaching on an incredibly enjoyable activity. However, working with the club 
leader to alter his preferences allowed him to create a more productive quasi-
object filtering system that allowed Garry to manage his engagement and 
information flows with others. Assistance in working through the parasitical 
relations early on prevented the cascade from gaining momentum. The close 
connection of the club members and staff served to escalate this resolution 
before irreparable damage could be done. This event also showcases once 
more the destabilising tendencies of understanding our bodies in nuanced and 
contradictory ways (Vannini et al, 2012: 30).  
 
The third and final case will be in reference to Josh and his interest and 
relationship to a film project and travel incident and the ways in which the 
temporal duration of events impacts upon habitual actions and motivations.  
 
Josh - Filming Breakdowns 
 
Josh, a member of the Youth Club, managed the relationship between forming 
new habits and favourite interests, which was strongly influenced by the gap 
between the origin and resolution of an event. Josh can be a loud, brash and 
somewhat self-centred young man in his early 20’s who often got himself into 
trouble. He often referred to himself as “the wind-up merchant” of the group and 
that he liked to “take the mick” out of people. Unfortunately, he often took this 
too far and was not sensitive to others feelings or the context of his remarks that 
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required staff to remind him to “tone it down” or reprimand him. On occasion, he 
would show strong mood swings and experience intense bursts of anger. These 
were very short lived and non-violent, but were quick to emerge as Josh did not 
show easily observable displays of increasing irritation. This boisterous attitude 
transferred over to the ways in which he engaged with other members. He often 
wore large, puffy coats to make himself unintentionally very physically imposing. 
He also found it hard to be considerate of others people’s opinions or 
perspectives when he was stressed, angry or upset and would become very 
selfish. Behind all these issues, however, was a young man who was very 
motivated and focused on doing good things for the club and for representing 
those with autism on a wider level. Over the course of my fieldwork, Josh 
became part of an advocacy organisation as an ambassador for young autistic 
people. By the end of my fieldwork, he was preparing to address a group of 
MP’s at the Houses of Parliament on ways to support those with autism. This 
inspired him to take better care of himself and consider the way he spoke and 
dressed to convey his passion for advocacy. When the situation called for it, he 
could also be very gentle and intimate. This was shown to me when Alice, his 
close friend, was being overwhelmed by the noise and movement of the 
underground train; he took it upon himself to use his large frame and puffy coat 
to let her press into him to cover her face, eyes and ears to block the sensory 
stimuli out. This multi-layered character factored into the two events I now wish 
to focus on.  
 
Early on during my fieldwork, Josh, who had expressed interest in taking part in 
the research, soon after the first focus group session, embarked on a mission to 
create a short film for the charity’s website section on the Social and Youth 
Club. This was spurred by a number of issues. His enthusiasm for and interest 
in working with technology including PCs, game consoles and mobile devices. 
He often boasted and informed people that he would buy all kinds of 
technological devices. This included an IPad, which he often took with him and 
used in different contexts and for multiple tasks. A central use for the IPad was 
the discovering and utilisation of apps. He would often be captivated by an app 
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and would engage with it for a few weeks and share it with the group, such as a 
quiz app or video clip player, before moving onto the next app. The idea for the 
film came about one evening when Josh was finding and downloading a film 
creation app that allowed the user to produce short clips with music, visual 
effects and production credits. Josh’s ultimate goal was to make a short film that 
would showcase the fun, positive and accepting nature of the club and that 
would be a service user produced promotional tool that was directed by them, 
for other services users.   
 
During one club session in early November 2014, myself, Josh and two other 
members, were brainstorming ideas for the film and settled on our different roles 
for the film including director, production director and camera operator. We then 
went to the clubroom entrance and made a short montage of each of us entering 
the door, making poses, with captions to mark the introduction to the video and 
show the audience who was behind the film. After this, we reviewed the 
montage and made adjustments until everyone was satisfied. During this time, 
we focused on the main content of the film, the activities and people to be 
showcased in the film and the style and effects to be used to highlight these 
aspects in the best possible manner. However, we ran out of time and initially 
made plans to continue with the work next week. Josh also agreed to show 
Alice (another participant of the focus groups and research) how the film app 
worked for the next week. It was agreed that apart from me, they would meet up 
in the park on Wednesdays, as they routinely did, to discuss ideas further and to 
get straight to filming on the club night. However, for the next 3 weeks after this 
session, Alice did not come to the Clubs she and Josh were quite close friends, 
who shared anxieties, important events and laughed and joked with each other. 
This removed Josh’s initial enthusiasm for the film and we did not work on the 
film again for the rest of the time I conducted my fieldwork.  
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Josh’s unwavering commitment to recruit me as part of the filming activities was 
a surprise. It was one of my first glimpses at his caring and inclusive nature, 
wanting to get people to be involved in group activities. On occasion, I would 
walk around the club space and observe the many different activities, rather 
than settle and take part in a specific one. This was in order to gain a more 
holistic sense of the social interactions of the club space. But, if I am being 
honest, this strategy was equally due to my social anxiety and subsequent 
difficulties in instigating conversation or knowing how to ask to take part in a 
board game mid-way through for example. Josh’s impassioned request that I 
take part in the film project was a relief in this case as I had been invited to take 
part in club activities. I am grateful to Josh for this openness in this situation.  
 
A number of factors led to this unfortunate conclusion, which fed into the 
problematic of how to best manage and introduce new habitual and routine sets 
of practices into an already well-grounded and stabilised set of habitual actions 
and structures. Let me note that when I talk about habitual actions and 
structures in this context, I am referring for the former with regard to events such 
as board game play, Wii use, arts and crafts or heading to the outdoor field to 
play football. The latter involves the weekly same location and time of the clubs, 
the same group of staff who attended and supported the members, the timing 
and occurrence of a break mid-way through the 2 hours and the signposting of 
these said structures throughout the session for clarity. Ordinarily, the club 
would begin by members entering the room and getting settled in. The staff 
would then retrieve from the Club store cupboard, depending on availability and 
ease of access due to clutter and mess, arts and crafts, board games or 
pool/ping pong equipment. This would continue until an hour had passed, when 
the group would head to the college café for the break. During the second half of 
the session, members may re-join the games or activities, or, they could take a 
more relaxed approach and sit on the sofas to have more laid back discussions, 
rather than having to manage and negotiate the social etiquettes and turn taking 
involved in playing a board game for instance. I bring up the general flow of a 
club session here, because the filming disrupted several of these conventions 
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and also alerted me to some new norms that had remained unnoticed until that 
point.  
 
Firstly, the film planning activity had a clear sense of purpose to it and was 
highly structured and organised, this was in stark contrast to playing a board 
game or pool game, where members would often drift in and out of the activity, 
depending upon interest, general ability to maintain social composure and if 
another member or activity was calling to them or piquing their interest. 
Secondly, the filming session was undertaken outside of the clubroom itself. We 
relocated to the small passage that led to the room and filmed the separate 
member montage clips walking down the passage, through the door. Aside from 
rare occurrences, often in the Youth Club, when people would chase after each 
other during teasing related to tactile discomfort and the above mentioned food 
breaks, the activities in the club were kept within the spatial confines of the club 
room. To be separated from the central activity hub of the club was thus a 
spatial demarcation that rendered it for the participants as a unique and different 
activity than would normally be undertaken.  
 
On a more individual note in relation to Josh’s connection between routine 
engagements and planning, during a focus group, he, with the help of the club 
organiser, revealed to me that he often had difficulty in initiating or undertaking 
activities that were not an immediate part of his established routine. If left to his 
own devices, he would remain in his room and play online multiplayer games 
like Call of Duty. In order to combat this, he and his support assistant devised a 
weekly timetable and outline of events such as washing and cleaning teeth, 
getting clothes on and so on. Phil, another club member inquired as to “Whether 
he would clean his teeth without the timetable”. Josh replied that “I wouldn’t 
unless someone told me to”. Josh, however, took pride in the fact that he “did 
not need an alarm to wake up” and “I do all the jobs around the house without 
being told”. His motivation to come out of his routine in this instance was guided 
by ease of access and familiarity of his devices, becoming immersed within 
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them sometimes to the cost of external engagements. Furthermore, I noted at 
the start of this section that Josh was motivated by his ambassador role to 
practise his speaking skills in front of the mirror consistently. This was a self-
organised initiative and thus Josh embodies both aspects of independence and 
support that mix together in specific contexts. His interest in creating the film for 
the charity was later taken up by him becoming an ambassador for an 
associated autism organisation that wished to bring issues of work, political 
participation and access to government as central concerns. He also oversaw 
the process of assessing whether autism organisations were meeting their duty 
to provide support and services. He clearly had a motivation and interest in the 
film project and was just as keen to share that enthusiasm with the rest of the 
club members. 
 
So, what were the habitual mechanisms that prevented Josh from doing so? 
The key to answering this query can be found in Dewey’s (1922) work on how to 
effectively establish new habits so that they can become engrained and 
dynamic points of entry and action to a particular problem or situation. Dewey 
argues that too often, when we are trying to instil in ourselves new habitual 
formations and set of actions, we try to break away from our old habits and very 
quickly engage in the direct opposite of the behaviour we are trying to curb in 
order to sustain new action pathways. For Dewey, this misses the point entirely 
of what habits are and can do for us, as habits are a performance and 
continuum of actions and structures of being in the world. Thus, to try and stop 
smoking by suddenly not smoking at all is incredibly counterproductive and the 
highly negative effects of withdrawal will most likely convince the person to 
engage in the behaviour more and be less reluctant to try and stop. What is 
required in these situations then, is some mediating concept, activity, action or 
practices that serves to bridge the gap between the old and the new. Instead of 
cutting off smoking, the person may go to a support group that alongside 
helping to quit smoking undertakes leisure activities and becomes a social hub 
for the people involved (Dewey, 1922: 15-42). 
 ~ 137 ~ 
 
For the film session, this scenario described by Dewey played out in a number 
of ways. The first problem was that Josh introduced the idea suddenly to the 
members of the group, and while the interest and passion he displayed helped 
to carry the project along, the lack of binding social arrangements, such as the 
people involved not being present for the next few weeks and the group re-
entering the normal routine of the club due to this lack of engagement, led to the 
project’s demise. The question of wanting to show Alice how the app worked 
was a good idea in this context. However, to introduce the idea to her at the end 
of the club session to be followed up in a weeks time, did not lend itself to 
forming a sustaining connection. Instead of say, introducing the app to Alice one 
week as part of a wider engagement with the usual routine of the club and then 
bringing the idea up to other members, interested in what they were doing and 
then the next week, sketching out ideas for the film and what activities would 
feature, Josh set up the production, allocation of roles, outline of ideas, activities 
to feature and the actual filming, all in the space of 2 hours! Following Dewey, in 
order to be more effective, the filming needed to be introduced gradually and as 
part of the wider interactional order in which the intrigue of activities is garnered 
by mulling around and interacting with other members. The gradual formation of 
a more organised, not necessarily formal, routine of filming, editing and planning 
procedures could have been set up, established and utilised over the course of 
a few weeks.  
 
The reader may have noticed at this point that Dewey’s argument is in some 
senses similar to Serres’ (2007, 2008) notion of the quasi-object. To recap, 
Serres is more concerned with a general framework from which to study all 
mediating or third relations between objects and subjects. Quasi-objects and 
parasite relations are universal for Serres and can only be worked around, 
never removed. Dewey then, is engaged in a social and interest driven analysis 
of how to maximise the effectiveness of habitual engagement. Where quasi-
objects allow us to slow down our perceptions and draw in the socio-spatial-
temporal coordinates to particular events, Dewey’s transactional approach to 
habits points us to the socio-psycho-ecological nexus’ that are to be found in 
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play within a given situation. The filming situation can thus best be summarised 
as an event that was a temporary quasi-object to bring together members’ 
commitments and organise them across different and diverse spaces. The 
transactional process needed in order to bring these to fruition was lacking. The 
lure and familiarity of the club routines and the lack of spatial or temporal 
engagement beyond the first and immediate session caused the breakdown. 
Josh’s desire to not continue the project without the aid or the insights of the rest 
of the group reflected the shared and social nature of the endeavour that also 
enabled new spatial arrangements, such as the filming in the door passageway, 
alongside potential new socially mediated scenarios of members performing 
common activities for the film.  
 
Escalator Sickness 
 
I now want to consider another favourite of Josh’s that serves to further point out 
possible transactive relationships that altered over time. During my research, 
Josh often brought up his interest in trains. When he was younger, his uncle 
would take him to work with him at the ticket office. Josh was then treated to an 
insider glimpse at the train network computer system that kept track of all the 
trains with various different graphic and visual effects, colours and data codes 
that enabled communication and operation of the train system. This sparked an 
interest in knowing where each train and network in London led to. Over time, 
he learnt about the vast majority of trains and their routes. In his teenage years, 
Josh noted that on occasion, he would often sit with his girlfriend at a station 
and train spot for several hours. This then led into the contemporary form of this 
interest. After a few months, people who regularly worked at the station and 
regular rail passengers noticed their presence and established a rapport with 
them. Josh then regaled his interest in trains and his knowledge of the networks 
proved very helpful for the passengers. He was thus very much appreciated and 
his knowledge was recognised, reinforcing his interest and desire to one day 
work on the train computer network. 
 ~ 139 ~ 
 
I gained this knowledge by listening to and taking part in group discussions with 
Josh in a group discussion during a train journey and did not ask him about it 
personally. I did not have to in many situations. For example, when waiting 
outside the train station for the rest of the group to take the train on the trip, he 
would come up to me to discuss issues he was having with his freedom pass, 
trying to renew it. He exclaimed that he “I will argue for hours“ with the train 
officials and stubbornly insist that there were no issues with the pass. During 
these situations, I did not attempt to question Josh’s assumptions or suggest 
that it might be rude or overbearing to insist that he was absolutely right. I let 
him speak at me rather than engage in a dialogue. Perhaps this was not the 
best option as he was willing to make the whole group wait until the situation 
was resolved if it came to it. Ultimately, I did not want to appear as a figure of 
authority and left the situation for the club leader to handle. Josh’s overbearing 
conversational style and his stubborn disregard for the welfare of the rest of the 
group troubled me somewhat. Part of this was selfish reasons “if we are 
delayed, the plan of how the day will proceed I made in my head will be 
disrupted. That is going to cause some major anxiety”. My own autistic 
tendencies of desiring planned, routine disruption entered heavily into my 
considerations. On another level, I was concerned that Josh would make a 
public spectacle of the group in public and draw unnecessary attention to us and 
make us look disruptive and cause tempers to flare. Similarly to Garry, my 
thoughts became preoccupied by these anxieties and the weight of my 
interaction lingered. Whenever we approached train ticket stations and gates 
during our journey, I tensed up and my anxiety prevented me from being fully 
engaged with my surroundings. In these situations, my focus on the background 
was diminished and as such, my focus was on the immediate situation. In the 
end, no incidents arose and our journey proceeded relatively smoothly. 
Nonetheless, in contrast to Josh’s accepting gesture to take part in the film 
project, here, I gained a first-hand sense of his brash and overbearing 
character. While in-the-moment, the situation was uncomfortable, after waiting a 
day to write up my field-notes, I gained a more well-rounded perspective on the 
event.   
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Taking these interests together, contributing to self-affirming factors of 
recognition and self-taught knowledge, led Josh to be confident in his abilities in 
navigating and possessing useful guidance for people with queries about travel 
routes, such as when the group went out on club trips to museums, theatre 
shows or the seaside. On trips, he would often charge ahead of the rest of the 
group because he knew where he was going and how to navigate the various 
tunnels, passageways, stairs and platforms that made up the train and 
underground stations. He also was self-assertive and often ignored people’s 
concerns when he stood near the yellow line on platforms or came across as 
smug when he retorted that he did not need help or guidance because he knew 
what to do.  
 
This background is important in understanding an incident during a trip to a 
museum that combined Josh’s use and interest in trains with his physical 
embodiment and proprioceptive management of navigating an underground 
station. We were arriving at our stop on the underground and had to climb 
several sets of steep escalators to get to the street. The group went up the 
escalators together, however, Josh soon became profoundly uncomfortable with 
the high concentration of bodies in close proximity and the inertia felt due to the 
slow momentum of the escalators. He made a snap, ad hoc decision to not wait 
for the escalators. Instead, he ran up the 2 or 3 sets of escalators needed to 
reach street level. However, when the rest of the group reached the top, Josh 
was suffering from an asthma attack. This went on for about 30 minutes as we 
slowly walked to the museum entrance. In essence, Josh traded his 
proprioceptive and socio-spatial discomfort for bodily, and in particular, 
respiratory crises. It is impossible to know whether or not he anticipated the risk 
of an asthma attack based on the quick, pressured decision that he made. But 
nonetheless in this scenario, he did not or could not gain a sense of the 
threshold levels that would trigger negative responses in his body and so one 
anxiety producing cycle, which could be viewed as a more general sense of 
awareness, was replaced by one in which the physicality of the body became 
primary.  
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Drawing from Serres’ analysis, it is possible to theorise that Josh sought to 
escape from one parasitical relationship, only to become embroiled in another. I 
will explore how this played out in a future club session in a moment and how 
the relationship between reflexive and somatic rituals was enacted. But first, to 
finish off this scenario, because we had to travel back via the same method, 
Josh asked whether two people from the group could stand behind and in front 
of him in case he fell over due to vertigo, with little regard for their own safety or 
if they would agree to do so. He could not, in his strained and vulnerable state, 
formulate a considered solution to the problem that took into account the wider 
structures and micro processes that constituted the group dynamics of the 
travelling party. Following Mead (1934) once more he focused more upon the I, 
or the more individual and internal factors that impacted on his approach and 
struggled to extend his reflections beyond the iconic, or in-the-moment, feelings 
and sensations, to use Vannini et al’s (2012) terminology. He struggled to walk 
with the group and assess whether or not his asthma attack had stopped, 
indicating difficulty in reconciling a “token-type” or making sense of his 
sensations through discussions with others. Interestingly, Josh’s asthma served 
as a biological and social parasite, making it an active quasi-object that forced 
itself upon Josh and the group. This translated on occasion to being a 
provocative quasi-object that produced concern and status check-ups in relation 
to Josh’s condition. The lack of symbolic realisation prevented Josh from 
contributing to effectively resolving his active and provocative status on his own 
terms. This contributed to his seeming lack of awareness on the part of other 
group members to bear the responsibility of aiding him during our journey.  
 
Ordinarily, this is where the event would have ended, causing Josh to try and 
find self-sought solutions to his problems. However, it just so happened that 
around a month later, during a club session, a representative from Transport for 
London came to the Youth Club to talk to the club members about the latest 
initiatives and schemes to help those with autism. During the Q&A period at the 
end of the session, Josh asked if there was a way to get around using 
escalators if the station in question had no lifts. The representative replied that 
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during non-peak hours, it was possible to ask the station staff to temporarily 
stop the escalators and walk up them. This answer satisfied him greatly and he 
began to prepare to see how he could put it into practice. This epilogue to the 
escalator episode points to how the event became embedded within Josh’s 
mind-body and enabled him to respond to elicitations for queries regarding 
disabled access using public transport. This space enabled him to become more 
aware of the somatic rituals inherent within the event that he could bring 
together and make broader sense of the event and devise new forms of action 
to tackle it. He was inspired both by his emplaced experience of the escalators 
and his wider and more historical developmental interest in rail infrastructures, 
along with his confidence and assertiveness in relation to this interest to forge 
new connections and pathways. In this sense, parasitical relations are not 
always negative and can lead to productive reflections on somatic careers that 
help those affected by them to relate to them in new ways that respond to 
concrete and emplaced problems.  
 
Conclusion – Reformulating Parasites and Quasi-Objects Through Autistic 
Experiences 
 
The process of forming quasi-objects is an essential and universal function of 
human engagement with the world. Quasi-objects are also bound up with and 
only emerge in connection to specific social practices and events in the world 
such that the processes called upon play specific roles and provide diverse 
responses (Brown, 2002). As this chapter has shown, the different uses and 
functions of quasi-objects in the formation of habitual processes is diverse and 
maintains a linkage between personal interests and the means to manage and 
negotiate them within wider social contexts. The degrees to which parasitical 
relations enter into this picture are also dependent on the situation and the 
emplaced character of the social actor and social environment in question. What 
is parasitical to one autistic person may be harmonious for another. As I have 
already noted, processes of quasi-object formation and parasitism are 
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inescapable, but this does not mean that complexity and dynamism cannot be 
found. In order to examine this proposition it is important to recognise the 
central tendency within the above accounts of balancing or modulating between 
becoming too immersed in an activity and being overwhelmed by sensory 
stimuli.  
 
What is necessary, and indeed is inherent within Serres’ notion of the parasite, 
is the productive capacity of third relations to produce connection between two 
seemingly absolutely demarcated domains to enable productive dialogue 
(Brown, 2002: 16). The favourite quasi-object enables this through several 
processes. The first of these is the connection of personal investments and 
material, social or technological mediators that enable this process to be 
possible. For Doug this meant bringing the seemingly unbridgeable gap 
between cats and their specific, ecological characteristics and the 
simultaneously global/local process of climate change into dialogue to produce 
effective and quirky technological solutions such as the cat toilet. In another 
sense, we could also argue that Doug is drawing upon an anthropological sense 
of temporality in that the history of domestication of cats is a form of biological 
parasitism so that we may sustain ourselves and produce new forms of relations 
for cats to embody.  
 
Gary’s struggles to maintain a comfortable sense of connection to his 
performing obligations is a dynamic example of how noise and interruption 
emerged over time and the ways in which social media intensify the need for 
successful solutions to be found. These forms of what it means to be a parasite 
all point to the complex ways in which autism is imbricated in processes of self-
stability and destabilisation which are further complicated and augmented by 
technological advancements. Ultimately, this chapter has attempted to show the 
various relations of favourite quasi-objects and habitual interaction that served 
to structure and engage the participants in the research. It has offered analysis 
and insight into how parasitical relations and habitual action are co-constituted 
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and offer pragmatic solutions and responses to the transactive milieus in which 
autistic individuals find themselves.  
 
What the examples demonstrate are the empirical means by which the universal 
need for humans to produce quasi-objects is made performatively, enacted 
within specific contexts for specific needs and uses. Here I have expanded 
Serres’ focus on the material and symbolic tokenistic approach (Brown, 2002) to 
one that incorporates the socio-psycho-ecological dimensions of social life 
through various means of making quasi-objects social. The mechanisms used 
by my autistic participants are not completely powerless in the face of the 
universal and inescapable processes of parasitism that grounds and structures 
society and social relations. I have also complicated the notion that special 
interests are merely obsessive, stereotypical and repetitive. Recognition must 
be made to the immense amount of work and personal meaning embroiled and 
folded into the processes of habitual favourite formation and the diverse array of 
possible meanings and processes participants understood and related to 
themselves and the world around them.  
 
The next chapter will take a rather different tack as the focus will shift to a 
reflexive account of the researcher’s position as a disabled researcher within the 
contemporary neoliberal university. It will explore how the concepts and ideas 
within this thesis are inspired by my own sense of experiencing the world and 
how these concepts in turn can be used to make sense of my own role in this 
project. As such, the tone and writing style of the chapter will change to a more 
open, more informal and unconventional means of engaging with ideas and 
writing itself. In particular, I develop an account that takes the evocative nature 
of autoethnographic writings and reconsider them from the perspective of a 
researcher with autism. I will seek to challenge some of the assumptions 
underwriting critiques of autoethnography as narcissistic in relation to writing 
about oneself. In doing this, I will offer an argument that autoethnography, or 
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autieethnography, can offer insights into the mundanities of everyday academic 
practice that can highlight the taken-for-granted assumptions of such activities.   
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Chapter 4 - An Auto/AutieEthnography Part 1 Methodological and Researcher 
Positionality 
 
Vignette - A Multivocal Outline of Key Themes in The Autoethnographic 
Literature 
 
Descriptor Voice:17 – I sit at a table, in the middle of the club room, not actively 
participating in any activity in an engaged way, but rather, observing, listening, 
feeling and assessing the emotional state of myself, participants and the 
interactions between them, trying to gauge the unfolding events. Next to me is a 
club member, who preferred to be on their own, yet, was not averse to people 
being in close proximity (so long as they did not interrupt their activities). They 
were playing a solo game of Scrabble. I was attempting to undertake my usual 
form of “interaction” within a busy social scene, appearing not to be invested in 
anything, in deep self-thought, yet listening and looking intently at ongoing 
events. I might learn about a couples’ dinner plans, conversations on a work 
document needing to be referred to in a meeting, and so on. Trying to look deep 
in thought so that no-one disturbs me, but, in the club setting, I am slightly more 
relaxed…… as I get enjoyment out of the antics ongoing around me as the quirks 
of each member continue to evolve for me in new scenarios and topics of 
discussion.   
 
                                                          
17
 The use of “voices” in this chapter and the next “Autoethnography Part 2” is part of my 
commitment to an evocative style of autoethnographic writing that I will explore in the first 
conceptual section. The “voiced vignette” that starts the chapter utilises a number of techniques 
to disrupt and draw the reader’s attention to the different modalities and events occurring in the 
vignette. If the reader is disorientated by the sharp introduction of a different writing style, they 
may wish to begin the chapter from “Introduction - of Vignettes and Autoethnographies” and 
finish the chapter before returning to the vignette for theoretical and conceptual context.  
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Writer/Reader Voice: Wait a moment, Descriptor Voice, you seem to be going 
coming out of your role here slightly. You’re talking about and explaining the 
author’s mode of sensory engagement when sitting down and still, but, that 
should be relegated to the Analysis/Interpretation Voice! You’re setting up 
different kinds of voices as distinct entities and already the reader is seeing 
them blur together. Should I be talking about the club member’s activity? Getting 
distracted by trying to formulate something like my everyday sensory coping 
mechanisms? Let’s not ramble and try to fit too many ideas into this vignette like 
I try to do with the theoretical and conceptual ideas I wish to discuss! 
 
Descriptor Voice18: (Right, back on track then). As I sit across the table, the club 
member is playing Scrabble with themselves, not wanting others to get involved, 
but also not totally averse to the idea, putting words together at their own 
leisure. I sit opposite them on the table and the board is upside down, so as I 
watch, I am trying to decipher the words backwards, or slightly curved to the 
right or left based on my head and bodys spatial positioning. I PONDER THE 
DIFFERENCES BETWEEN TRYING TO THINK OF WORDS BASED ON 
SINGLE LETTERS, SEPARATED INTO TILES AGAINST WRITING WITH 
THEM VIA PROSE OR POETRY WHERE THE UNITS OF THOUGHT MIGHT 
BE WITH WHOLE WORDS RATHER THAN LETTERS PLACED TOGETHER, 
                                                          
18
 The different voices in this section are used to explore and make explicitly apparent the 
different concerns and forms of writing and thinking that are often erased from the final text such 
as deciding what to exclude from analytical considerations. The different grammatical forms, text 
sizes and formatting choices allow the words and ideas conveyed in them to be given a 
distinctive textual key and trace that deepens the immersive description of the ethnographic 
event. Central examples are the different coloured text, providing a multi-modal and thus multi-
sensory context to the vignette that formal writing does not convey. Further, the use of italics in 
this descriptor voice serves a quasi-mimetic role in that the curved nature of italics is attempting 
to mimic the spatial orientation of moving my head and the insights this leads to. The 
subsequent capitalisation of the analytical insights are to shock the reader into a more cognitive 
mode of thinking that is attempting to shut down the evocative technique just utilised which the 
ethical voice goes on to reflexively question and disrupt a single, coherent narrative strain 
(Perselli: 2008).  
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ONE AT A TIME. Whilst doing this, I think of my research and how because I 
AM FOCUSED ON THE SENSES, THIS VISUAL, KINAESTHETIC EVENT OF 
READING UPSIDE DOWN SCRABBLE TILES IS WHAT I END UP FOCUSING 
ON, TO THE IN-THE-MOMENT AT THE DETRIMENT OF OTHER SENSORY 
MODES OF ATTENTION such as the level of background noise, the smells of 
food and how the heated inside room is contrasted with the cold, dark outdoors.  
 
Ethics/Focus Voice: Pause again, should I REALLY include this vignette? I 
mean, the club member I am referring to is not someone who took part in the 
focus groups and was not as engaged with the research as other members. I 
had decided to focus most of my analysis and field-notes on the 12 members, (6 
from both Youth and Social Clubs), in order to gain a more in-depth 
understanding of their sensory and habitual engagements with the social world. 
But, this member caused me to reflect on my own sensory and habitual biases 
when it comes to sensing, not just observing the research setting. This club 
member gave me pause to think about my bias to cognising ideas in my head 
and the difficulty of not letting my emotional or affective sensations be mediated 
by disembodied theorising and conceptualising later on. (This point is being 
SHOUTED out above, but, is this too overbearing?) Nonetheless, should I 
include this vignette as an example, as the event is so brief and the description 
is being lost to the interpretative domain? (Also, am I being too self-absorbed?) 
 
Analysis/Interpreter Voice: Well, this vignette is indeed valuable, as you have 
mentioned, but you have not mentioned the member’s name or even gender 
and the activity they have engaged with, Scrabble, would not be too readily 
identifiable as many other participants engaged in solo Scrabble games and 
were part of the wider ecology of activities that took place in any given club 
session. I also just want to note that your descriptions of the sensory and spatial 
processes that you undertook to make sense of the upside-down Scrabble tiles 
displays a more emplaced and bodily sense of how particular ideas, concepts 
and meanings can come from specific environmental and bodily configurations. 
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It may just be the case that you are already showing awareness of different 
modes of emplacement and that different forms of literature presentation allow 
for multiple interpretations and readings of a single event. Just as 
autoethnography can encompass biographical writing, poetry, traditional 
storytelling and theoretically informed analysis.  
 
Ethics/Focus Voice: Ah…. I suppose those are good points.  
 
Descriptor Voice: Partway through the game, the club organiser and leader 
came over to see what was happening and make casual conversation with me 
and the club member. However, not long afterwards, the Scrabble playing 
member noticed the Wii game console in the top right corner of the room with 
Mario Kart Wii playing and became captivated by the sounds and colours of the 
graphics and character voices. They then went over to play the game with other 
members, leaving Scrabble rather abruptly without putting anything away or 
acknowledging the club leader. The club leader and I both shared a knowing 
glance that sensory stimulation overcame social niceties. I then went over to the 
Wii area where members and participants were located and switched my modes 
of attention to the interpersonal group dynamics of taking turns and expressing 
and sharing frustrations and successes in the game.   
 
Writer/Author Voice: Ok, time to switch my writing/thinking process to the more 
formal, continuous prose writing of developing a traditional introduction.  
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Introduction - Of Vignettes and Autoethnographies 
 
The above vignette serves to illustrate some of the key methodological, 
theoretical and ethical issues that have been raised in the literature on 
autoethnography. This chapter will discuss the most relevant literature and 
examples within the autoethnography corpus that have formed my perspective 
on the method and my reasons for developing my autoethnographic accounts 
as I have. I will first outline some of the writing techniques and devices I have 
drawn upon and used in my own autoethnographic writing. Reasoning will be 
given for my use of a vignette format, the inclusion and demarcation of multiple 
voices within the vignette account and the methodological and theoretical 
reasons for these decisions based on poststructuralist concerns with 
autoethnography.  
 
Detailed attention will be given to the methodological, theoretical and ethical 
concerns that have been raised against and for autoethnography. In particular, I 
will address the accusation that autoethnographic writing is narcissistic or self-
absorbed; arguing that viewing autoethnography in this way reinforces negative 
conceptions of autism in relation to developing relationships with others and 
conveying ideas to those others. I shall also consider some of the relational 
ethics that pertain to my account that is shaped by my connection to disability 
support and what this reveals about the mundane and hidden aspects of PhD 
writing and academic work in general. My conclusions will serve to reemphasise 
the importance and possibility of doing an autistic autoethnography or 
“autieethnography” and the importance of developing analytically informed 
research analysis.  
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The Evocative Uses of Vignettes and Multivocality in Autoethnographic 
Accounts  
 
My use of vignettes is based on several inspirations drawn from Humphreys’ 
(2005) outline of their use in the autoethnographic literature. Vignettes concern 
and develop a “vivid portrayal of the conduct of an event of everyday life” 
(Erickson 1986: 149), that enhance “contextual richness” (Miles and Huberman, 
1994: 83), giving depth and life to the charity clubs. They are “performance 
vignettes [that] elicit emotional identification and understanding” (Denzin, 1989: 
124). They are performative in the sense that they bring into being aspects of 
their description and elaboration in their elucidation. I, like Humphreys, also 
follow Erickson who argues that vignettes should be “based on fieldnotes taken 
as the events happened” (Erickson, 1986: 150). In aligning myself as an 
emerging sociological researcher/theorist, I display my allegiances and 
emotions that serve to make the vignettes meaningful and are based not solely 
on my field-notes, but also, “headnotes”: “the impressions, scenes, and 
experiences of the field that are far too numerous to record” (Ottenberg, 1990 in 
Wall, 2008: 45). This includes conjuring up the emotional and affective tonalities 
of the events in question, the arrangement of the objects such as furniture in the 
club room and the degrees to which the routines of habit had been disrupted. 
The use of memories in data or field-notes is often seen as problematic within 
conventional and realist ethnography due to their fragmented, unreliable and 
vague nature. However field-notes can often contradict remembered events and 
also remediate memory every time they are read, altering them in the process 
(Lederman, 1990). Utilising memory in this way prevents realist objectivity and 
gives access to some of the more spontaneous reactions during the research.  
 
 
In the introductory vignette passage above, I describe and explore the multiple 
ways in which my subject position within the context of my research at the clubs 
was conducted. I have used different “voices”, as well as colours, font sizes and 
formats to try and convey the different ways in which forms of connection and 
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relation to the subject matter intersect, diverge and relate to produce a particular 
version of an event. The event described in this vignette led me to reflect on 
how the research was altering my awareness, both bodily and cognitively, of 
how I interpreted actions and events in the fieldsite. In producing a fluid, 
evolving account of how responses to the event developed, applying a 
“multivocal” approach, I have drawn upon Robert Mizzi’s (2010) work of 
articulating the multiple subject positions from which Mizzi interpreted an 
autoethnographic episode. A multivocal approach seeks to attend to the “plural 
and sometimes contradictory narrative voices located within the researcher” 
(Mizzi, 2010, emphasis in original). The article in question is seeking to explore 
the multiple subject positions within Mizzi’s international development work in 
Kosovo to train teachers. The vignette he develops however, concerns issues 
related to the controversial issues of homosexual identity and state repression 
in Kosovo and the ambiguous ways in which Mizzi’s colleagues speak about the 
issue at the workplace regarding new employees. Mizzi deploys different voices 
related to cultural sensitivity, employee and teacher subjectivities to explore and 
detail the contradictory, congruent and intersecting positions from which Mizzi 
made sense of the situation. 
 
I want to consider this approach from the perspective of giving multiple voices 
and positions to the researcher and participants and how this portrayal can 
contribute to autoethnographic accounts. Mizzi is careful to point out that the 
connection to wider social contexts in autoethnographic work should not be tied 
to legitimised or culturally or indeed, academically formalised categories such 
as class or gender. Rather, any autoethnographic account should be specifically 
related to the concrete, empirical detail of the situation and what the 
autoethnographer feels best captures the arguments they wish to make. We 
should seek to challenge stereotypical accounts of how the author may be 
perceived and which kind of writing “fits” particular kinds of events and the 
associated reporting style whether it be descriptive, analytic or narrative. For my 
purpose, this means showcasing how an autistic researcher conducting an 
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autoethnography can both embrace familiar means of description and also 
challenge them.  
 
Mizzi argues that:  
 
in an autoethnography voices can, in fact, layer and (en)counter each 
other […] the narrative voices encounter and build upon what each is 
saying and, through this process, they situate themselves either in 
agreement or contradiction with each other. Sometimes they do so 
purposefully with the intention to express harmony, vulnerability, or 
conflict, and sometimes they just stand alone for consideration as 
part of a chorus. The shared goal here is that by bringing attention to 
narrative voices, an open orientation towards the reader emerges 
whereby the reader may become emotionally involved with what is 
being said […] Effectively, multivocality can (a) highlight power 
differences in a research scenario between the researcher and 
participants, (b) encourage the researcher to consider how competing 
aspects of her or his identity shape relationships, and (c) expose 
underlying researcher vulnerabilities or tensions. (Mizzi, 2010: 7-8).  
 
Multivocal autoethnography can give the context and analytical tools that are 
necessary to develop an awareness of the social, emotional, cultural and 
emplaced contexts in which power in social interaction occurs and the ways this 
impacts on the potential future directions of these interactions. Mizzi develops 
these insights with reference to Bakhtin’s (1981) analysis of dialogic discourse 
that recognises the forms and techniques in which narrators introduce genres 
and speech patterns. This is done in order to produce different forms of 
meaning and understanding within a text that can challenge genre or linguistic 
conventions to expand and surprise readers and writers. This process is termed 
“heteroglossia” (Bakhtin, 1981: 263). This in turn allows for a “plural 
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consciousness” (ibid: 278) that enables social dialogue to emerge from 
developing the background context through to these heteroglossia processes. 
As Mizzi’s quote above suggests - in contrast to Bahktin who argued that 
multiple voices of an author do not overlap -in multi-vocal autoethnography, the 
voices build upon or disrupt each other to create new effects and meanings. 
This sense of multiple voices speaks to issues of author representation that I 
turn to below.  
 
An Evocative and Post-Structural Commitment to Openness  
 
 
My intention in thinking with these theoretical and methodological concerns, and 
drawing on Gannon (2006), is to develop an autoethnographic ethos that is 
sensitive to discontinuities in experience, and the dynamic, liminal and 
contested discursive domains in which we find ourselves and the multiple 
subject positions that we encounter and embody. Memories are written into the 
body, but they are not permanent marks. Rather, they are traces that are 
reinscribed and rewritten during each encounter. The use of particular events 
and other people’s accounts in autoethnography to show that the author is both 
owner and non-owner of a particular account and non-realist devices such as 
multivocality can contribute to disorientating readers. This sense of 
multidimensionality is not easy to take in all at once and should not be open to 
complete absorption. Instead, it can open up awareness of the contingencies in 
our lives and social structures. The materialities, socialities and affects of these 
encounters are interconnected to each other and cannot be reduced to a realist 
account that tries to retain objectivity and neutrality towards a (re)description of 
the events during research encounters. In some ways, I am trying to capture or 
provide readers with a sense of how autism can be experienced for some 
people. It can bridge “The Edges of the Known World” (Bogdashina, 2010). 
Hallucinogenic, multi-coloured, spatially fluctuating and other disturbingly 
uncomfortable phenomena can often be experienced by those with autism. The 
opening vignette of this chapter serves as a limited and partial representation of 
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how a highly over-stimulated individual might experience the world. I am not 
suggesting however that we should only focus on this perhaps over-sensational 
aspect of autistic experience.   
 
 
Instead, I endeavour to develop a partial commitment to poststructural evocative 
autoethnographic writing which comes with important caveats (these caveats 
follow on from Hacking’s outlining of the different genres of autism writing 
(Hacking, 2010)). Clough (2000b), for instance, has argued that 
autoethnography is a form of “postmodern trauma culture” that produces what 
she calls an “(over)excited subjectivity”” (Clough, 2000b, in Gannon, 2006: 476). 
The accounts focus on limit and deviant experiences and posit a self that is 
grounded in experiences that are unquestioned. To avoid this, awareness of the 
genealogies of subject construction that are at play in the use of particular 
subject positions is important. The researcher then needs to find ways to ensure 
that the account is partial via the use of disjointed narrative, conjoining theory 
and personal experience. To avoid the trap of falling unquestioningly into the 
“autism as alien” story or “autistic affinity with technology” narratives requires 
that we know what kind of narratives these genre tropes conjure and what work 
they do to produce autistic subjects.  
 
 
The use of the above poststructural strategies aims to resist any easy 
categorisation of autobiographical genres. This thesis serves as an academic 
genre of writing and while dedicated attention will be given to the process of 
writing and discussion, the self-reflexive process of articulation cannot remain 
outside of the modes of speaking and discursive formations that allow the 
researcher to speak and present new ideas and data on autism. This does not 
mean that caricatures such as the autistic child as “alien” will be reproduced or 
wholly denied and avoided in the writing. But rather caricatures serve as double 
backdrop for both the researcher and the reader. For the researcher, this 
awareness allows the writing to be formulated with care and attention to the 
accounts and experiences given by participants within this framework. For 
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readers, it allows attention to the ways in which the writer has created particular 
forms of mediation and enables awareness that other representational 
strategies and techniques are possible. 
   
 
Autoethnography Concerns and Challenges  
 
 
Mizzi’s arguments for the value of multivocality can also serve to be useful and 
thoughtful responses to a common critique that autoethnographic work that is 
too much focused on the self. Anxious scholars have questioned 
autoethnography as a method that is not inherently, “academic”, or, more 
sympathetically, are concerned that such focused introspection will lead to a 
form of “narcisstic reflexivity” (Roth, 2005). This concerns the notion that the 
positionality of the researcher is given  in a static, ironically non-reflexive mode 
that does not address the impact such activities have on the research or 
critically question the status and authority of the autoethnographic subject. In 
this way, relations of power, responsibility and attention to social markers of 
difference are glossed over in order to produce a unified account of an 
autoethnographic self. A more productive and insightful approach to reflexivity 
within an autoethnographic framework may be developed by adopting 
“methodological” and “interpretative” awareness. Methodological reflexivity 
refers to specifies techniques and methods to conduct reflexive work concerning 
awareness of power differentials and locating the historical and cultural contexts 
of the research situation (Lynch, 2000). Interpretative reflexivity interrogates 
what is seen as normative frameworks of reference and works through them to 
investigate alternative ways of viewing the situation such that all parties 
question their obligations and responsibilities to such normative codes (Lynch, 
2000 in Tsekeris, 2013: 72). In evocative autoethnographies, this is 
complemented by reflexive work that seeks to give voice to those who may be 
under-represented or lack the material, social or economic resources to 
represent their perspectives so that their everyday ways of making meaning are 
given recognition through means of “ethnomethodological” reflexivity (Lynch, 
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2000: 33-34). This combination of reflexive imperatives is what I want to suggest 
is a key reason why critics of autoethnography are so harsh in their criticisms. I 
will return to this shortly.  
 
 
Further critiques of autoethnography show disdain for the apparent lack of focus 
on the wider structural conditions which shape the subject positions of the 
autoethnographer. In other words, reflexivity is invoked to strengthen the status 
and comfort of the researcher in contextualising their research without 
challenging or developing a dynamic account of such activities. These questions 
of methodological quality and debates within the reflexivity literature (Reed-
Danahay, 1997, Motzafi-Haller, 1997) take on a more unique angle when 
considered within this project. The etymology of the word “autism” which derives 
from the Greek “autos” or self and “ismos”, of action or of state is implied to 
mean “morbid self-absorption” (Online Eytmology Dictionary, 2013). This 
connects to concerns around reflexivity becoming merely a narcissistic and 
personalised reflection without acknowledging the mutual co-constitution of this 
self via a community of social others and structures (Okely, 1992, Bourdieu, 
1992). The charge of narcissism can also be seen as overzealous within 
evocative autoethnographies that express commitments to an ethos of co-
construction between writers, readers and third parties. As Holt (2003) argues, 
the critique of narcissism is attributed to autoethnography as a universal 
enterprise without attending to the particularities of the piece in question. Holt 
further elaborates that the criteria for evaluating qualitative research still 
adheres to a scientific discourse in which trustworthiness, viability, credibility 
and so forth are considered the golden standards. But this is not necessarily 
what forms of evocative autoethnographic work are trying to achieve.  
 
 
This universal, stereotyped response to autoethnography can be seen as an 
imposition of standardised criteria to forms of work that seek to explore the 
dynamic, fluid and chaotic areas of social life that cannot be defined to such 
criteria (Holt, 2003, Ellis and Bochner, 2006). Such attempts are trying to 
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impose forms of control on evocative autoethnography that do not acknowledge 
the fact that inserting such structures on them reduces the creativity and 
vibrancy that multiple-voiced vignettes, for example, may be trying to invoke 
(Tsekeris, 2013: 75). However, from the evocative side, the appeals to an 
expanded sense of reflexivity beyond acknowledging the situatedness of the 
researcher to consider the responsiveness and responsibilities inherent in the 
research interaction can become more parochial than is intended. Because co-
creation of meaning and interaction in much social research is considered 
common sense, to neglect these qualities can be construed as a researcher not 
being adequate or sufficiently trained to the point that their moral and ethical 
character is questioned (May, 1999). Researchers who adopt reflexive methods 
are in danger of portraying themselves as all-seeing knowledge producers 
(Haraway, 1988) and arbiters who are aware of unconscious biases and the 
historical, cultural and social contexts in which these emerge (Harding, 1991, 
Alcoff et al, 1993). Only through reflexive methodological and theoretical 
practices can the sociologist open horizons and expand understanding for both 
parties (Pels, 2000b: 9). The desire for an objective validity criteria for social 
research becomes disruptive in this case as the lack of proportionality between 
causes and effects is broken, giving rise to new, emergent and dynamic 
processes and outcomes that are divergent from what could have been 
predicted (Tsoukas and Hatch, 2001: 988). The question then becomes how to 
manage the reality of complex, emergent and dynamic interactions and to 
develop a reflexive practice that can take these qualities into account.  
 
 
These reflexive concerns have been explored in depth in various different 
literatures. The most important of these is Bourdieu’s (1986, 1992) interests in 
the forms that different kinds of capital can lead to different forms of reflexive 
practice and standpoints. This is what we might call a “sociological” approach to 
reflexivity that recognises the structural and cultural influences on individual and 
group reflexive practice. Lahire (2011: 139-142) has argued that Bourdieu’s 
emphasis on structural reproduction of habitus, the structures that shape social 
actors actions, beliefs and predispositions, reduces the materiality and 
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specificity of social action to abstractions of the habitus. To counter this, other 
approaches, which take a “psycho-social” approach to reflexivity in recognising 
biographic background, social context and conscious and unconscious and 
conflicting accounts and rationalisations (Hollway and Jefferson, 2013: 53), do 
not abstract social action, but ground it in psycho-social processes and 
practices just outlined. This approach considers psychoanalytic processes, such 
as transference or countertransference, the processes where analyst and client 
transfer meanings, openness or resistance to each other as “a resource for 
understanding that could not be achieved through cognitive analytic kinds of 
knowing” (ibid: 166). In this way, reflexivity can address overemphasis on 
theoretical readings and ask researchers to be vigilant of misreading, for 
example, protecting the researcher from distressing accounts. Further, 
researchers should not discount contradictory data as problematic, but as giving 
insight into complex social lives (ibid: 62, 74). What is problematic in Hollway 
and Jefferson’s account concerns the lack of attention to the non-human and 
the distributed senses of agency that this brings. Human cognitive and bodily 
processes and meanings are given precedence with non-human agency being 
measured against the intentions of the human subject. I will address these 
concerns later in the chapter in which the quasi-object, like framework of autistic 
being that I have been developing in the thesis is applied to these issues.  
 
 
These issues of reflexivity and situated perspectives concern me beyond their 
theoretical and methodological implications to an understanding of autism that is 
indirectly derived from the etymological root discussed above. Namely, this 
concerns understandings of autism as intensely individualistic and unable to 
connect to others. Autistic people are seen to live in their “own little world” so 
that the bridge between their’s and others perspectives, feelings or actions is 
seemingly restricted (Huws and Jones, 2010). To the extent that people with 
autism are self-contained, the condition serves to sharpen a curiosity to seek 
understanding and, as a matter of necessity, to prevent being overwhelmed by 
social events. Indeed, recent evidence and debate has contended that for some 
autistic individuals, the desire for social connection and empathy towards 
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emotional expression may be hypersensitive, leading to a struggle to prevent 
identification (Markram and Markram, 2010). For a large group of autistic 
researchers, this gap between autistic and “neurotypical” modes of meaning-
making and living is untenable and serves to demarcate boundaries of what is 
and is not human.  
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The Slippage Between Autoethnography as Narcissistic and Theory of Mind  
 
The question of narcissism 
and self-absorption deserves 
closer attention, and can be 
framed through the concept of 
Theory of Mind (ToM). I will 
discuss this via Yergeau’s 
(2013) work on ToM and how 
this impacts autistic 
representation and self-
understandings of autistic 
people’s place in the world. 
Yergeau is one of the few 
autistic autoethnographers 
that explicitly discusses, in a 
theoretical fashion, the issues 
uniquely and specifically 
relevant to those with autism 
when writing academic 
autoethnography. She 
demonstrates how theorists of 
Theory of Mind serve, through 
their depictions of people with 
autism, to disenfranchise 
them and make the prospect 
of even contemplating an 
autoethnographic account 
difficult, if not effectively 
impossible. Here, I am 
referring to how psychologists 
think about and with the term 
ToM which for them refers to 
Box 1 - A Personal, Evocative Critique 
 
In my case, I should be producing an 
empirically and theoretically developed 
chapter such as “Habitual Favourites”, 
able to recognise patterns, themes and 
find the forces that shape the connections 
between these relations. But, I cannot 
contribute to an autoethnographic 
exploration of the issues that arise for an 
autistic researcher working in a neoliberal 
university context. I lack the social insights 
to gain an understanding of the views of 
others and my own views are skewed to 
cognitive and sensory biases that prevent 
an accurate and cogent account that can 
be easily assessed and absorbed by 
others. I should not even think I have the 
right to critique the grounds on which 
qualitative research or autoethnography in 
particular are framed because I cannot 
account for the interactional frameworks 
that structure all such accounts.  
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being able to: “infer the full range of mental states (beliefs, desires, intentions, 
imagination, emotions, etc.) that cause action… having a theory of mind is to be 
able to reflect on the contents of one’s own and other’s minds” (Baron-Cohen, 
2001: 174). Baron-Cohen considers ToM to be a defining characteristic of what 
it means to be uniquely human. Difficulty with or a lack of ToM places a person 
on the boundaries of humanity. Yergeau points to various autistic psychology 
authors, such as, Francesca Happé (1991) who argues that, I, the writer of this 
PhD thesis, cannot develop an autoethnographic project because I can only 
write within the emplaced perspective of someone with autism. In other words 
“because autistic individuals lack ToM, they cannot express the autistic 
experience in non-autistic terms (which, of course, are the only “appropriate” 
terms) (Yergeau, 2013). Thus, being autieethnographic is, according to ToM 
researchers, an EXACT manifestation of a ToM lack. As Baggs (2003) wryly 
notes “Autistics are not expected to write autobiographies. We are expected to 
write textbooks, which happen to be about ourselves.” (see Box 1)19. In this 
case, Grandin’s (1986, 2000a) accounts are exemplary of this interpretation, 
utilising “rational” metaphors of computers to explain her processes of 
categorisation and argumentation in relation to her work. This, however, 
discounts the emplaced and inter-subjective processes involved in being in 
                                                          
19
 My use of textboxes in this chapter and chapter 5 is a form of “intertextual” writing technique 
(Lather and Smithies, 1997). The boxes rub up against and vie for the reader’s attention in 
splitting the narrative between prose and textbox. These intertextual boxes enable construction 
of “a tangled web of meanings” (Serres, 1995b). This is recognition of the fact that speaking for 
any kind of narrative or analytical account is never clear and always marked by complexities of 
interpretation (Lather and Smithies, 1997: xvi). Just as Lather and Smithies argue that: 
“HIV/AIDS exceeds our ability to “master” it through knowledge, we wanted a book that used a 
“flood” of too much too fast, data flows of trauma, shock and everydayness” (Lather and 
Smithies, 1997: 48). I use the textboxes to explore returns to my writing to consider how events 
have changed in hindsight and also to draw a tonal change in my annoyed response to the 
notion of my lack of ToM.  The angelic intertexts in this way, serve as a means to bring to 
attention the ways in which I am not just a sociological researcher and academic, but also as a 
learner, displacing myself, my analyses and seeking to create a sense of ongoing engagement 
with my work (Perselli, 2008: 240).  
 
 ~ 163 ~ 
 
touch with the animals she works with and accounts for ToM discounting of 
embodied processes.  
 
 
These problems are highlighted further by Yergeau (2013) who notes that when 
sensory, emotional or psychological issues do emerge and autistic individuals 
undergo a meltdown or find difficulty expressing their experiences due to 
withdrawal into themselves because of high stress levels, then these 
experiences are often ignored and cast off as merely “the autism talking”. This 
reflects a biomedical view that these symptoms are purely pathological and do 
not acknowledge the way in which these attitudes do injustice to the real and 
emplaced struggles of autism that interact with their other social identities. 
Yergeau further suggests that, if autistic individuals lack a ToM, giving people 
with autism a voice in political or social domains is perhaps the “ultimate 
oxymoron”. If we accept that “mindblindness” is a real phenomenon, those who 
promulgate such theories would regard a position of focusing on the 
embodiment of autism as a precise reflection of a lack of ToM. It is noteworthy, 
as Yergeau goes on to mention, that the definition of ToM is circular in that it is 
defined by the non-autistics and is then embodied in autistic people and thus 
forms a “looping effect” (Hacking, 2010). This discounts the real paradox that 
those who posit that people with autism lack ToM, themselves end up 
discounting the complexity of the condition.  
 
On a more fundamental level, ToM is precisely that, a theory that discounts the 
emplaced and distributed nature of cognition in which even non-autistic or 
“neurotypical” people can be deceived, hence, no one could lie or mislead 
people. The problem with this disembodied approach is that it serves to place 
autistic individuals as monstrous spectacles that engage in strange bodily and 
verbal processes. They would be reduced as people and the emotional, 
cognitive and embodied turmoil of social life would be rendered impossible to 
parse or interpret. Because the bodies and minds of people with autism ToM 
lack are posited as being so different to a neurotypical manifestation of the fully 
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embodied and cognitive ToM, how is it possible to say that non-autistics can 
understand autistic ToM since the gulf of humanity is so large? In some ways, 
poststructural accounts of fragmented selves and unreliable narrators are 
inevitable for ToM theorists. With no unitary grounding in which to frame the 
experiences of the autistic subject, multiplicity abounds. This multiplicity is not 
an open or playful space however (Goodley, 2014: 52). Dominant modes of 
what it means to be human are challenged and place enshrined neurotypical 
ideals into question that leads to symbolic and physical violence (ibid: 55). 
Yergeau notes that she can only be an unreliable narrator. Her autism prevents 
her from being introspective and making meaning based on interaction with 
others. She emphatically asks: 
 
Are my feelings to be trusted? Can someone without a body have 
feelings? Can someone without a body be subject to abuse? Can 
someone who lacks a theory of mind accurately narrate the lives and 
actions and abuses of others? Can she narrate her own life? Where 
is the body in theory of mind?” (Yergeau, 2013, n.p.).  
 
 
All of these questions could be rerouted through poststructural, rather than 
negative, medicalised trait, positing autistic sociality through the prisms of 
liberal, humanist and neurotypical frameworks. However, the nexus of power for 
those with autism to embrace such poststructural domains is very much negated 
within this dominant understanding of autism. After all, if people with autism 
have no ToM, no sense of self-identity, no feeling bodies and cannot understand 
others: linguistic, gestural or psychical communications, to what extent can they 
be said to feel emotions or experience violence or pain? How can we ever take 
what they say seriously if their memories are biased without all these forms of 
reference? This leads me to matters of “proving” vulnerable and marginalised 
identity positions and viewpoints in autoethnography.  
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The Question of “Proving” Autoethnographic Credentials 
 
 
How does the charge that autoethnographic accounts are too narcissistic impact 
the way in which they are produced? Further, how does this connect to the 
problematic issue of discussing autism as a ToM deprived condition, whereby 
individuals cannot develop their own ideas or express them to others? The 
reader may have noted the boxed discussion above, where I, briefly, gave my 
voice to my unrestrained thoughts on what ToM entails for me on a practical 
level in relation to writing my thesis. It forgoes academic restraint and formality 
in place of defensive anger and justification. But, to what extent am I justified in 
doing this? This section will go on to explore how autoethnographic thinkers 
have tackled the problem of academic rigour and the ways in which the 
questions regarding autistic ToM, I have discussed in this chapter, can bring 
new insights to these debates.  
 
 
Wall (2008), has noted, when discussing her autoethnographic piece on 
international adoption with a committee of faculty members, that they: 
“cautioned [her] to guard against being a defensive adoptive mother… [and]… to 
engage with the literature unemotionally and to craft a text that portrayed 
balance and intellectual analysis” (Wall, 2008: 43). With this in mind, having 
gone through the literature, she felt that the arguments were based on the 
assumption that adopters were cultural dopes or pawns that were manipulated 
by media images of rescue children from insufferable conditions, without 
attending to the structural, political or economic motivations for this and ignoring 
these same conditions at the site of adoption itself. Wall argued that this was a 
prejudicial assumption by social theorists supported by biased analysis. 
However, based on the above advice, she toned down her revisions of this short 
and impactful argument into a more verbose paragraph that was more 
sympathetic to the authors who were focusing on more functional, structural 
issues rather than micro factors. Wall felt that this lessened her own 
contribution. She also did not feel that her own writing was catering to what 
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Tedlock (2000) details as: “women’s ethnographic and autobiographical 
intentions… [as]… powered by the motive to convince readers of the authors self-
worth, to clarify and authenticate their self-images.” (Tedlock, 2000: 468). This is 
further implicated in a realist stance that sees transparent representation of 
writing as via an orderly and self-assured argument which ignores the fact that 
the ethnographic writing is a performative reproduction of what occurred in the 
field-site. This is done via memory and discursive reinterpretations of an 
account located in historical, political and personal situated contexts (Wall 2008: 
42).  
 
In the same vein, Yergeau’s arguments touch on these central issues in which 
those with autism are positioned as not even having the capacity to clarify their 
self-images and can only be reported on by others on their behalf. I included the 
emphasis on mechanical pattern recognition, because this is what people with 
autism are seen to be good at, taking a set of research notes, codes, themes, 
seeking out patterns and conducting, rational, carefully defined analysis and 
procedures to develop results. The issue Wall faced was that her advisors 
thought that she was being too rash with her analysis of the literature and was 
not nuanced enough to consider the theorists’ blind spots she critiques. This, 
however, was a key component of her account and having to discard it for a 
more traditional, balanced approach removed much of the intended punch of 
this section of her work. 
 
My boxed discussion then, is a reply to those ToM theorists who would reduce 
what an autieethnography can be by stereotyping and reducing those with 
autism to the status of non-human. It is as Yergeau has poetically argued; 
because people with autism have no means to connect or understand others, 
they: “possess no rhetorical defense: they dwell in a world of mindless skin-
bags, a life of utter interiority, an arhetorical wonderland of disempathy” 
(Yergeau, 2013: n. p.). Thus, to be reduced to a mechanical being who, 
ironically resonates on a more than intellectual level with mechanisms, patterns 
and laws on a scale that is supposedly beyond “neurotypical” comprehension. Is 
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to reduce my own capacity and even right to express my own feelings, opinions 
or theories about these social patterns and mechanisms and become an 
unthinking, data-processing device.20 I must prove that I can make sense of and 
develop systematic connections from these mechanisms; my intellect must be 
performed rather than assumed, so that I can then have the privilege of 
inhabiting the space of opinion, debate and dialogue.  
 
 
Yergeau, drawing on Bascom (2011) has referred to this one-sided nature of the 
“proof” required for those with autism to display a ToM as a “Theory of War” 
(ToW). ToW recognises that people with autism actually do develop an 
awareness of the fact that other people have motivations and bodily presence. 
As autistic individuals grow up, the social meaning of eye contact becomes 
more potent beyond just the hyper-sensitive sensory dimension the mental and 
social intent, experienced as motivation and beliefs are added onto the 
perceptions of those with autism. The term ToW comes from the belief that for 
people with autism to develop a ToM: “is to have a theory of how theory of mind 
theorists violently remove the autistic body-and it is likewise to have that violent 
removal denied… the autistic bodymind is inconsequential, fundamentally non-
existent” (Yergeau, 2013: n. p.). This sense of an uphill battle is paradoxically 
located within the independent, isolated self, without apparent recourse to 
external co-constructive elements of social engagement. An autoethnographic 
attention to “relational ethics”, or the ways in which our accounts connect to the 
subjective, material and environmental elements that comprise and permit our 
accounts can help to correct this unjust perspective.  
 
 
 
                                                          
20
 In Autieethnography Part 2, I go on to demonstrate just how mistaken and naïve this 
perspective of what intellectual activity for those with autism is from my own embodied 
experience of conducting research and undertaking analysis.  
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An Emplaced Concern With Relational Ethics  
 
The concerns with how autism can impact on how autoethnographies are 
written and read are borne out of a concern within the autoethnographic 
literature to consider the “relational ethics” of the accounts produced. These 
produce accounts that consider the impact they have on the participants 
involved, including how standard ethical devices and procedures (such as a 
commitment to anonymity) and the way they are implemented impact upon 
research participants. Linking this with Hacking’s (2010) insights, these 
concerns ask me to consider how I portray myself and my participants in my 
accounts. Do I seek out their “deviant/obsessive” behaviours related to 
favourites, habits and sensory experience that concur with their autism 
diagnosis and see all actions as manifestations of their autism? Is this then a 
reflection and confirmation of the ToM argument of my own self-absorbed 
understanding of autism that only sees the world through an autistic lens and 
cannot possibly speak outside of such a frame or are “encouraged” by academic 
cultures to perform or come across as neurotypical in order to accrue academic 
capital (Eddy, 2011)? These questions force us to undertake a situated 
reflexivity (Haraway, 1988, Harding, 1991) that questions power relations, 
author motivations and representational and inscription practices.  
 
Ethics are relational in the autoethnographic literature in that they are reciprocal 
and reflect as much on the autoethnographers as they do other readers. Ellis et 
al, (2011) are also keen to point out that much of autoethnographic writing 
concerns itself with people, objects and institutional structures that are close to 
the researcher’s heart and also their conditions of existence and survival. As 
such, autoethnographic authors must be aware of how they write, so they can 
continue to live with and within these intimate domains. The relational 
dimension to ethics in autoethnography then cannot be reduced to a mere, post-
hoc, reflexive process that displays the superior ethical consciousness of a 
writer. Rather, relationality is a part of the writing process itself. It must consider 
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the cultural and social structures and frameworks of meaning that particular 
forms of writing engender, alongside questions of how the topic at hand is 
constructed and presented within the societal context in which writers develop 
accounts for different audiences.  
 
These issues of relational ethics can be put into more concrete focus in 
considering Davidson’s (2010) work on how accommodations can be made to 
the sensory spaces of autistic people. She argues that it is important to go 
beyond approaches based on making accommodating alterations to social 
spaces that make autistic people aware of, and provide resources, through 
which they can understand spatial and sensory issues. What is needed is a 
relational approach that recognises the interconnected nature of autistic and 
neurotypical sociality and their respective modes of sensory navigation 
(Davidson, 2010: 310). Drawing upon autistic autobiographies that outline the 
many ways in which everyday sensory lives are made difficult through sensory 
and spatial disorientation, she asserts, following Shore (2003), that:  
 
Inasmuch as people on the autism spectrum need to understand and 
interact in a largely non-spectrum world, people who are not on the 
autism spectrum need to work on understanding those who are on 
the spectrum. (It) cuts both ways. (Shore, 2003: 165).  
 
I want to now extend this relational account that emphasises the desire and 
need to extend autistic and neurotypical mutual understanding, in line with Ellis’ 
description of autoethnography as a process of “wander[ing] around a bit and 
(get) the lay of the land” (Ellis, 2004: 120). Singer’s invitation is to “travel in 
parallel with us for (a) while and see how the world looks from our angle” 
(Singer, 2003: xi). Importance is given here to walking alongside and eventually 
to a crossing of paths as meaning and understanding is formed. Rather than 
foreclosing understanding of those with autism, based on an abstracted, 
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cognitive form of understanding such as ToM, we should be open to the multiple 
ways in which people with autism relate to and experience the world. Whether 
this is through intense affective engagement with animals, plants, technology or 
the materiality of the environment such as waves or sound forms, these co-
produced interactions are more diverse and creative than ToM authors suggest. 
I want to assert and argue here that the Serresian notion of the quasi-object (as 
discussed in Chapters 1 and 3) is invaluable for showing how the distributed 
forms of cognition and, indeed, emplaced embodiment through different subject 
positions, materialities and environmental milieus can help us to see these 
diverse modes of sociality in action. This is ultimately what an autieethnography 
might look like if we are to develop an account of autism that respects and 
recognises the differential forms the “human” might take.  
 
Autoethnography as Journeying and Pragmatic Balance 
 
My use of descriptive vignettes attempts to create fully outlined scenarios to 
further explore and expand upon analytical ideas, alongside forms of varied 
presentation styles of writing and discussions of the differing levels of power, 
attention and feelings involved with writing these accnts. These practices serve 
to cut a path between the analytic and evocative distinction I described and 
explored in Chapter 2. This is what I mean by “pragmatic balance”, being able to 
navigate the two dominant “styles” of autoethnography in such a way that new 
insights are developed that are not possible without this conjunction. Like Wall 
(2008), I find myself staying true to a pragmatist focus and, from my reading of 
the autoethnographic methodological literature, suggest that a middle ground 
between realism and constructivism is necessary for ethnographic research. I 
respect the need for formal, thoroughgoing and rigorous theorising and analysis 
and gain a depth of understanding and perspective from them. I also enjoy the 
literary, artistic and free-flowing nature of performative and humanities-based 
work that explores what could be and investigates the limits and constraints of 
human and natural socio-environmental milieus. The debates between analytic 
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and evocative autoethnographic traditions have often been described by 
autoethnographic scholars, following Rorty, as “not issue(s) to be resolved, only 
(but) difference(s) to be lived with” (Rorty, 1982: 197, in Ellis et al, 2011). This 
pragmatic maxim has been invoked in the hope of reducing the tensions of 
wanting to, on the one hand, as argued by Grant et al, (2013), view the position 
and relationality of subjects to the external world around them as autonomous or 
intensely interconnected. On the other hand, Ellis et al, (2011) point to the 
seemingly impossible standards set by critics of autoethnography writing. Such 
critics wish for autoethnographic writing to be both more artistic and less 
theoretical, more like art and literature and more scientific and rigorous in its 
writing technologies and methodological principles. Rather than providing an 
answer or “middle-ground” to this debate, I want to acknowledge that 
autoethnographic writing, whether viewed through story-telling or theoretically 
informed self-reflection and analysis, is open to constant redefinition and 
alterations of meaning. This, in part, is because the process of undertaking an 
autoethnographic project and writing is likely to be conducted in an iterative 
process that returns to multiple aspects of the account, moving between 
external guidance and internal emergent elements (Ellis, 2004). However, 
ambiguous unfolding of writing should not be disavowed as negative or 
antithetical to the empirical quality of autoethnographies. It should be seen as a 
productive opportunity to “wander around a bit and (get) the lay of the land” 
(ibid: 120)21. I hope to show, through the vignettes and debates in the 
autoethnographic literature, that a theoretically aligned middle position and an 
emplaced, situated, middle position of autoethnographic writing can encompass 
the following two elements:  
                                                          
21
 We should also not neglect Haraway’s dictum that situated knowledge is becoming 
“answerable for what we learn how to see” (Haraway, 1988: 583). As such, differential, situated 
power relations between wanderers should always be kept in mind. The barriers to specific 
forms of wandering, such as a supposed lack of ToM or the situated standpoint of researchers 
should be reflexively accounted for and analysed to address the factors that impoverish 
autoethnographic writing.  
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1. Complete Research Member (CRM) - This means utilising my position as a 
researcher to develop theoretically and empirically guided reflexive methods to 
explore the ways in which I interact with my participants and how we create 
meaning together. Such an approach showcases how theory is informed by 
empirical material and a tempered realist focus shaped by participants’ sense 
making practices that show the researcher and participants perspectives and 
how these interact with and through each other (Anderson 2006)22.  
 
2. An “evocative” text which uses literary and writing techniques (outlined 
above) that complicate dominant modes of academic writing and reading 
regarding our understanding of autistic sociality and positionality when it comes 
to writing on, and with topics deeply intertwined with what it means to be 
autistic. This form of autoethnographic work seeks to expand the potential 
realities and experiences of writers and expectations of what form of expression 
these discussions may take. My aim extends beyond the need to encompass a 
diversity of representations of how people come to experience and 
communicate the ongoing events in the social world. I would like to incite 
readers to feel, connect and respond, not just intellectually via theoretical, 
methodological or conceptual discussion, but also sensually and emotionally via 
confusion, empathy, joy and frustration.  
 
Further, I hope that, on a more textual level, the thesis being split into two styles 
of writing is one such way in which a pragmatic balance might be developed and 
put into practice. I also wish to write analytically evocative autoethnographic 
pieces that utilises different writing techniques alongside theoretical and field-
note discussion to explore and contribute to the autoethnographic literature on 
how autism is experienced and expressed within an academic context.  
 
                                                          
22
 See Chapter 2 for an elucidation of analytic autoethnography and for some hesitations and 
problems that arose when committing too strictly to the methodological guidelines of an analytic 
autoethnographic approach.  
 ~ 173 ~ 
 
Beyond Poststructural Autoethnography to Quasi-Object Relationality  
 
I am not unaware of the difficulties of using a poststructural position in exploring 
ways of expanding upon the presentation of autoethnographic accounts. To 
focus on a discursive ontology of subjectivity retains a form of abstracted 
cognitivism that reduces a focus on the senses and emplacement as attention is 
drawn to social discourses. It also runs the risk of reinforcing the more negative 
edge of Yergeau’s (2013) engagement with the reality of autistic bodies, 
emotions and feelings. As Yergeau noted during her forced incarceration in a 
psychiatric ward, the gurney that she was strapped to “was more material than I 
am”, due to the beliefs of the psychiatric workers that “it was just her autism 
talking” (Yergeau, 2013: n. p.). She was reduced to a discursive set of medical 
categorisations. A focus on the purely discursive within autoethnographic risks 
marginalising sensory and affective bodily experience and obfuscating the 
cognitivist bias in our understanding of autism noted by Yergeau.  
 
 
As Davidson and Smith (2009) argue, in their research on autistic 
autobiographies, attention to “more-than-human” geographies and emotions, 
can serve to provide a corrective balance and addition to the above mode of 
thinking. These more-than-human interactions within a ToM perspective can 
only be thought of in ways that downplay or outright ignore the affective and 
non-human emergent meanings that arise from relating with animals and 
objects. Such ways of relating cannot be seen to be meaningful, precisely, 
because they do not possess human capacities, despite their significance in co-
constitutive becoming and being in the world (Davidson and Smith, 2009: 905). 
The more-than-human geographies here comprise a set of sensitivities that 
extend to being able to feel, connect with and understand animals, plants and 
other materials beyond what is seen as a liberal, humanist version to what is 
seen as “human” characteristics or traits within a ToM framework (Goodley et al, 
2014). For example, Williams (2003) talks about her childhood connection to 
trees, in particular, an old palm tree in her front garden that stood stout and 
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alone. The palm tree gave Williams the opportunity to be affected by the tree’s 
silent, yet sturdy disposition. She would stand near it and in the process was 
able to share her emotions of rage and despair. These moments of venting were 
her ways of being: 
 
 
a social kid: social with the dirt, the trees the grass […] I felt the 
world deeply and passionately. I was cheerful in my own world and 
I had a fascination with anything that was not directly 
confrontational and which would allow me to simply be (Williams, 
2003: 16).  
 
 
The physicality of this relating was further reinforced by being able to climb the 
branches and experience a sense of belonging and friendship that was possible 
because of the lack of expectations or judgement. Williams appreciated and 
respected the sense of open connection that she felt the tree was signalling to 
her (Williams, 2003: 40). Miller (2003) emphasises that this respect and sense 
of humility felt in relation to the tranquillity of some forms of nature, can teach 
those with autism what it means to show empathy.  
 
 
This and similar “human” capacities are taught through a connection to these 
more-than-human socialities that lead, later on, to an understanding and 
appreciation of how neurotypical people connect with other humans utilising the 
same kinds of affective and relational social understanding (Miller, 2003: 54). A 
prominent example of this is Dawn-Prince Hughes’ (2004) ethnographic work 
with gorillas. Hughes observed and learnt the social codes and conducts of a 
gorilla society and utilised these tools in her human relationships to much 
success (Prince Hughes 2004: 117). The ability to develop these capacities at 
all for ToM theorists is fundamentally contradictory to their understanding of 
what autism is. Even more troubling for ToM theorists is that this learning 
emerges from non-human sources and then is translated to human 
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relationships, serves to showcase the limited means of understanding a 
restricted ToM approach to autism can have. As Davidson and Smith (2009) 
remind us, many neurotypical people often bracket off these diverse, quasi-
object, relational processes to the world and thus can be as being artificially 
impoverished. The positive sense of multiplicity in Yergeau’s questioning of 
autistic humanity can be found in diverse places. Cognitive, ethical and moral 
concepts such as respect, humility and empathy are connected and threaded 
through natural and animal quasi-objects which serve as anchors to be 
transferred to other scenarios. Thus, Yergeau’s questioning of the capacity of 
those with autism to have feelings, present structured stories, experience and 
think through these narratives and emotions should not necessarily have 
negative repercussions. Those with autism can share these modes of 
experiencing the world if an appropriate milieu is present. These milieus 
recognise the sensory and ecological ways in which autistic ways of relating 
emerge and are shaped beyond a purely discursive-semiotic or cognitivist point 
of view.  
 
 
If we wish to develop more in-depth and sensory ethnographic understanding of 
autistic worlds, then grappling with more-than-human relations and translations 
from the more-than-human to human sociality will be required. In Part 2 of the 
autoethnographic focus of the thesis (Chapter 5), I will attempt to do this through 
vignettes interspersed throughout the chapter. In particular, I will focus on the 
affective and embodied processes of my research encounters and the means 
through which I sought to at once be open and to learn to be affected to the 
events occurring around me. This will enable me to show the multiple ways in 
which my emplaced, affective subjectivity, alongside my discursive subjectivity 
was produced in the various encounters that shaped the practices of research 
and writing of my thesis. The introductory vignette has begun this process 
through a self-recognition of how my researcher sensory bias was formulated 
and originated through an awareness of my corporeal actions in tandem with my 
discursive rationalisations. This has been described by Myers (2016) as a form 
of “energetic” or “gestic” data analysis that utilises the bodymind of the 
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researcher to trace out or draw lines of movement, stasis and gesture to capture 
the affective and sensual means of moving, acting and thinking through and with 
the world. These forms of analysis can spark memories or sensations of the 
event being recorded via a transduction of materiality and social energies. In 
this ethnography, it meant paying attention to the many sensoryscapes of the 
club, for example, how did the soundscape impact my attention and how did I 
bracket this off or fail to do so due to sensory stimulation? This is only one step 
in developing a sensual awareness and the subsequent representation of this 
sensuality. In the conclusion to the thesis, I will outline some future directions in 
which the habitual favourites framework can be developed through sensory 
methods.  
 
 
The co-constructed, quasi-object, like relationality of the world can better be 
accounted for in this formulation of autistic being. The question of 
representational practices then can be said to extend beyond Hacking’s (2010) 
concerns with autistic genres that seek to demarcate hard-bounded “kinds” of 
representational experience. My research suggests the value of exploring the 
ways in which autistic experience can be couched in terms of the degrees of 
attention given to the portrayal of autistic subjects and their (quasi) objects of 
interest. In order to be respectful to the diversity present in autism, we should 
see sociality, I argue, as comprising an ecology of emplaced/milieu situated 
quasi-objects and subjects. Any account that has this as its main goal or guiding 
criteria should aspire to explore and account for this complex web. In so doing, I 
am extending the notion of “strong objectivity” that asks us to explicate our 
situated perspectives, biases and power relations to develop a reflexive 
objectivity rather than a stunted objectivity that would banish these qualities 
entirely from our accounts (Harding, 1991). However, rather than assuming that 
humans and their representations should have complete influence over what 
matters, we should take into account the non-human and material milieus in 
which relationships are located so that we can be open to what they have to 
show us (Savransky, 2016a: 66-68). It also requires us to go beyond our 
anthropocentric descriptions of social life and take seriously the notion that an 
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external world beyond ourselves is truly an independent entity that possesses 
unique characteristics that can challenge and enhance our understanding. 
Autieethnography, with a focus on the multimodal ways in which experience is 
lived, represented and written can enhance a notion of strong objectivity by 
highlighting the more-than-human world that intersects with habitual, quasi-
object, based relations.  
 
 
As Goodley et al, (2014) have discussed, attention to the limits of humanism, as 
noted by Davidson and Smith (2009), are integral to disability equality (as the 
recognition of rights that comes with humanist liberalism emphasises autonomy 
and bounded rationality), as some with disabilities are excluded from the 
category of the human. They argue, along with Braidotti (2006, 2013), that we 
have entered an era of posthumanism in which we are no longer bound by 
“moral rationality, unitary identity, transcendent consciousness or innate and 
universal moral value” (Braidotti 2013: 92). As such, life becomes through a 
process ontology that is not individualised but is expressed through connections 
(Braidotti 2006). Equally, a posthuman conception of life recognises that the 
humanist approach to humanity as the ultimate arbiter is the ultimate utopian 
ideal. It ignores how we are enmeshed within scientific, informational, cognitive 
and technological practices that make us just as much part of nature as nature 
is part of us. Therefore, we are co-constituted by the many non-humans around 
us, animals, insects, plants and even cosmic forces like the nebulous aftermath 
of exploding stars (Braidotti, 2013: 66-67). Thus, our solidarities with these 
others are not alien or anthropomorphic as liberal humanism would have it. We 
have all along been part and parcel of these non-human others, having folded 
and intersected with them to the extent that we can experience more than just 
human centric notions of social interaction and being. Because of all these 
factors, Goodley et al argue “that disability is the quintessential posthuman 
condition: because it calls for new ontologies, ways of relating, living and dying” 
(Goodley et al, 2014: 348 emphasis in original). “People with physical, sensory 
or cognitive impairments are plugged into a myriad of cultural, professional, 
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disciplinary and political practices that shape their embodied selves and inter-
relationships with the world” (ibid: 348).  
 
Because of these factors:  
 
Disability […] emerges in these contemporary (posthuman) times as a 
moment of relational ethics: urging us to think again about how we 
are all made through our connections with others and encouraging us 
to embrace ways of love and life that are not rigidly framed by 
humanistic values of independence and autonomy (ibid: 349).  
 
If disability is the posthuman condition, then I want to argue that an engagement 
with autistic ontologies can help us think through these new posthuman 
relations with human interaction and non-human beings. The above discussion 
of autistic non-human engagement begins a process of highlighting the 
posthuman nature of autistic being.  
 
Before I conclude this chapter, I want to consider some of the broader aspects 
of scholarly production that impact upon the autoethnographic process to 
highlight some of the specific autism-related factors that arose during the course 
of my thesis.  
 
 
PhD Work, Disability Support and Relational Ethics 
 
 
The last issue I wish to focus on in this chapter concerns the wider network of 
support I receive in relation to my recognition of having a disability and the 
impact this has on the production of my thesis. I had support from the disability 
services at my institution to connect with and advance my studies. The most 
important of these adjustments for my purposes here was my support worker, 
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who helped with a variety of tasks including: study skills, time management, 
administrative and bureaucratic support, academic reviews and advice and 
advocacy on disputes in relation to support provided and university policies and 
decisions. During the course of this thesis, a central concern of ours was to look 
over my drafts, independent of my formal supervision sessions (although in 
practice sometimes these overlapped and influenced each other). As Tregaskis 
and Goodley (2005) note, the use and employment of assistance for disabled 
researchers during a research project is an understudied area of inquiry. They 
point to a group project where a disabled researcher had a support assistant 
attend during his interviews and other data-collection activities. This support 
structure in which the research takes place is thus constitutively different in 
many ways as compared to other students. I raise this issue here because 
relational ethics entails getting others to read through an autoethnographic 
account to provide feedback and gain a sense of mutual understanding. The 
context and role of the persons chosen for this end are noted in 
autoethnographic accounts and reflexively considered as to their impact on the 
researcher and the people involved (see Jago, 2011, for several examples of 
this). This is a form of ethnomethodological, open reflexivity that does not take it 
as simply “boring” or “mundane” that these processes occur every day in 
ordinary people’s lives, but are dynamic and emotionally rich negotiations of 
meaning and action that take into account the chaotic and fractured nature of 
social life. This leaves open space for spontaneity, surprises and 
responsiveness to the writer and the people they write about (Tsekeris 2013: 
74-5). Nonetheless, the context from which my co-readers and in some senses, 
co-author, the support assistant, (a professional paid to assist me), raises 
questions as to the degree of co-authorship and the way in which the 
development of the project was impacted by such concerns.  
 
 
This situation can also be framed in a different way, to argue that the situation of 
having a support worker assisting me throughout the PhD process is not 
something that is necessarily “extra” help. If, following the social model of 
disability (Oliver, 2004, Barnes, 2012), we regard disability as the resultant 
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socio-cultural responses to impairments, then the support I receive is as much 
part of my autoethnographic framing as is the theoretical and methodological 
issues I have grappled with in this chapter. A society that is developed for the 
majority of the population without disabilities, results in purposefully excluding 
those with disabilities from society in a variety of ways, or, in a more limited 
sense, preventing them living lives with opportunities equivalent to non-disabled 
groups. Of course, this dichotomous logic still signifies a situation in which those 
with disabilities lack something and need more help than others to achieve 
social parity. This binary conception can only be upheld if we take for granted 
the idea, from humanist liberalism, that humans are autonomous, rational and 
non-disabled. This is matched against a largely abstracted and disembodied 
figure of an ideal human that takes as self-evident the normativity of social and 
cultural activities as though they were natural frameworks that have always 
organised interactions. One argument against such an ableist idea of the human 
asks us to consider that no subject acts in isolation and that feats of co-
operation are essential to all forms of social life. This has been framed within the 
field of disability studies as the issue of universal vulnerability (Turner, 2006). 
This argument recognises that much of social life is based on a highly 
unrealistic expectation that people embody an idealised health profile that 
expects consistently good health no matter the circumstances. Deviation from 
this is seen as a failure or issue when, in realistic terms, it is an inevitable part of 
ageing and living. In this way, my support functions as a means, not to provide 
access to a social means of existence that allows me to reach parity with non-
disabled students, but highlights the structures of support that any person could 
utilise, but are often in the background. Our bodies, as Wearing et al, (2015), 
drawing on Shildrick and Price (2006), argue: “are necessarily a part of 
interdependent alliances and prosthetic extension. Normativity works by making 
this interdependence invisible” (Wearing et al, 2015: 2). For example, the use of 
peer-support, post-doctoral groups where researchers talk through theoretical or 
methodological ideas related to a set of literatures or topics, is similar to my 
support worker talking through my ideas with me.  
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Nonetheless, it is important not to overemphasise the “extra” support I receive 
for a more methodological reason. As Chang argues and reminds us:  
 
 
autoethnographers undergo the usual ethnographic research 
process of data collection, data analysis/interpretation, and report 
writing. They collect field data by means of participation, self-
observation, interview, and document review; verify data by 
triangulating sources and content; analyze and interpret data to 
decipher the cultural meanings of events, behaviours, and thoughts; 
and write autoethnography (Chang, 2007: 209).  
 
 
If I am undertaking all of these procedures, then, the use of a support worker 
can be construed as forming part of my procedures of triangulation. They do not 
just read through the chapters, but work with me in a professional capacity to 
develop my ideas and connect together themes and concepts. I am developing 
a unique form of triangulation that connects data with a professional working as 
part of a country-wide organisation that assists and helps provide resources and 
conduct research to support autistic people. My way of working with my support 
worker gave them insight into how autism is changing and the many factors that 
impact how I would write and present the thesis to an interested audience. I now 
want to demonstrate further that my relationship with my support worker 
organically developed best ways of working together through some of the key 
areas of relational ethics.  
 
 
The relationship was not just one-way however. My worker was comfortable and 
accepting of the fact that particular sensory issues such as a room’s lighting or 
sound levels could be problematic. They would actively work with me to find 
rooms that were free and would make me as comfortable as possible to focus 
on developing my ideas. In return, I could attend more directly to being more 
positively “social”, in the sense of being able to interact with my worker and react 
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to their gestural, vocal and meaning-laden interactions more effectively. This 
allowed me to go on to more freely engage with the ideas that were co-
generated from our discussions, leading to greater clarity in defining goals to 
work towards as well as refining and breaking down the various strands of 
thinking that would come to me as we talked. That I could develop and think so 
lucidly about my work and ideas resonates with Smith and Sharp’s (2013) work 
on sensory feedback loops. I could attain maximise efficiency and give myself 
as someone who was socially considerate and open to communication, because 
I was comfortable both in terms of sensory stimulation and happy to talk with 
someone who was encouraging and open to giving me avenues to challenge 
myself, for example, attending a weekend-study away session, whilst working 
through the issues and challenges this would present. In these regards, we were 
enacting a form of a feminist ethics of caring (Collins, 1990), in which we were 
attentive to consider the more emotional, empathetic and relational modes of 
understanding ourselves and the audiences to which I was writing. We 
discussed our vulnerabilities, such as the difficulties of attending conferences or 
how caring for someone at home led to challenges in finding time to work 
effectively or the structural and financial issues that prevented support that was 
beneficial to my PhD work.  
 
 
By thinking about my support in this manner, I am not only able to examine the 
power relations inherent, yet left unspoken by the non-disabled majority, I also 
reveal the ways in which networks and interdependences with multiple external 
others are constituted and valued as worthwhile by others (Goodley et al, 2014). 
As Goodley and colleagues note, we do not readily accept such tight integration 
and high numbers of people involved with our lives. Therefore, we require 
analysis that informs our thinking about questions of intersectional dependence 
that blurs the boundaries of self/other, nature/technology and ability/disability 
(ibid: 348).  As the next section demonstrates, this potential of a posthuman 
disability framework serves to make the academic mundane strange.    
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Revealing the Analytic Potential in the Academic Mundane 
 
 
Documenting the relationship of knowledge production and the power relations 
inherent in writing autoethnographic work is to develop an awareness of the 
mundanities of academic work and research. These banal practices are often 
overlooked in conceptions of research that take these questions seriously, 
namely, that of reflexivity are important to prevent researchers from taking for 
granted the conditions in which they work. As I have shown, in the worst cases, 
reflexivity is utilised to showcase a self-assured awareness of the conditions 
shaping an author’s subjectivity, without recourse to the non-academic factors 
that led to these ideas and shaped them just as much as technical concepts and 
theories. This can be seen if we consider the case of a respected seminar 
series discussion of someone’s developing research account, or the 
aforementioned informal PhD student and post-doc researcher discussion. 
These activities are relegated to, at best, an “Acknowledgements” section in a 
thesis or article, regardless of the impact and influence such contributions had 
on the argument. These aspects of work are not counted as citations of value, 
which are restricted to publishable, copyright-owned materials in a bibliography.  
 
 
Further, this attention to the circuits of value, power and recognition are all the 
more important to someone with a disability and not just because of the power 
imbalance. For an author with Asperger’s Syndrome, these kinds of networking 
relationships and acknowledgements are even more crucial for success. 
Difficulties in accessing and understanding the social complexities of these 
scenarios are thus inevitable, but, this situation can also be used to uncover and 
challenge the academic values inherent within the system to alter them for the 
betterment of all groups in the academic sphere. Highlighting the “everyday” 
practices of academic work then is not just a means of critiquing a distanced 
and elitist view of reflexivity poses opportunities to, as in the seminar example, 
expand upon the ability to track, record and share the development and 
alteration of ideas and concepts as they emerge from intellectual discussions. In 
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the second part of this autoethnographic account (see Chapter 5), I will develop 
this line of thought to consider how characteristics of autism can be used to give 
affective resonance to cherished methodological and analytical ideas to 
challenge the inner workings of academic life through the means in which 
autism brings out the hidden elements and mundane practices that go unnoticed 
within academic work.  
 
 
This is not to say that work is not already under way to examine this 
understudied topic. Laura Micciche’s, upcoming book “Acknowledging Writing 
Partners” (Forthcoming), looks at the roles and effects of feelings, time and 
animals in writing practices. Preliminarily, she argues, in accordance with the 
argument in this chapter, that Acknowledgement sections are formative for 
academic identity creation and solidification, but can also serve to promote the 
“animals, feelings, sound, and places” of writing that are repressed in the main 
text (Micciche, 2014: 499). For many, including Strickland (2011) and Donahue 
and Moon (2007), appreciation of people and animals are so close in proximity 
that they demonstrate the equal - if not primary, in the case of Strickland - 
importance of animals as necessary to produce writing as an inseparable 
element of authors’ writing ecologies. Further, feelings like love and the 
inspiration it can engender, irrespective of the topic at hand, feature heavily in 
giving the reader a sense of the networks in which writers are located. Micciche 
frames these kinds of relational and co-constitutive acknowledgements within 
Ingold’s development of an “ontology of dwelling” (Ingold, 2012). Here, humans 
are engaged and immersed in a world where an active, practical and co-
emergent engagement emerges so that writing is part of the world and the 
things, places, people and objects that make up the world are essential to this 
writing. As such, by bringing attention to these forms of relation, it becomes 
possible to recognise the non-normative inspirations behind autistic being and 
thinking and that drives our inspirations as dwelling in the world.   
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A Concluding Multivocal Discussion  
 
 
Formal Conclusion Voice: In concluding this chapter, I’d like to again highlight 
that rather than being a fundamental detriment to autoethnographic writing, 
autistic sensibilities do not preclude the possibility of such an account. Rather, 
what this chapter has done is to highlight the writer’s position within the 
autoethnographic literature and consider some of the more pressing challenges 
and adjustments that took place in order to develop an autoethnographic 
account. I end with the consideration and reminder to have a more 
encompassing ToM and that those who cannot or struggle to speak to the 
dominant styles or frameworks of legibility or sociality, are not without their own 
means of understanding. 
 
 
Future Orienting Voice: Ok, formal writing voices need to take a break for a 
moment. The reader needs to be made aware that what is to come in the next 
chapter may be a little unexpected. Right then, I am going here to make the 
reader aware of the next chapter’s sharp change of tone. Having developed my 
position and stout defence of why I believe an autieethnography, or autism 
inflected autoethnography is possible and important, the next autoethnographic 
chapter will focus on developing evocative and uncomfortable writing that 
deviates from the self-assertive and organised formal writing that has so far 
dominated the thesis. The reader will be presented with two sets of long-form 
vignettes: one tackling the mundane writing and caring situation in which this 
PhD has taken shape. Another will tackle the affective and discursive forces that 
shaped my research thinking and practice. The conceptual discussion that I will 
engage in after these vignettes will, in this spirit, explore the fuzzy, not fully 
rational elements of what I have discussed rather than close them down. The 
chapter aims to develop what is noted as autistic people’s ability to be honest 
and unambiguous about their feelings or what they think about a topic. This 
desire to not keep feelings or thoughts bottled up to prevent stress, uncertainty 
and anxiety will be the spirit that drives my work in providing an 
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autieethnographic piece of writing that looks at the personal, interpersonal and 
structural elements that shape my writing and academic subjectivities.  
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Chapter 5 - An Auto/AutieEthnography Part 2 - The Conditions of PhD Labour - 
Autoethnographic Writing Vignettes   
 
Introduction - Of Writing Vignettes and Autoethnography  
 
This chapter is part conceptual, part theoretical discussion and part 
introspective and personal description. As such, my voices, perspective and 
emotional stances will be front and centre of much of the chapter. I will start 
each section or topic with a descriptive narration of the personal experiences 
and processes that led to their inclusion in the chapter. I will then consider the 
wider methodological, theoretical and practical effects that my experience raises 
in relation to these topics.  
 
The first section and vignette will discuss the mundane and practical writing 
conditions that structure my academic, personal and family life. This story will 
explore the emotional difficulties that balancing such responsibilities entails and 
the impact this has had on my becoming a professional social researcher. The 
second vignette will detail an affective account of how my own manifestation of 
Asperger’s Syndrome contributes to a unique form of subjective awareness that 
influences my approach to analysis and theorising. I will explore how such 
conditions affect the production of knowledge and I hope to provide readers with 
some insight into how neurodiverse researchers experience the emplaced 
cognitive and bodily processes of research. Both vignettes will serve to highlight 
the degrees of care that have been part of my writing context and research 
practices. I highlight the various ways I care for and care about the people, 
theories, events and words that make up my thesis. This leads to discussions of 
the different consequences that different forms of caring have, in particular, the 
degree to which caring too much is a detrimental and parasitic process that has 
important consequences for my academic identity. I conclude by rethinking how 
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a sociological imagination can be rethought when considered through the 
insights developed across this chapter and Chapter 4.   
 
Writing Vignette 1 - Writing in Chaos - Autism, Writing and Home Care 
 
I want to begin this chapter with a more personal, revealing and vulnerable 
dimension  to working on my thesis. So far, I have displayed to readers of this 
thesis a more or less traditional, standardised, assured and professional 
academic persona and voice, able to purvey the relevant literature with insights 
and critique, display analytical prowess in exploring the different facets of such 
work and write arguments that constitute a rational, detached and recognisable 
form of discourse that progresses in a logical sequence to form sound 
conclusions. This chapter serves to disrupt this sense of academic identity by 
showing the ways in which emotions, responsibilities towards others and the 
sensory, informational and social aspects of my Asperger’s interact with these 
accepted and dominant forms of academic identity. The vignette presented 
below outlines a typical day for me, working on my thesis, and demonstrates the 
external conditions, beyond the intellectual and writing obstacles that academics 
can encounter that press on my ability to work effectively.  
 
Characters, Conditions and Concerns - Some Background 
 
I usually start working at around 9:15 and… Hold on a moment, I think that some 
background is necessary in order for the vignette below to make sense. Most of 
the disruptions, breaks and frustrations that come with trying to maintain a 
stable and productive work schedule are related to the fact that I look after my 
mum, assisting her with many daily activities and other tasks intermittently on 
Monday-Friday from 7:15 – 17:30. My mum has a combination of conditions: 
Chronic Fatigue, a hypoactive thyroid and lowered and inflamed immune 
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systems that cause her great difficulty and discomfort in undertaking a wide 
range of activities. She gets tired very easily and has little energy regardless of 
her overall condition, so she is limited in terms of how much she can do before 
having to sleep for a few hours. Unfortunately, this is not helped by the fact that 
sleep does not provide rejuvenating effects despite the fact that on average, 2-3 
sleep sessions per day are necessary to maintain some semblance of wellness. 
Beyond these more general conditions, mum is very susceptible to illness and 
debilitating effects and conditions such as colds, headaches, sore throat with no 
voice and skin rashes. This means that she cannot go out and can only do 
housework or other tasks in short concentrated bursts, with assistance from me 
or others. The level of dedication required often means that other tasks such as 
washing are left to pile up from four members of the house and so require 
further investment if another task has taken priority. Practically, this means we 
are fighting a perpetually unwinnable battle with the various household activities 
to keep backlogs from developing including: the washing, washing-up, sorting 
piles of papers into order, garden maintenance or assembling a new table, 
wardrobe and so on. Something always has to give in this scenario and gets 
delayed until mum has enough energy to tackle it or dad is off work at the 
weekend or for a holiday. When mum does not have the constitution to do these 
tasks, which is, sadly, much of the time, I often do some of these tasks such as 
cleaning as I am the only one at home for most of the time as a full time PhD 
student writing this thesis.  
 
My difficulties with independence due to social and sensory informational issues 
mean that I cannot travel far beyond my local shops, a two-minute walk up the 
road without travelling with my dad or sister who work all day. I am also very 
routine-driven due to my Asperger’s and disruptions to them, whether due to 
unscripted events such as a crisis in the house or due to special and infrequent 
events such as birthdays, cause great anxiety. If my routines are disrupted, I 
often get too wound up to be able to focus on working and even if they are small 
and short, disruptions prevent me from working effectively or in severe cases 
stop me working at all on that day. This is compounded by the fact that mum’s 
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conditions cause her to experience mood swings and she gets frustrated easily 
due to pain and fatigue. I am very sensitive to these changes, being with her for 
so long and I often shut-down or get angry due to her slightly frenzied 
persistence on tasks or her making a bigger deal of things than I feel is 
necessary. I know she does not mean badly with these frustrated outbursts, but, 
I can never fully discount them and I feel uncomfortable because of difficulty in 
controlling and dealing with my emotions in a productive manner.  
 
Having outlined the central background elements that feature in any “working 
day”, I now present a vignette, below, of a sample working day.  
 
My PhD “Writing Day” Exhilaration, Exasperation and Emotional Exhaustion23  
 
9:15: I go down the stairs to the living room, sitting just beside the back right 
corner on the sofa. I sit down, open up and log on to my laptop and open up the 
Word document for the chapter(s) I will be working on today. Ted, our family dog 
is sitting on the sofa to the left of me today; he will most likely come over next to 
me on the right later on for a brief period. “Right, Word’s open, get document, no 
not that one, ah, there’s the chapter! Now, where did I leave off? Helping out 
over the weekend made me lose my place a bit… Ah, yes, the “Doug – Cats, 
Technological Quasi-Objects and Soylent as Parasite” section.”  
 
9:20 – 9:50: (Reading through my field-notes and focus group data, I locate the 
section describing Doug’s interests in technology and cats). “Hm, this is really 
interesting, Doug is seeking to develop his own quasi-object with the “cat toilet” 
idea. What need or role is this construction serving?” (Scrolls to the Soylent 
                                                          
23
 My thoughts are placed within quotation marks in this section. When I am talking to mum, my 
internal thoughts are placed within brackets to mark them clearly as a different mode of address.  
 ~ 191 ~ 
 
explanation in the field-notes). “I seem to recall him mentioning something about 
technology helping to mitigate social and natural problems and thus benefit both 
human and cat populations”… (scanning)… “There it is. This is a bit too abstract 
though. The Soylent event during the club session was filled with banter, friendly 
mocking and bemused interest as to Doug’s personal motivations for engaging 
with it.” (Ted jumps up beside me on the right at this stage). “Oh, this is good! 
Doug recognises the habitual, cyclical and mundane nature of housework and 
this frustrates him because it is using energy and resources which could be 
engaged in more practically relevant and enjoyable things for him. Soylent is 
acting as a quasi-object itself to counteract the parasitism of household chores 
by removing the need for food and water breaks. This is SO INTERESTING!” 
(The thrill of finding theoretical and empirical connections overcomes me and I 
start typing furiously, jumping from point to point as they enter my mind, rather 
than proceeding linearly) “The cat toilet is a quasi-object constructed by Doug, 
“oh yes” Soylent is acting like a relational social object,” (double checks 
relational object definition). “Ah yes, I see how I can dev…” 
 
9:50 – 10:10: Then, just as I am getting into a writerly flow, a familiar voice and 
request echoes down the stairs. “RrOOOoob?” mum inquires, cheerfully 
wondering if I am in my room or downstairs. “Yes mum”, I reply. Locating the 
sound of my voice, she says “Oh, there you are, what are you doing down 
there?” She asks with genuine inquisitiveness. “I’m doing my work”. I say 
plainly, an automatic and unremarkable stock phrase at this point in the PhD 
process. “Oh… ROOoob? Could I have some tea and biscuits please?” The 
question is said with knowing cheek as she knows she is interrupting me and 
understands this frustrates me, but her tea and biscuits are important to her so I 
happily oblige. (Ted, hearing mum’s voice, pricks his ears up and charges up 
the stairs to see her). I make the tea and take it up to her bed. (“Just think, if this 
was last week, she would have had to hobble over to the stairs and bang on the 
railing to get my attention because of her voice loss”). Ted is waiting on the bed 
next to her, looking forward to his little piece of digestive biscuit. As I set off to 
get back to my work, mum gives me a face of intent; she wants to ask me to do 
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something she deems “vital”. “Rob? Could you take the bin bag of rubbish down 
and take the tray of cups and plates down please?” “Yes Mum”, I reply wryly, 
noting that the bag is only half full and the tray is not even fully covered with 
cups or plates. “Can these things really not wait?” I think to myself. “I have to 
make two trips”, which I deemed unnecessary; “this is going to distract my 
developing analytic thoughts”.  
 
10:12 – 10:38: Having done all of that, I sit back down at the laptop and reorient 
myself to where I was. “Right Sigh… Doug would rather have convenience than 
sensual social experiences. Now, I need to develop an account from a different 
participant that highlights a different element of habitual favourites.” (Going 
through my field-notes, keeping my attention focused on notes made about 
favourites or habits). “Hmm, Garry’s management of extracurricular interactions 
beyond his leisure and disability support clubs is an interesting mediation 
between favourite activity and routine processes. His mediating process is….” 
KNOCK, KNOCK, KNOCK!! (Woof, Woof, Woof). “Oh, is that a parcel at the 
door?” I go to the door and indeed, there is a parcel waiting for us a familiar face 
is present. Getting so many parcels has meant we get a number of recurring 
drivers coming to us. “Hello, how are you today?” The lady chimes with 
affection. “Hello, I’m good thank you”. I take the package and sign the electronic 
PDA. “Thanks very much, bye, have a nice day!” “Cheers, bye”. I take the parcel 
and place it on the kitchen table. I take a look at the time and see it is 10:40. 
“Well, as I am up, I suppose I could make my lunch while I am here. I know I 
could wait until 11:00, my normal time, but I am up now and might as well do it 
so as not to interrupt my workflow for the third time today”.  
 
10:40 – 11:10: I make my lunch and sit back down in my work space.  As I am 
eating. (KNOCK, KNOCK, tap on glass), (WOOF, WOOF, GRRRRR). “Another 
parcel… Ah… up we go”. I hurriedly swallow my current piece of biscuit, put my 
plate to the side, away from Ted’s prying nose and mouth and get the parcel. I 
sit back down to finish my lunch. “Haahh… Right, let’s finish lunch”.  
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11:10 – 11:35: “Lunch is eaten, now where was I? Oh yes, Garry’s management 
of interest and interaction. In this case, his lack of a nuanced understanding of 
technology reinforces with his “get away from overwhelming social stimulus” 
response and he seeks to remove outside contact beyond the club gatherings.” 
(I scan through my field-notes for a specific situation at one club.) But then, I 
hear heavy footsteps coming down the stairs, groaning after each two or so 
stairs due to the effort required. Ted, having gone upstairs after the last parcel 
was delivered, excitedly comes charging down the stairs at hyper speed, tail 
wagging, comes to the living room door and stares out, waiting for mum to come 
down. She arrives and sees me typing up Garry’s analysis. “Rob? Could you 
help me please?” Her coy, cheeky attitude from earlier on has seemingly 
vanished and a serious and determined intent has overcome her. (“Oh, we are 
doing stuff are we? You could have let me know that we were doing stuff 
today.”) “Yes mum.” (“I am trying to do my work and you can see that I am doing 
it and we have already done things around the house/fine….. SIGH, here we go 
again. I wonder how long this will take today and if I can return to work in good 
time?”) I get up and go on to face the horror of the backlog of housework.  
 
11:40 - 12:00:  Mum slowly makes her way into the kitchen and over to the sink 
(“Oh, it looks like we are just doing the washing-up, this shouldn’t take too long”) 
I hopefully reassure myself, looking at the moderately small amount of washing 
present  (“This should only take 20 minutes, good, I can get back to work then”). 
We start washing up and I dry the plates and bowls and place them into their 
appropriate cupboards. As we are finishing up, Mum looks out to the washing 
stands out in the dining room, directly in front of us and I can see her tidiness 
gears turning. (“Oh no, she is going to ask me to help with this, isn’t she?”). “We 
need to place these into piles and then take them all up”. I look over to the four 
large piles that are already on the dining room table. (“Wonderful, even more 
things to add to these piles.”) 
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Box 1 - “Interjecting” Descriptor Voice: 
Oh. Um, hello again reader, you may 
remember my “voice”, ahem… from 
Chapter 4. Anyway, I am “interjecting” 
here to give a kind of current status 
update when writing about the past as 
it relates to the present writing section. 
I just wanted to interject here by 
pointing out that, as my analysis/writer 
and emotional voices wrote this 
chapter, the events that transpired in 
the vignette continued. Sure, the 
details and specifics are a little 
different, but, if you change some of 
the events such as washing up to: 
hanging out the washing backlog in the 
garden, or, in less mundane situations, 
sorting out when our washing machine 
leaked water. Then the results are 
largely the same. I wanted to bring this 
to your attention to give you some idea 
of the temporal scale and nature of the 
circumstances I describe in this 
vignette.  
 
12:00 - 12:50: Meanwhile, as I am 
outside, mum is pottering around 
looking for more “unnecessary” 
things to do in my mind. She 
simultaneously manages to put 
some MORE clothes into the 
washing machine for a short, 30-
minute wash, for us to hang up 
later on. And she also manages 
to find some miniscule amount of 
dirt on the kitchen cupboard doors 
and starts to wipe them with anti-
bacterial wipes. When I come in, 
she is panting and out of breath. 
“Rob…” (breathes heavily and 
takes in some breaths to get her 
voice back). “Could you wipe 
these doors please?” (“Is this 
really necessary? We do not have 
guests coming around every day 
judging us could we not just leave 
this?”) I would have said this out 
loud, but I have done so in the 
past to no avail and I just keep my 
admittedly petty frustrations to 
myself nowadays. As I finish 
wiping up, mum opens the fridge 
door, “oh my God, we’ve got to 
clear this out”. I peer into the 
interior and see a small amount of 
things to clean out, but oh no, of 
course, it is not that easy. When 
mum says, “we need to clean out 
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the fridge”, what she actually means is, “ we need to take out the food, empty it 
into food waste bags and remove the shelves and clean them, including the 
vegetable trays  and so on.”  
 
12:50 - 13:25: After this has been done, I turn my attention, weary and frustrated 
to the ironing piles and pick one to take upstairs. As I carry the piles of washing 
up and down the stairs, with little cognitive stimuli to latch onto, my mind of 
course turns to feelings of guilt. Emotional and conflicting thoughts and feelings 
emerge. “Well, so much for doing any more work today! Look! It’s13:05 now! By 
the time were finished, there will be no point in continuing as it will be my 
relaxation and dinner preparation time” Moderately irritated, I start lambasting 
myself, “I really should be doing my work right now. I helped tidy up for the 
majority of yesterday and I really should be doing my work to catch up”. I then 
start becoming resentful about my mum being so pedantic and in my mind, 
obsessed and manic about doing housework, “Why does she get so worked up 
about this, it is so stupid, it really is not worth getting this worked up about it. I 
know I am getting worked up about her getting worked up and… Argh! “sigh.” I 
feel a surge of anger inside and I give in to the anger, grit my teeth and tightly 
clench my fists. I then release the tension and quickly calm down again. This is 
my “angry stim” that you could say that I often get when mum is in a bad mood 
due to her thyroid issues. Resentment soon becomes resignation and fatalism 
before turning into acceptance, “Sigh” I suppose there is not much I can do. I am 
so worked up now that I know that I will not be able to focus on writing properly 
and I will most likely be interrupted anyway. Besides, I have plenty of time until 
the next supervision session to finish the chapter off.” “Pile two”, “pile three”, 
“pile four”, “pile number five, up we go.” My emotional and cognitive defeatism is 
transferring to physical non-enthusiasm as my body feels the strain of going up 
and down the stairs more than it should. Anxious pangs are pulsing through my 
chest, my mouth is getting dry, teeth are clenching and grinding, I am feeling 
light-headed and my stomach is churning. These are the symptoms of anxiety I 
know intimately. They are so engrained in my habitual bodily and physiological 
disposition that I cannot even imagine what any other mode of habitual bodily 
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“normal” is like at this point. I experience an “anxiety cycle” where the symptoms 
of anxiety cause me to be more anxious and this in turn causes the symptoms to 
intensify. I have reached the cruel middle point where I know that nothing 
serious is ever going to happen, but the symptoms are strong enough, still, to 
cause me concern and intrude enough on my emplaced consciousness that I 
cannot block them out. “I think I understand on a more fundamental, emplaced 
level what Doug was talking about in regard to mundane household work now. 
That’s something for work, right?”  
 
”Mind out the way Ted”. I chime in a high pitched, cheerful tone (Ted moves to 
the side)”Thank you”. This brief period of light affective communication does not 
feel “fake” as to the way I feel however and gives me a break from the negative 
mood I am currently in. Ted’s dog-like ways of acting and his innocent curious 
nature, which dogs often express regarding our activities, gives me a sense of 
comfort and I imagine ways in which he is thinking about what we are doing 
from the perspective of a dog and the ways in which he tries to make sense of 
our actions. I think, in some ways, this gives me another angle from which to 
personally connect to Doug’s interest in cats and their “catness”. I feel an 
emplaced connection to his affective and discursive constructions of this 
relationship, amongst the drudgery and frustrations of mundane housework and 
the insurmountable obstacle it presents.  
 
13:30 - 15:00: As I finish off the last remaining piles, mum is hanging up the next 
washing load. “Rob, Could you get the tray and bring down the stuff from 
upstairs?” Because mum is in bed for most of the time, she accumulates cups, 
plates and cutlery due to copious amounts of tea consumption and lunch and 
dinner being brought up to her. I am ok with doing this, as I saw earlier that we 
would need more plates for dinner later at 17:15. I collect them all and 
cautiously carry them downstairs. We then wash these up and I dry them and 
place them in their appropriate cupboard locations. We take a break after this 
and sit in the living room and talk about various topics such as the news, politics 
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or what is going on in the life of my dad or sister. I do not continue working 
during these breaks that we have because I know we are going to get up again 
and be interrupted YET AGAIN before I can get into an efficient writing flow and 
rhythm. After about 25 minutes, we get back up and see if the washing machine 
has finished yet. It has 10 minutes to go, I take out the recycling bags that have 
been filled after clearing out the fridge and tidying the kitchen. I then take out the 
washing to hang it up on the line in the garden, which takes a little longer than 
doing it inside due to the pegs and rotating the outside line. We then both make 
mum some lunch and head upstairs at 15:00. Then I go to my room and have 
some solitary time in order to recover and recharge.  
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Reflective Voice: Hello, It has been a 
few weeks since I have attended to the 
working day vignette. I have noted, as 
the reader probably has, that the 
scenario I have depicted is very 
negative. This one-sided outline is at 
once an “accurate” construction of my 
thoughts and feelings during the events. 
But it fails to capture the more light-
hearted and positive dimensions that 
these activities bring, like how mum gets 
immense satisfaction from making things 
tidy and improving the house, or how we 
laugh and joke about silly things like the 
absurdity of the storylines of the Soaps 
that mum watches or playing with Ted 
and laughing at his playful behaviours.  
Discussion - Writing as a Mundane Academic Habitus  
 
The above vignette about my 
working day is filled with many 
complex relations, emotional 
fluctuations, research practices, 
thought processes, caring 
responsibilities, analytic themes 
and habitual worldly 
engagements. I will, over the 
course of the rest of the chapter, 
explore each of these aspects in 
some form. I want to begin by 
examining and exploring the ways 
in which my writing experiences 
can be conceptualised in a very 
descriptive sense. I will then go on 
to explore how academic writing is 
shaped and constituted by the 
location and conditions from 
which it emerges. This process 
could be termed an academic 
habitus which structures and 
influences the kinds of writing and 
attitudes towards it.  
 
In the most general sense, my writing can be understood as taking place within 
the unpredictable and chaotic nature of my home life-setting. I work through 
sections of writing and thinking that are always punctuated by external 
disruptions, pauses directed by my mum and family’s needs, as well as desires 
and requests. As such, I very rarely have the chance to enter into a truly 
 ~ 199 ~ 
 
focused or flow-like state in my writing as my mind/body is eternally peripherally 
aware of the next task that my mum might need assistance with. Because of 
these constant interruptions and the consequent disorientating effects they 
have, it is difficult for me to go beyond the phase of reorienting myself to the 
arguments I am developing and integrating and consolidating my reading, 
empirical data and analytical insights into a coherent piece of written work. To 
focus on the in-the-moment domain of writing, I am less immediately concerned 
about the connections to the other chapters, the grammatical clarity and aspects 
like sign-posting or how my work connects more broadly to the relevant 
literatures beyond the immediate ideas and reading I am working with. Within 
mainstream autism theory, these challenges would be framed as displaying 
difficulties with global/local coherence (See Happé and Frith, 2006 and Booth 
and Happé, 2016). However, as I have noted in Chapters 1 and 3, this 
reductionist focus on cognitive-based explanations discounts the emplaced 
sensory and habitual quasi-objects that can provide a more nuanced account of 
autistic being and becoming. In relation to my working day vignette, retaining 
awareness of my writing and managing home care  responsibilities can be more 
fruitfully understood through the sensory thresholds framework of Smith and 
Sharp (2013) I outlined in Chapter 3. Here, the material, sensory, bodily and 
cognitive interact together to constitute the factors that generate disruptive 
effects in terms of negotiating the complexities of the writing process. I thus find 
it much harder to relate parts to wholes or vice versa without extensive and 
considered detachment, analysis and review of the situation at hand. Later in 
the chapter, I will consider how these sensory thresholds interacted in relation to 
notions of care.  
 
Following Kamler and Thomson (2014), developing my identity as an academic 
researcher has been complex and truncated by the many factors I have outlined 
above. In these terms, my writing is very unstructured. On occasions, days go 
by where I do not have a chance to think about or write for my thesis at all due 
to family commitments. Therefore, developing a unique and identifiable 
academic “voice” is something that emerges in spurts and bursts rather as a 
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continuous engagement. Indeed, my mode of working goes against the linear, 
standardised and simplified models of PhD guidance, exemplified by books 
such as “Writing Your PhD in Fifteen Minutes a Day” (Bolker, 1998).  
 
As discussed by Kamler and Thomson, this presents the view that: 
 
language is transparent, a straightforward conduit for thought. The 
process of writing is simplified into a linear process, where students 
are exhorted to think first, then write. They need to plan, get the 
chapter outline clear, and proceed, bit by bit, chapter, by chapter, as if 
meaning is already formed prior to the writing (Kamler and Thomson, 
2014 :4).  
 
My research-writing practice makes this overview of research-writing impossible 
to attain. Within this form of thinking, any deviations from these best practice 
tips are seen as the researcher/writer being negligent or not good enough to 
conduct thesis work. The deficits are placed solely on the individual writer and 
do not consider the wider social factors that influence the writing process. On a 
more personal level, this linear progression of working is not connected to the 
style of the thesis. This is because my core thesis aims, themes and overall 
research project is a unique and original combination of literature, concepts and 
ideas. I do not have the luxury of producing a draft where the argument and 
meaning of the chapters are set in stone and all that is left is the tidying and 
polishing of grammar, argumentative logic and spelling (ibid:4). Because of the 
way I work, the chapters benefit from scattered writing, thinking and reading 
practices that produce meaning piecemeal in liaison with feedback from my 
support worker and supervisors. This scattered nature of working however does 
not prevent concentrated bursts of activity. In the less busy times of helping 
mum and family, I am able to focus on thinking through some ideas away from 
the actual physicality and presence of staring at my computer screen. I have 
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found this to cause me to lose motivation to write on some occasions due to the 
repetitive nature of the work involved, when not motivated and spurred on by an 
existing idea of conceptual inquiry, as I note in the working day vignette. Further 
to this, as I discussed with my support assistant, whom I noted in Chapter 4, 
whenever I am not able to work on the thesis due to other commitments, when I 
next come back to it, I have an intensive and frantic writing session which I feel 
as a kind of intellectual and physical catharsis. These spurts come from ideas I 
have as I start writing, having come back from a break rather than ideas I have 
been consciously formulating during that break. My unconscious runs in the 
background and there are more ideas than I am consciously aware of, but it also 
points to the different material and medium differences of conceiving the ideas 
in my head and re-reading and reorienting myself to the chapter after a break.  
 
Kamler and Thomson (2014) remind us that the process of writing a doctoral 
thesis is a complex and iterative process that goes beyond developing a finely 
crafted document to considering issues of “identity/text work” (Kamler and 
Thomson, 2014: 26). By this, they mean that as doctoral researchers go through 
the system and processes of PhD research such as vivas, conference 
presentations, working through articles for publishing and so on, they work out 
how to present an academic identity that is conducive and appropriate for 
diverse situations and audiences. Because of this, writing in a digital, word-
processed document is an entirely different medium, process and experience 
than undertaking a verbal presentation at a conference or in a viva. Not 
discounting the fact that writing down ideas in a separate research diary in a 
fragmented format, requires a different set of cognitive skills than working 
through these same ideas within the structures and conventions of prose and 
argumentative logic and development. Kamler and Thomson contend that this 
cognitive process is not separate or distinct from the bodily comportments 
required for writing, speaking and working through an intellectual project. As 
such, these somatic habits developed during the writing process are embodied 
in the muscles, body comportments and nerves of PhD students and thus form a 
core part of a distributed student identity. These kinds of responses and 
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conditioned, habitual ways of interacting and reacting to writing and thinking can 
be framed as a kind of habitus or the socialised subjectivity of PhD students. 
The emplaced comportment and actions of doctoral students habitus are placed 
within a larger set of relations, which Kamler and Thomson (2014) develop in 
utilising Norman Fairclough’s (1992) model of discursive framing to locate the 
writing of a thesis. These wider networks of relations can include the student 
supervisor relationship as well as the infrastructural and institutional practices of 
where the student develops their thesis the university, the library, cafes, on the 
train, in the home environment, or in the work office amongst many others.  
 
I wish to address the working-day vignette in regard to the issues that Kamler 
and Thomson first raise in relation to the specific material, bodily and medium-
specific nature of research writing.  
 
The Consequences of Writing in Chaos - Thinking With Care in Writing  
 
My desire to write the “Working Day” vignette speaks to a number of issues that 
come with the practicality of writing. A recent approach to discussing the 
complexities of the writing process can be seen in Les Back’s (2007) work on 
scholarly writing, which examines the different ways in which the components of 
writing, the context, the writer’s desk, as well as objects and rituals help the 
writer develop ideas and cope with problems, writerly or otherwise. These 
aspects, brought together, could be called a writerly craft and go on to constitute 
the ways in which the practicalities of writing emerge and go on to shape the 
subsequent output of the writer. However, I am concerned that, if left 
unquestioned or treated too romantically, the concept of craft could ignore the 
potential hardships that go beyond writing as something that is left outside of the 
purview of the craft concept. While this notion is invaluable to describe the 
object-focused, affective and emplaced subjective spatial and temporal factors 
that go on to constitute the writing process, it does little to develop ideas about 
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the practical and equally emplaced challenges that go beyond the writerly craft 
as such. What about those with processing disabilities such as dyspraxia? How 
does the writer’s craft become influenced and shaped by conditions that serve, 
in some ways to challenge the very sanctity and expectations of what it means 
to be a writer? How do writerly rituals and habits intersect with non-writerly 
mundane and everyday rituals and habits of housework, familial responsibility 
and care when they press on the writer more than is expected? Rather than 
viewing academic writing as if it “can be plucked from the everyday and treated 
as a stand-alone activity, one that renders outcomes, fills pre-existing genres, 
serves as stable evidence of one kind or another”, we might think of writing as 
“contaminated, made possible by a mingling of forces and energies in diverse, 
often distributed environments. Writing is defined, ultimately, by its radical 
withness” (Micciche 2014: 501-502, emphasis in original).  
 
This emphasis matches the focus on quasi-objects I have been developing and 
will continue to develop in this chapter. As McRuer (2004) argues, normative, 
neurotypical forms of writing and composition play into neoliberal imperatives of 
standardised teaching in order to produce flexible and docile bodies to master 
measurable skills and techniques (McRuer, 2004: 49-50). As I noted in Kamler 
and Thomson’s critique of Bolker (1998), deviation from standardised 
techniques and practices of reading, thinking and writing is located in the 
individual student, researcher and writer. To move beyond critiques that argue 
for incorporeal resistance such as creative and free writing, McRuer points to 
the importance of non-normative, embodied corporealities that speak back to 
normative composition. Therefore, in relation to my Asperger’s or for those with 
dyspraxia, this means taking into account their unique modes of articulation, 
writing should not just be taken into account. They should be seen as 
constitutive of writing as a practice that cannot be displaced by normalising 
techniques of capture. I will address these issues in my discussions of my 
second vignette below in relation to writing milieu and non-normative writing and 
analysis practices.  
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As I note, this is not to say that writing as a craft cannot address these issues. 
For example, the work of Dorothy Smith (1987) has been central in pointing out 
the ways in which power relations intersect with the mundane activity of writing. 
Specifically, she speaks of how a sociological writer, in the privileged position of 
a university office, can speak about an external social world, without ever 
necessitating thinking about the usability or cleanliness of the floor or bins. 
These jobs are performed by night workers who never interact or intersect with 
the routines and writing practices of the academics in question. High-level 
questions and the conceptualisation of writing as craft can only be achieved if 
time is not taken up or occupied too much with tasks that take away from the 
activity of writing. If a specialised and demarcated spatial and temporal area of 
study cannot be maintained or created, then writing becomes less ordered by 
the structures of thinking and writing and more open to the strictures of non-
writing-oriented tasks.  
 
Because I have written the vast majority of my thesis in a home environment, 
these kinds of institutional questions are not directly relevant. But, we can also 
extend these questions of power and positionality into domestic study or writing 
settings. I want to focus specifically on questions relating to aspects of care. I 
want to focus on the care I give to my mum, the care I give to my writing and 
analysis and the care my mum gives to her concerns with the house. I want to 
work through what questions of care mean when I look at how mum and I 
understand the home situation. I will focus in on me and my mum’s differently 
situated or punctualised (Munro, 2004, 2005) connection to the 
thesis/writing/house/maintenance relation can help to explain the frustrations 
and complexities of our responses to it.  
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I believe that a feminist consideration of care as a concept, practice and ethical-
philosophical project can highlight the specificities of my writing and home life 
relationships. This framework seeks to account for “fostering […] mundane 
maintenance and repair, [where] a world’s degree of liveability might well 
depend on the caring accomplished within it” (de la Bellacasa, 2012: 198). 
Caring is essential for any form of life or world-building to take place. Even when 
normally, care is not acknowledged as crucial to an event, someone has to take 
care of someone or something in order for it to be possible. Neglect leads to 
highly diminished results or the complete dissolution of the elements that 
constituted the event. In this sense and in contrast to more utilitarian notions of 
care, “the vital necessity of care means standing for sustainable and flourishing 
relations, not merely survivalist or instrumental ones” (ibid: 198). Equally, care 
involves emotions and material labour and can be based on exploitation or 
domination just as much as affection and attentiveness. Thus, we should not 
idealise care as, although it is an essential precondition to effective social 
relations, it requires work and necessitates consideration of the ways in which 
harmonious and troublesome relations intertwine to make care possible.  
 
How are these insights related to my own situation presented in the above 
vignette? Firstly, my difficulties with independence mean that I rely on my 
parents during most weekdays to give me help with planning out and organising 
my days. This may include making sure that the dinner is cooked, giving advice 
on how to manage moving bank accounts and reminding me to undertake 
routine household tasks. This mutual dependence on each other is a central 
crux from which to expand upon the notion of care outlined by de la Bellacasa 
(2012). The material and emotional labour I outlined in my vignette speaks to 
questions of responsibility and dedication to two very different tasks the 
difficulties in managing the “head work” of my PhD writing and the “body work” 
of household tasks and the emotional negotiation for me and my mum. On the 
one hand, PhD writing is a positive, affective rush that heightens my conceptual 
manipulation and theoretical development capacities through tracing, 
highlighting and developing my own personal form of praxis, or the combination 
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of theory and empirical research. On the other hand, helping my mum around 
the house causes me to resent household tasks and consequently I lack 
motivation to take care of things independently. Equally, my frustration with my 
mum’s frustration of her inability to keep the house as she would like prevents 
me from engaging with my PhD as much as I would like. The scale of writing 
and the sheer amount of material labour that is needed in the house, in the form 
of washing, cleaning and shopping for four people, two of whom work full time 
from Monday to Friday, never reach an equilibrium and both remain in a 
constant state of catch-up. Thus, without each other, my mum’s and my worlds 
would be completely dissolved.  
 
These insights lead me to consider de la Bellacasa’s (2012) discussions about 
“caring too much” and the multiple ways in which this produces problematic 
relations in regard to those we care for and with. Firstly, caring too much, 
devoting too much to one form of association, person, object or activity can 
“extinguish the subtleties of attending to the needs of an “other” required for 
careful relationality. All too easily, it can lead to appropriating the recipients of 
“our” care, instead of relating ourselves to them” (de la Bellacasa, 2012: 209). 
For me, this means that my anger and frustration at my mum’s obsession with 
what I consider pointless work in the house has become an all-consuming factor 
that interacts with all aspects of my life, not just my PhD writing. Because I 
spend much of my time at home, I am highly attentive to potential tasks that my 
mum might seek to undertake. The cupboards are slightly dirty that means we 
will probably end up cleaning the whole kitchen when mum notices it, even 
though the cupboard needs to be cleaned and nothing else does. This sort of 
anxious and frustrated form of anticipatory alertness and the resultant anger and 
resentment completely blinds me to other forms of relating to housework or 
feeling satisfied with the result of our labour. Just like Doug, the nature of 
housework is cyclical; it is never complete and thus my anticipatory alertness 
becomes integrated into this cyclical form of labour that can never be 
dissociated from my mum’s attitude to the tasks.  
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I am experiencing what Smith and Sharp (2013)24 have noted as the varying 
different forms of input emotional, sensory and interactional which are 
modulated through various thresholds of abilities to cope. My ability to cope and 
my inability to escape the parasitical nature of this household relationship, 
where the noise of housework or my thesis haunts each other has 
“asphyxiat[ed] other possible skills” (de la Bellacasa, 2012: 209), or ways of 
being or relating to housework. In other words, it has become a static, habitual, 
affective state of being integrated with mundane material labour. My emotional 
outbursts of anger and anxiety I discuss in the vignette and their anticipatory 
symptoms serve to add a physiological and psychological parasitical 
mechanism to our interactions. To balance and manage each of these parasites 
to prevent worry, distress or unease is very difficult and I have not managed to 
find a way to negotiate such diverse concerns. The same sorts of tasks, the 
same kinds of attitudes towards these tasks, the same spatial arrangements, 
the same familial petty disputes and laughs, all feed back into each other such 
that novelty is hard to produce, let alone imagine.  
 
What I rarely have time to consider is the fact that mum cannot help but depend 
upon me and that ultimately, I could never not help her around the house as I 
could never not let go of the guilt that I was leaving her helpless. I could thus 
never appropriate my responsibility to care for her. Not only this, the parasite-
like situation has taught me and drilled into me several important lessons that 
complement the deficiencies of my autism. These are, namely: being attentive 
to and learning to be affected by my mum’s different forms of care towards the 
house, I am more able to cope, to a limited degree, with the frustration, 
spontaneity and anxiety that my mum exhibits in relation to making the house 
look good. Furthermore, I have developed and expanded my skills to help my 
parents take care of their widowed elderly mothers with regard to memory 
issues. And, I seek to develop my ability to remain calm and considerate in the 
face of frustrating misunderstandings that occur due to forgetfulness. I have 
                                                          
24
 See Chapter 3 for an in-depth discussion and application of this study.  
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come to realise that she is just as trapped as me in this habitual parasite of a 
relationship, in similar and different ways. Like me, she is trapped within the 
spatial confines of the house. The same sorts of tasks, the same kinds of 
attitudes towards these tasks, the same spatial arrangements, the same familial 
petty disputes and laughs exist for mum. But for her, they are related to the 
difficulty in keeping the house. No work, a lack of contact with friends and the 
resultant spatial and social isolation means that the house has become the one 
thing outside of family that she can care for. She takes great delight in planning 
how to improve things and internet shopping for new items for the house. 
Unfortunately, this love for house organisation turns to frustration when your 
muscles ache, and your thoughts are muddled and incoherent. When your 
emotions are destabilised due to hormonal and physical imbalances, care for 
the house becomes complicated and dealing with your son’s neurodiverse 
sociality becomes something of a challenge to work through.  
 
These issues can usefully be described as displaying forms of what Munro 
(2004, 2005) has called “punctualized” identity formation. Here, subjectivity is 
not directed to pre-existing social structures, but relates to them as they develop 
based on forms of structural emergence and agential actions responding to the 
spatial and temporal milieus that they inhabit. Identities are, in this sense, 
formed by the “demanding” elements of these times and spaces, because mum 
is isolated in the house, her identity, actions and thoughts are oriented to its 
care, maintenance and improvement. Spatial and temporal issues become 
centred on the ways in which the space can be made better through new 
storage options, for example, or by the time needed to paint a bedroom. This 
will then lead mum to consider how visitors will come to view us if we leave the 
painting unfinished due to fatigue and illness; thus, her sense of self is shaped 
around these interlocking questions. These responsibilities and obligations 
cause her to see these as “demanding” affordances because the care invested 
in them is so great.  
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How Do You Cope? - Future Directions  
 
I want to end this section on the notion of care in relation to me, my mum and 
the house by ending on the same questions that de la Bellacasa asks in 
“Nothing Comes Without Its World” (2012). “How do you cope?” “Does the 
attention required to keep our knowledge aware of its connections and 
consequences lead inevitably to anxiety?” “Aren’t anxiety, sorrow and grief 
unavoidable affects in efforts of paying serious mental attention, of thinking with 
care, in dislocated worlds?” (de la Bellacasa, 2012: 212). The question of coping 
is intricately connected to care because these issues illuminate the affective 
nature of knowledge politics (ibid: 212). In relation to anxiety, sorrow and grief, I 
feel that in my case, as I noted in my writing-day story, it is a strongly habitual 
means of interacting with the world that has become interiorised to the extent 
that feelings and thoughts of being anxious create anxiety in a cyclical loop. This 
interiorised state is manifested in the anticipatory anxiety that I discussed 
earlier, such that I know in advance how things will play out, based on the way 
mum reacts and moves through space and the modes of address she uses 
when talking to me. de la Bellacasa also inquires as to whether these negative 
affects rather than being constitutive to a relational notion of care “belong to an 
out-of-place sense of inaccurateness: that something does not match, does not 
hold together, that something could be different?” (ibid: 212 emphasis in 
original). In our case, the situation could be different in the sense that a key 
factor of the tensions created is due to my PhD work.  
 
After all, this situation is being sustained by the PhD I am writing. Once it is 
submitted and the writing has concluded, the parasite will be dislodged from its 
current hook in the habitual cycle of mum, the house and the thesis. It will 
change locations and thus the impact it has will change also. No longer will I 
have to worry about whether I am working enough on my thesis. No longer will I 
have to have to worry about time being leeched away from me. Temporality will 
be freed in this case, as I will no longer be bound by the linear expectations of 
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my PhD writing, which has to be completed by a specific time. Although the path 
to completion is denoted as linear, the directions taken to reach the end goal of 
submission are mutable and uncertain, the trials and tribulations are open, yet 
the outcome and markers of progress are set. This dissonant disconnect is very 
troubling to a person with autism, as there is a logical disconnect between the 
intent, the actions and the justifications for achieving them. Then, only one side 
remains uncertain; mum’s desire and urge to care for the house, based on 
impulse and frustration, become the new normal and, for me, temporality 
becomes more bounded to the spatial confines of the house. The emotional 
frustration and pettiness will most likely remain. Such firmly cemented 
sentiments do not dislodge easily, but they can exclusively be focused on trying 
to communicate to mum the problems with her excessive caring without having 
to risk putting my thinking and writing skills at risk due to social and emotional 
overload. I will be able to afford to care too much about mum’s attitude to the 
housework situation.  
 
In this sense, the anger and anxiety I feel can be better used and redistributed 
as something that is a sign of the unbalanced amount of care being placed into 
the house. In other words, I will be able to focus fully and bring attention to the 
inaccuracies in this relationship and work to resolve them and develop a more 
positive attitude to house-care and mum’s understanding and subsequent 
actions based on this care. Instead of perceiving the situation as a damaging 
and draining affective state of being that prevents any form of negotiation or 
thinking otherwise in the habitual parasitic relations, I would then argue that 
caring too much for the house will always generate anxiety and sorrow for mum 
and me, because we care so much about the stakes of how we perceive the 
situation. Unless the imbalances are addressed, we will never be able to move 
to change the circumstances in which we find ourselves.  
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I now want to touch upon a more positive aspect in relation to the writing 
process as a whole. I will refer to concepts developed by MacLure (2013), which 
address the tension I noted in Chapter 4 regarding the autoethnographic 
impulse to combine both scientific and artistic means of writing research 
accounts. More specifically, I will discuss the tension involved with an autistic 
writer conducting an autoethnography of academic research, in being portrayed 
as only being able to be systematic and pattern-sensitive rather than attentive to 
the emotional and affective and meaning-laden aspects of research practice.  
 
Writing Vignette 2 - The “Glow” of Academic Thinking and Writing as Habitual 
Favourites 
 
MacLure (2013), in her discussion of analysis and in particular coding, notes 
that while coding is necessary in order to provide stability and meaning in the 
context of research and specific forms of understanding such as charting 
networks of power, knowledge and categorical differentiation (MacLure, 2013 
:170), it is much less able to deal with issues that do not follow the conventional 
grammar of meaning-making such that the same kinds of associations are made 
(ibid: 168). Furthermore, coding cannot discuss questions that go beyond 
linguistic, discursive or semiotic domains of events that disrupt these 
categorising imperatives such as the bodily, affective and ineffable inherent in 
any social encounter. Following Stewart and her methodological call to 
“unforgetting” (1996: 11), these aspects of research and phenomena that go 
beyond, resist or subvert formal categorical meaning-making, disrupts the 
desire to submit all difference and fluidity to static and clearly mapped codes. 
MacLure argues that we might pay heed to language and its enactments in 
discursive  mockery, jokes, lies, shrugs and embodied snorts, tears and laughter 
(MacLure, 2013 :171). These both prevent the serious work of analysis but point 
us to broader analytical strategies for research that include acknowledging, not 
disowning gut feelings and allowing guilt, fear, anxiety and other mind/body 
affects to influence and drive forward our empirical and theoretical discussions 
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and developments (ibid: 172). In what ways do these discussions relate to my 
workday vignette and the process of conducting an autieethnography? They first 
of all point to the entangled nature of trying to develop an analytical theoretical 
thesis in regards to topics as ephemeral as sensory experiences and 
atmospheric conditions alongside the “harder” domains of habit and favourites. I 
have already commented on this in Chapter 4, but MacLure allows me to go 
further by considering, in a very practical sense, the ways in which working 
through my empirical material can embody these processes.  
 
Discussing sensory experiences in connection to favourites leads to productive 
and seemingly unproductive senses of unease. The ineffable runs up against 
the linguistic, and the affectively charged places uneasy questions against the 
strictly coded and rational linguistic description of research data. My analysis is 
in a constant antagonistic state. I am obliged to make my data meaningful and 
am strongly encouraged to develop representational meaning techniques that 
further encourage me to leave out or ignore the idiosyncrasies of autistic 
stimming or language use as these are regarded as just “the autism talking”. By 
not giving these qualities their own explanatory or analytical power to disrupt the 
analytical work conducted on them, they are reduced to discursive codes that in 
turn reduce these affective/rational coagulations to something other than 
themselves and place them within hierarchical and stultifying categorical 
markers. Therefore, these mark a physically and emotionally intensive gestural 
bodily action as one thing or another rather as a state of liminal working-
through-the-world or an in-between affective and rational mode of everyday 
action.  
 
I have sought to resolve this problem through the use of what I have mentioned 
in Chapter 4 as kinaesthetic energrams. These work through the discursive, 
gestural, and embodied ways in which these affective and rational mixes of 
action can be recorded, working through sensory memories and embodied re-
enactments of the habitual, sensory and gestural actions made by myself and 
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my participants which can be used alongside the linguistic inscriptions of my 
fieldnotes. This emplaced technique goes beyond these concerns and can be 
extended to consider the affective and discursive processes of analysis itself. 
MacLure goes on to make a point that I found particularly resonant to my own 
form of autistic emplaced, affective/rational process of research,  
 
MacLure describes this dynamic research process as: 
 
“languorous, and not wholly cerebral pleasure in giving oneself over 
to the data […] Maybe it’s just me, but I enjoy that part of the research 
process that involves poring over the data, annotating, describing, 
linking, bringing theory to bear, recalling what others have written and 
seeing things from different angles […] The researcher is at this point 
a live conduit wherein the materiality of things, the struggles for 
concepts, one’s “shared entanglement” (Bal, 1999: 30) with others, 
and with the uncut and unbounded totality of the data, can be felt. 
(MacLure, 2013: 174, emphasis in original)   
 
I can confirm that this felt aspect of the research process is not just based on 
her own account of the experience of research. It also speaks to one of my own 
“favourites”,  the act of reading, analysing, thinking about and with and writing 
about social theory and research. I, like any person with autism, who has a 
special interest, can become so immersed in reading about a particular set of 
theories, a conceptual trail, different positions on the merits of an author’s 
perspectives, that it is not just a case of interest, but a compulsion to know. I 
have to know about the topic or I will get anxious, upset and frustrated that I do 
not have the answers and will not be satisfied or truly able to relax until I can 
find a way to work through the issues I am having. That is the thing about 
autistic special interests; they can imbue the entirety of the person’s being in 
regard to their beliefs, actions, reference points for comparison and 
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understanding other’s perspectives. In more specific and theoretical terms, I get 
a sense of what MacLure, drawing on Taussig, calls “disconcertment” (Taussig, 
1993). I am caught between affective intensity and cognitive clarity, which are in 
constant flux in relation to how I react to daily life and, in this case, social 
research and writing. I am not sure exactly how to proceed or where the 
inspirations come from, but I know that they excite and encourage me as well as 
disheartening me at the thought that perhaps they might not lead anywhere after 
all. However, when a particular idea, concept or theory makes sense and comes 
together, I experience what Deleuze refers to, in describing the passion of an 
event, as “a sort of leaping of the whole body” (Deleuze, 2004: 170).  
 
My affective and rational capacities become hyper-charged, things flirt in and 
out at breakneck speeds, and ideas, concepts and applications all come to me 
at once. I feel a sense of connection to the totality of the data, theory or 
concepts at play, as if, for that moment, they are the centre of my universe of 
awareness. My emplaced mind/body becomes subsumed in the logics, 
arguments and empirical richness of the data or theory and allows me to feel 
alive and connected to something that I understand so profoundly. At times, it 
only reaffirms my passion for learning even more. I see the most abstracted 
theoretical system as something with an affective logic that gives me pleasure 
just thinking about it and understanding how it operates rather than just as a 
logical system. These processes and systems gain a sensory and affective 
charge that makes them multisensual, Deleuze’s (1993, 2004) affective writings 
become emotional and material in very literal ways, Foucault’s (1991, 2010) 
descriptions of disciplinary systems and their spatial, temporal and material 
logics and the concomitant use of techniques of the self become embodied, 
concrete feelings in my sense of self. Serres’ (2007, 2008) parasites and quasi-
objects become felt, co-existent things that prey and support my social actions 
and understandings. Practically, this means that developing a framework that 
accounts for the sensory, habitual and distributed, posthuman components of 
autistic experience invites a wide array of emplaced “languorous pleasures” in 
my writing and research. Doug’s enjoyment of “catness” becomes something I 
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respect and feel intimately. Williams’ (2003) description of tree companionship 
produces mimetic effects of acceptance and affinity for the processes of nature. 
Josh’s brash and forceful interaction, that I discussed in Chapter 3, causes me 
to recoil and places the concept of social quasi-objects in an emplaced, sensory 
and interactional context that enhances my understanding of provocative 
objects. The conceptual and theoretical toolkits I utilise pleasurably intersect 
with the materiality of things and the totality of data to produce an intense mode 
of engagement.  
 
I feel intense pulses of excitement rushing through my body as I make 
connections on a representational level by learning and utilising new concepts 
and on an affective level through expanding my knowledge for its own sake, not 
for any pre-determined goal, the activity itself is enough. My Asperger’s 
Syndrome is a major component that shapes the cognitive, affective, and 
material responses I have in these excited moments. Why bother demarcating 
them when them mixing up is so comforting, exiting and profound in developing 
my learning, sense of self and emotional and sensory fortitude? That is what 
coding and written documents are for. As MacLure (2013) notes, the assertive, 
certain, liberal subject emerges during analysis. The process to get to this end 
point comprise the flows, connections in-between material, social and linguistic 
domains are open to experimentation to develop insights. MacLure summarises 
all of this as developing the researcher’s “glow” and Stafford (2001), in 
describing the cabinet of curiosities, attempts to classify the edge of knowledge 
exotica of the world, and calls such multi-sensory experiences  
 
intensification. As a kind of exhilaration of the senses, intensification 
is affectively complex: learning, enchantment, perception, cognition 
and seduction are caught up in each other (Stafford, 2001: 7 in 
MacLure, 2013: 180-81).  
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This quote captures my myriad engages with the authors, theories and analytic 
themes I highlighted above. In summary, my experience of doing research and 
writing is caught between the poles of interruptions and frustrations and times of 
exhilaration and affective/cognitive intensity. The question of balancing out the 
positive and negative domains of my research experience and the resultant 
anxieties and work balance issues I have outlined in this section is still unsettled 
for me. Facing forwards to the future, I am slowly but surely developing my 
academic identity by presenting my work to student audiences for the first time, 
having my work published in journals and developing blog posts. The process 
may be slow and may not perfectly fit the accelerated model of neoliberal PhD 
demands of flexibility, frantic multiple workloads and networked connections 
(Eddy, 2011). But, this work serves to challenge these expectations by drawing 
attention to the vast amount of work required to develop and maintain such work 
and networks, which often goes unnoticed.  
 
Back to Caring - Intellectual Structures and Identity  
 
I now want to take some time to reflect once more on issues of care. This time, 
however, the tone and focus will emphasise the positive and dynamic nature of 
my intellectual thought processes identified in the above section. Drawing once 
more on de la Bellacasa’s (2012) thinking about the relationality of care, I will 
utilise her readings of Donna Haraway (1997, 2000), who details how caring is 
composed of thinking with multiple forms of existence and relations such that 
any form of existence is composed of semiotic, material, epistemological, 
political, emotional/affective and non-human objects and forces (Haraway, 
2000: 403). In this way, caring in a non-moralistic and non-normative capacity 
shies away from and detests reductionism of any kind and constantly questions 
taken-for-granted categories and ways of thinking to generate unique insights 
and approaches to questions and problems. This approach thickens our sense 
of what the boundaries of any phenomenon or object, are as heterogeneous 
components make multiple relations and thus thicken our accounts and 
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diversified by “diffracting” patterns of difference. (de la Bellacasa, 2012: 199-
200, Haraway and Goodeve, 2000: 193).  
 
In this sense, my research sensibilities include representational techniques such 
as reading linguistic field-notes and examining and correlating theoretical and 
conceptual links to empirical data. This is combined with an attention to the 
affective sensibilities in my research practice including kinaesthetic energrams 
and the glow and languorous pleasures of writing. In doing this, I have actively 
sought to prevent any kind of autistic narcissism by making explicit the way in 
which my internal affective and representational research practice has been 
made possible and conditioned by the work of other intellectual figures. Equally, 
I have explored the biases and emotional and social weaknesses that 
characterise my caring relationships with my mum to develop a vulnerable 
position alongside that of the confident scholar. In fact, I have an immense 
dislike for making grandiose or egocentric statements about my work or 
sociological abilities. I do not want to present myself as too arrogant or 
omniscient due to a desire to subscribe to a modest sense of knowledge 
production that recognises the iterability, relational unfoldings and co-
becomings of structures and actors (Haraway, 1997).  
 
De la Bellacasa is equally concerned with attributing too much impetus to an 
author who seeks a “disposal of the gap” (Munro, 1999) between what past 
writers have argued and for the criticising author to develop a “critical insight” 
that will disrupt previous knowledge structures. Instead, we can engage with 
“fostering a style of writing-with, (it) is not who or what is aims to include and 
represent in a text, but what is generates: it actually creates collective (sic), it 
populates a world” (de la Bellacasa, 2012: 203, emphasis in original). The 
researcher constantly reminds themselves and their readers that they are not 
the only person or element that is present in developing writing-with-care. 
Furthermore, “writing-with is a practical technology that reveals itself as both 
descriptive (it inscribes) and speculative (it connects)” (ibid: 203). One way, in 
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which I have sought to develop this writing-with, referring back to Chapter 4, 
concerns the means through which a conceptualisation of what makes those 
with autism human may include the more-than-human elements that comprise 
their social worlds. The specific relationalities of the objects, people, animals or 
events that constitute such autistic socialities depend on the habitual quasi-
objects that go on to make a meaningful difference to those involved.  
 
Rather than assuming a universal representational schema such as Theory of 
Mind, we should be empirically specific about which factors matter to those with 
autism and respect their perspectives on these issues. In this way, following 
Stengers (2000), I am seeking to create interest by locating understanding in-
between relations in such a way that we are taken up via interest in learning 
with and not in spite of those with autism in relation to their sensory and habitual 
quasi-object relations and what they mean to them. Because these 
relationalities are co-emergent alongside the actors and their milieus, the 
components that comprise them, whether they be a favourite location, object 
etc. are not distinct and demarcated “types” or “kinds” of phenomena 
(Savransky, 2016b). They subsist and endure for those with autism within 
specific frameworks of interaction that relate to negotiating sensory 
experiences.   
 
The second, key reason why I wished to include this unconventional insight into 
the practical workings of research and PhD writing is to counter some 
unproductive tendencies within contemporary academic publishing practices. As 
Munro (2005) has argued, conventional publishing practices subsume the wider 
influence of writers beyond the bibliography so that the named academics are 
credited and counted, with the collective thinking being displaced to an 
“Acknowledgments” section, as I noted in Chapter 4. The thinking, activities and 
support that are noted in these sections are conferred no professional value or 
merit within a neoliberal academic institutional structure. Here, authors are 
objectified and separated from each other in order to be comparable. Metrics, 
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algorithms and administrative bureaucracy assign value to the works of these 
authors and become attributable to metric journal indicators, departmental 
publishing rates and citation analytics (Burrows, 2012, Knowles and Burrows, 
2014). This leads to the work of academics being dissociated from their labour 
and being incorporated into structures that limit what counts as valuable (de la 
Bellacasa, 2012: 202). De la Bellacasa asks what forms of knowing these 
modalities of standardisation exclude; I want to argue that the “wonder” and 
“glow” of research writing and analysis is what will be lost when my thesis is 
complete. Once my thesis is deposited in the library and uploaded online for 
public viewing, it will be made compatible with and amenable to search engines 
algorithms, depository infrastructural demands and potentially, metrics of value.  
 
However, these processes will mask the labour placed into the kinaesthetic 
energrams I have utilised when thinking and feeling with my field-notes. In 
addition, the multisensual sense of wonder and glow of research that I outlined 
above is not amenable to quantified notions of value. This significant aspect of 
my autistic modes of engagement with academic work is downplayed within 
these modes of valuation. Thinking with Bellacasa’s explication on care, I can 
only wonder whether I am caring too much and becoming too invested in 
writing, research and analytic thinking and investing too much into a form of 
autistic knowing that will be devalued. At the same time, I am hopeful that 
discussing these issues in this chapter will serve to bring these discussions into 
a wider conversation. McRuer’s (2004) emphasis on non-normative 
corporealities and writing is central to this objective and I hope that my 
discussions in this chapter can provide important empirical material for thinking 
with and developing such accounts, specifically, the kinds of power relations 
that are inherent in writing and researching within a wider sociological 
community and within what can be termed the “Sociological Imagination”.  
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Reflecting on a Sociological Imagination  
 
In this way, I am attempting to encourage myself to move out of my comfort 
zones of habitual action and emotional composition and remind myself of the 
responsibilities and senses of agency (Pelias, 2000) I have in working 
academically through the issues I and other autistic people face. On this wider 
level, I also wanted to address issues that arise explicitly because of my 
Asperger’s and give voice to some of the issues that arise when the challenges 
of autism, in general, impinge upon the expectations and mundane practices of 
academic PhD writing. Just as Jago (2002) has written about how her 
depression impacted on her academic career, something that she recounts as 
being downplayed by the university as a private matter to be dealt with in 
professional settings, I want to give voice to the hidden dimensions of my 
“hidden” disability which goes without being acknowledged if we only develop 
traditional, formal academic writing that deals in impartial analysis and objective, 
unbiased positions of the researcher and scientific authority. The most important 
and crucial of these has been invoking a therapeutic angle to these issues 
which resides in the capacity for autoethnographic work to speak to unseen 
cultural and social actions, behaviours and structures and then inspire others to 
identify with them (Ellis et al, 2011).  
 
So, I first of all want to speak to those with autism in relation to sensory 
experiences to give them a frame of reference as to why and how their sensory 
engagements and negotiations are so fraught with challenges and confusion. It 
is not solely a matter of the individual or the environment in which they reside, 
but a combination of the socio-environmental milieu in which habitual, sensory 
quasi-objects reside, emerge and adapt to an interlocking web of social 
relations. The formal empirical and theoretical chapters of this thesis serve to 
provide concepts, case studies and theoretical tools to help those with autism 
and those who care for them to better understand their sensory and social 
experience on a holistic and fine-grained level. These tools are not prescriptive, 
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but serve to be used in specific contexts and the relevant social, material, 
psychological and environmental quasi-objects need to be applied when they 
are relevant to the actors or environmental milieus in which they are located.  
 
All of these factors ultimately contribute to a sense of making the possibility of 
“witnessing” realisable. In other words: 
 
the ability for participants and readers to observe and, consequently, 
better testify on behalf of an event, problem or experience […] As 
witnesses, autoethnographers not only work with others to validate 
the meaning of their pain, but also allow participants and readers to 
feel validated and/or better able to cope with or want to change their 
circumstances (Ellis, Adams and Bochner, 2011: n. p.). 
 
My hope is that the two autoethnographic chapters will open up possibilities to 
develop a productive dialogue, bringing to light some of the issues, challenges 
and potential forms of action that could emerge from looking at the issues raised 
here. In some cases, I have specific answers and have explicitly worked out the 
reasoning for the issues I have raised, such as the connection between Theory 
of Mind and autoethnographic methodological critiques and challenges. With 
other discussions, the potential connecting relations are open to the future and 
less a question of theoretical discussion and more about empirical discovery 
and experimentation. As I write this thesis, I am working with my support worker 
and supervisor to develop strategies to present my work that embody the 
autoethnographic ideals of multiple-author reading and corroboration (Jago, 
2011). To prevent issues of social and informational overload, for example, we 
had the idea for my worker to read the presentation that I developed as an 
independent scholar and then for me to answer questions from the audience, 
particularly concerning my autoethnographic writing activities. Not only will this 
method allow me to be more aware of the way in which different people may 
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view and read my work in an explicit way, but it will also allow me to develop an 
account that is at once academic but also accessible. This format, in subtle 
ways, also gives me the chance to point to structures of non-disabled academic 
conference presentations that are not amenable to those that have sensory or 
cognitive differences (Gunaratnam, 2015, Garland-Thomson, 2007).  
 
This form of independent writing and then co-joint presentation can break up the 
process of academic presenting, from developing an argument, form coherent 
accounts for external audiences; the sensory, social and informational 
experiences of giving a presentation and synthesising and evaluating the 
comments, criticisms and insights from audience members and my own ideas. 
By splitting the work load, I am able to negotiate my sensory and social 
challenges as well as engage with audiences in a more concentrated and 
engaged manner. Rather than valuing “confidence, fluency, succinctness, clarity 
in speech, standing, the long days, the packed programmes” (Gunaratnam, 
2015: n. p.), this form of diverse academic engagement recognises that: 
 
There’s a sense that much more is going on here than at more 
ordinary conferences, where everybody just sits quietly and 
unobtrusively in rows of chairs staring intently at a placid speaker 
behind the podium” (Garland-Thomson, 2007: 120).  
 
The social practicalities of my Asperger’s become manifest in splitting the labour 
of academic presenting to another non-conventional presenter. On the other 
hand, this display can be seen as a form of “super-surveillance” where “bodies 
that are out of place have to work harder to convince people that they are 
capable” (Puwar, 2004: 61). Only by acknowledging the distributed aspects of 
autistic experience can we acknowledge the ways in which sensory habitual 
favourites play into mitigating anxiety and parasitical disruption. Working 
between the positive and negative aspects of parasitical relations can prevent 
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our vulnerabilities from producing poorly articulated that nourishes 
defensiveness (Gunaratnam, 2015: n. p.). The interplay of excitement and 
anxiety in academic labour requires that we pay heed to questions of the 
interplay of affective and representational processes such that presentation 
anxiety has as much purchase as the ableist structures of academic 
conferences.  
 
My final concern in this chapter is a call for researchers, autism 
advocates/activists, and social and charity sector workers to take heed of my 
experiences and thoughts to work through them. In order to develop issues, 
discussions, solutions and points of action to share and discuss other people’s 
experiences that I have discussed in these two chapters. In the most general 
sense, I have threaded through my autoethnographic writings an awareness of 
the “Sociological Imagination”. I have brought macro, and micro, level concerns 
together in discussing my specific experiences to create a more nuanced 
account of disability in academic labour. Autoethnographic concerns have been 
discussed in an attempt to dispel the common sociological issues with disability 
that treat the concept as a static category surrounded by negative associations 
of lack of agency, which go on to burden the category with generic modernist 
tropes of exclusion and frailty, rather than nuance and the actual experience of 
disabled people (Shuttleworth and Meekosha, 2012). I also have sought to 
address some criticisms of the Sociological Imagination which claim that while 
speaking to issues of openness and developing an experimental and plural 
understanding of the social world, they neglect important facets of social 
experience. As Shuttleworth and Meekosha (2012) acknowledge, Mills (1959, 
2000) did not pay adequate attention to specific social markers like class, 
gender and disability due to a focus on structure and agency as concepts in and 
of themselves. Ignoring the specifics of these social markers bound to logical, 
structured modes of understanding the connections between individual milieu 
and social structures, do not account for the ineffable and ephemeral 
(Shuttleworth and Meekosha, 2012: 353, Lemert, 1995: 10). I develop these 
aspects in the conclusion to the thesis.  
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However, this is not to say that Mills does not speak to or anticipate 
contemporary sociological issues the most important to me here being the 
sensual aspects of social life. As Gane and Back point out (2012), alongside 
developing inventive and creative connections between the oil industry, 
psychology, the military, theology and the political issues in sociological 
theorising (Mills, 1959: 13-14), Mills also encourages us to examine the feeling 
of sawdust, and the dusky pink sky and listen to the energy and rhythms of jazz 
to gain a sociological imagination (Mills, 2000a: 174). Autoethnography and the 
focus on an autistic researcher, in general, speak to one of the core founding 
calls to sociological thinking present in the discipline. While I am aware that by 
drawing attention to my autism as a self-centred characteristic feeds into the 
ways in which autism is treated as an academic and intellectual commodity, 
which places value on the ways in which it unsettles and questions modernist, 
liberal and neurotypical assumptions above other forms of disability (Mallett and 
Runswick-Cole, 2012), I also hope to go beyond such utilitarian concerns to 
develop a critical awareness of the dynamism and challenging potential of 
autism and reveal hidden domains of power in the mundanities of life.  
 
Conclusion   
 
I believe that this chapter can point to the intimate and structural issues that 
shaped this research and can be used by others to consider the ways in which 
the Sociological Imagination might be shaped by autistic modes of social 
engagement and thought. In so doing, I have sought to highlight the 
complexities, anxieties and pleasures that are threaded through writing, 
thinking, researching and analysis that is accompanied by having autism. This 
focus can foster an engagement with the mundane and hidden dimensions of 
PhD and academic labour that present challenges for thought. It is not just a 
question of focusing on forms of power and taken-for-granted assumptions in a 
general sense, but about sensitising ourselves to how these questions are 
imbricated and constituted among specific social and cultural groups. By 
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focusing attention on the specificities of autism in relation to these concerns, I 
have sought to demonstrate how this can be done and open up further analyses 
to expand such work.  
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Chapter 6 - Affective Atmospheres: Perturbations, Haziness and Emplaced 
Affects  
 
Introduction  
 
A concern with atmospheres and their effects, conditions and forms of 
emergence and breakdown have become of increasing interest in the last 10-15 
years. In particular, human geography (Anderson, 2009, Ash, 2013, 2015) and 
(post)phenomenological/philosophical inquiries (Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos, 
2013, 2016) have sought to investigate, define, theorise and debate the 
contours of an inherently ephemeral phenomenon. This chapter will explore 
each of these different disciplinary areas to develop an atmospheric account 
that is capable of addressing the multiple empirical relationships between 
sensory experience and varied factors that influence atmospheres that develop 
and maintain quasi-object interconnections. The purpose of this chapter is to 
begin to explore the links between the micro-level interactions explored in the 
“Habitual Favourites” chapter (Chapter 3). That address individual and group 
collective meaning making concerning sensory and habitual favourites and 
move on to consider the more emotional, affective and “more-than-human” 
processes that impact these micro mechanisms. The chapter begins with a 
description of what has been termed “affective atmospheres”. I then proceed to 
develop critical accounts in relation to affect that take to task the demarcation 
between emotion and affect, body and mind that infuse influential affective 
frameworks. I then move towards expanding how atmospheric fields, containers 
and means of boundary management allow those with autism to connect or not 
to broader social structures.  
 
The chapter will then go on to analyse key moments during my field-work that 
were central in atmospheric negotiation via boundary-making, intensity 
modulation or attempts to enact control over possible sensory/informational 
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streams that demand attention. I will show a number of affective and 
atmospheric strategies, conditions and possibilities that helped club members to 
bond socially, enact sensory management regimens, and navigate complex 
social atmospheres. I will also specify the material, environmental, bodily and 
social arrangements that were present to allow these specific atmospheres to 
emerge, to endure or dissipate through how these elements converge or 
assemble.  
 
What is An Affective Atmosphere?  
 
To begin, I offer a conceptual and theoretical description of the key framework 
for this chapter, “affective atmospheres”. This term is drawn from Anderson’s 
(2009) work that has sought to overcome some of the problematic binaries and 
contradictory developments that have led to stultifying and reductive accounts of 
affective and atmospheric processes in social life. After outlining affective 
atmospheres as a concept, I shall break down affect and atmospheres as 
separate concepts to develop a more nuanced and integrated account of what 
each term can refer to and how they can be utilised. For Anderson, affective 
atmospheres are:  
 
collective affects that are simultaneously indeterminate and 
determinate. Affective atmospheres are a class of experience that 
occur before and alongside the formation of subjectivity, across 
human and non-human materialities, and in-between subject/object 
distinctions […] Atmospheres are generated by bodies - of multiple 
types - affecting one another as some form of “envelopment” is 
produced […] Affective qualities emanate from the assembling of the 
human bodies, discursive bodies, non-human bodies, and all the 
other bodies that make up everyday situations (Anderson, 2009: 78, 
80) 
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There are a number of points I wish to raise from this diverse and in-depth 
description. First, Anderson suggests that affects do not just emerge from 
individual bodies, but can become collective and shared between people. 
Further, these affects are not just human perceptions of thoughts, emotions or 
actions, they include the materialities and potentials of non-human objects, 
processes and living things that have their own modes of relating that are 
different, even completely unknowable by human subjectivity. They nonetheless 
impact heavily upon atmospheric and human conduct and as such, must be 
included for any meaningful engagement with affective atmospheres. Second, 
the “in-between” of subject and object boundaries, is closely related to the 
concept of the quasi-object developed throughout the thesis. The boundaries 
between subjects and objects cannot be guaranteed in advance and are only 
realisable in action within a particular contextual milieu arranged around 
vortexes of interaction and emergence. This blurring of boundaries also raises 
questions as to the distinctions between the solid and “real” and the ephemeral 
and virtual as not dichotomous but mutually intertwined descriptions that 
become more or less applicable on the basis of the situation. Third, and as a 
lead into the next section, Anderson points to the ways in which affective 
atmospheres mediate the relationship between micro-interactions and macro-
processes via techniques and mechanisms of “envelopment”. Affective 
atmospheres produce effects, affects and certain “structures of feeling” 
(Williams, 1977) within porous, yet loosely bounded “spheres” (Sloterdijk, 2005) 
of impact that can flow in and out of each other. Importantly, his inclusion of 
“discursive” entities in his explication is central to debates within affect theory. 
Namely, the degree to which affect is below, unaffected and autonomous from 
conscious linguistic conceptions of reality.  
 
I now turn to a much more nuanced and detailed account of each of these 
aspects of affective atmospheres. I will first break down the terms “affect” and 
“atmosphere” to explore how they can be made more empirically and 
theoretically specific. In doing so, I highlight the problems when trying to move 
in-between realism and constructivist approaches to atmospheres and the 
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problematic assumptions of naturalistic biology on affect as a concept. I then 
offer alternative approaches that recognise the interplay of linguistic, discursive, 
material, ecological and social components of affective atmospheres.  
 
Affect as a Concept, Beginnings and Critiques  
 
The notion of affect is an enormously complex one that cannot be easily 
summarised. I will not attempt to cover each facet of the debates that have been 
fought over the meaning, consequences and potential of affect for studying 
social life. I will instead develop accounts that express ways of reconciling some 
of the contradictions, challenges and restricting arguments that have been made 
for affect. Before going on to explore more productive ways of considering how 
affect can be studied and conceptualised.  
 
In the most basic sense, affect has been contrasted with emotion. Where affect 
is the nonsignifying and unconscious processes that exist below the level of 
conscious awareness, emotions are the “subjective content, the sociolinguistic 
fixing of the quality of an experience which is from that point onward defined as 
personal” (Massumi, 2002: 28). Further explanation is given by Shouse (2005) 
who argues that: “emotions are social… and affects are pre-personal… An affect 
is a nonconscious experience of intensity; it is a moment of unformed and 
unstructured potential… affect is always prior to and/or outside consciousness” 
(Shouse, 2005: Para 1-5 emphasis in original). The body is given precedence in 
this context as affect is beyond and cannot be expressed in language because it 
happens below conscious awareness.  
 
 
This is an extensive debate and one that I cannot fully explore in this chapter. It 
is enough to say that critiques of affect, as just outlined, are problematic in that it 
reinscribes a reification of emotions as distinct representational modes and 
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affects as primal, nonsignifying processes where the body and mind are 
separated. Further, this distinction becomes a universalising impulse where 
affect swamps everything without exploring the ways in which affect, gesture, 
cognition, discursive formulation and past experience and expectations (read 
habits) intersect and thus impact all social interaction (Wetherell, 2012: 61). This 
is further exemplified in Ley’s (2011) central intervention in debating and 
critiquing affect theory as developed by influential theorists such as Massumi 
(1995, 2002), Thrift (2008) and Connolly (2002). Leys argues that because 
affects in Massumi’s case are based on unconscious and pre-reflective 
processes of action, no possibility of context is possible. The research Massumi 
bases his theoretical accounts on, assumes an “nonintentional” stance on 
emotions which treats them not as being embroiled in social, interpretative 
contextual negotiation, but as hard-wired, neurological responses that when 
activated, produce stereotypical responses (Leys, 2011: 464). These 
assumptions can be seen by a discussion of experiments conducted by Fried et 
al (1998), showcasing how a girl with epilepsy, when her “supplementary motor 
area” of her frontal left lobe was stimulated, she laughed involuntarily and 
simply attributed this response to whatever stimuli was present, people, books 
read and so on. The objects, events or people do not have any intrinsic value for 
the researchers; they simply are an outlet for the girl to ascribe her confusing 
reactions to an anchor of meaning.  
 
 
For affect theorists and neuroscientists such as Damasio (2003) who subscribe 
to the affect/emotion split, this demonstrates the power of the “half-second 
delay” between feeling and thinking. This is the gap between a physiological 
reaction to stimuli and our conscious recognition and reaction to such stimuli 
(Massumi, 1995). Because emotions lack intent and do not focus on any 
external object, they are simply organic and become materialistic processes 
without intentionality or meaning (Leys, 2011: 463). In this perspective, the body 
becomes a privileged vector of affective forces and actions and reinforces 
privilege to binary understandings of mind and body relationships.  
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This body however, is a static and mechanical one that is based on Tomkins 
and Ekman’s approach to emotions that bracket out the complexity of human 
experience into discrete emotional states such as anger, fear, etc, (Tomkins 
1962-63). These “primary” emotions are the basic building blocks of emotional 
life and any further complexities experienced such as resentful anger are 
directly based on these prime emotions. This is highly problematic, however, as 
the research these ideas are based on is incredibly faulty in terms of their 
generalisability and ontological weight as the “natural” emotional makeup of 
human beings (Leys, 2011). The methodology of using images of distinct human 
facial expressions in response to stimuli in a standardised laboratory or 
experimental set-up reduces our emotions and affects to what can be seen and 
ignores the interactional context in which they are located. Emotions or affects 
are not “basic” or primary a priori, they only become so based on the situation in 
which they become relevant. They are not merely reducible to the duplicative 
mechanisms of material physiological and neurological systems that only colour 
or “tinge” the external world without having a “real” presence of their own. 
Rather than assuming that human perception is central to affectivity, we should 
take into account the many non-human aspects of experience that motivate us 
and get us to engage with the past, present and future, not just duplicate without 
creative becoming (Stenner and Greco, 2013: 66-67).  
 
 
Wetherell (2013) argues that the concept of “affective practice” can offer a more 
nuanced and critical account of affect. This approach examines the ways in 
which emotion and affect are relationally distributed through body language, 
micro-interaction phenomenon such as positioning, in which we place our 
accounts within a specific interactional context in order to make legible sense 
within an existing group’s framework of reference (see Goffman, (1981) on 
idiocultures and referential afterlives). This also includes the material and multi-
modal factors that influence interaction. For example, Wetherell draws on Katz’s 
(1999) analysis of “road-rage” to demonstrate this perspective. Katz discusses 
how anger and blind fury in the phenomenon of road-rage is entirely based on 
socio-material organisation of western roads. Thus, the binary divide of ongoing 
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and oncoming traffic makes it so only those on the side we are currently located 
are eligible to get and be angry about. We cannot get a footing or position 
ourselves, literally, to direct our gaze, gesticulate and so on to these other 
drivers because of this spatial design. Affective outbursts are affected by the 
material, spatial and interactional designs and processes of driving on roads 
that constitute road-rage. Affect and emotions therefore are not split into 
discrete categories, but integrate with each other such that the body or mind is 
not privileged and that even unconscious affects are inflected by the milieu in 
which they originate.  
 
 
I now move to consider how these diverse affects can be dynamically structured 
and emerge creatively through attention to the potential of the concept of 
atmospheres.  
 
What Can Be Called an Atmosphere? - Boundaries and Effects  
 
In thinking about atmospheric phenomenon, there is a wide array of factors that 
can be considered in relation to theorising and researching them. Atmospheres 
can provide the link between the human, non-human, social and material as 
Anderson (2009) has argued. In the most holistic sense, atmospheres would 
incorporate what Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos calls an “open ecology” of: 
 
spatiality of bodies (humans, non-humans, linguistic… disciplinary), 
buildings, objects, animals, vegetables, minerals, money, 
communication, silence, open spaces, air, water […] This […] is a 
fractal manifestation […] namely the assemblage of the natural, the 
human, the artificial, the scientific,  the political, the economic […] on a 
plane of contingency and fluid boundaries” (Philippopoulos-
Mihalopoulos, 2013: 36) 
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This wide ranging initial outlining of what can constitute an atmosphere and its 
continuation and development is to point to the fact that any study of 
atmospheric relations is bound to a far larger range of intersecting questions 
and connections. What is important is that these atmospheric relations are 
grounded in specific milieus that must be defined in relation to a specific 
location and is immanent within an infinite possibility of virtualisation and 
actualisation (ibid: 37). Virtualisation, in relation to sociological problems, refers 
to a realm beyond immediate experience that contains all the potential ways a 
specific phenomenon may interact with the social world. Actualisation refers to 
the specific socio-eco-material means as to which virtual processes emerge in 
the world and the possibilities and limits of the particular phenomenon in 
question. As Motamedi-Fraser (2009) notes “the virtual… is not a blueprint… 
whether something is [going to be] important or relevant in a piece of social 
research cannot… be decided in advance” (Motamedi-Fraser, 2009: 75). The 
actual, in this framework, is a “temporary and contingent solution to a virtual 
problem” (ibid: 75). Because the relevant processes and events that actualise 
within a given social research project cannot fully be determined in advance, it 
requires a keen attentiveness to the emergent and novel processes of 
atmospheres and the ability to assess, in real time, when and why they matter. 
A central concern in this area of research has been to negotiate between the 
ephemeral, fluid nature of atmospheric constitution and the very real (actual) 
effects that they have on social worlds and the development of agential beings.  
 
 
Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos (2016) argues that sensory experiences cannot be 
seen in isolation or as singular because, when so defined, they become 
universals and attain a level of abstraction that is problematic in practice. 
Instead, these experiences dissimulate and diffuse as mutually exclusive 
entities and create new combinations of possibilities. Such a wide 
conceptualisation of social engagement serves as a counterweight to much 
theorising in research on scapes where the non-human and discursive are 
demarcated by specific spatial logics. This kind of logic can be found in thinkers 
such as the phenomenologist, Gernot Bohme (2005), who notes that we need to 
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have a sense of ourselves in order to experience the atmosphere of spaces as 
external. This reinstates a division between subject and objects, which the 
scholarship on atmospheres seeks to break apart by exploring the ephemeral 
and diverse entities that constitute the social. Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos via 
Schmitz (1995) believes that, if an atmosphere overtakes social actors, then the 
Cartesian subject/object division mystifies what an atmosphere is, rather 
replacing it with a more dynamic and inclusive empirical dimension. The human 
remains the locus of action, where Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos seeks to 
develop a “post-phenomenological” approach, asserting the complex meshing 
and weaving of these elements into topological outlines. He further contends 
that because atmospheres are topological, it is impossible to ever be outside an 
atmospheric container of some kind. This holds true for topologies that are 
social, affective, material or even cosmological. We are, in this respect, always 
bounded, in some way to specific conditions of possibility and boundary-making 
that fix and opens up possibilities based on our situated locations and 
perspectives (Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos, 2016).  
 
 
Further, in contrast to authors like Massumi and Connelly who treat affect as 
being beyond signifying political relations of meaning, contestation and struggle 
and as such, intervention is seen to be impossible (Leys, 2011). Philippopoulos-
Mihalopoulos states that political influence is inescapable due to the fact that 
atmospheric relations are, in large part, manufactured, by capitalist techniques 
of production and control where certain kinds of atmospheric conditions are 
filtered to select communities. For example. light, soft classical music is often 
played at elite, formal parties, and seductive low lighting and colours are utilised 
in shopping malls to encourage a numbed, affective embrace of consumerism to 
ensure stultified stability (Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos 2016: 150-51). Individual 
affects are reduced to and made subservient to the institutional and political 
means of control of specific atmospheric affects such that they become elevated 
to general and institutionalised “glasshouses”. These intensify and focus these 
standardised relations back to the people, objects and spaces that constituted 
them in the first place. In order to undo this complex meshing and blurring of an 
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inside and outside distinction, where we are made to feel comfortable with 
specific atmospheric relations, we should heed the ways in which means to 
control atmospheric phenomena is never total and the human and non-human 
intermingling always introduces new dynamics. These then take on a life of their 
own and constantly challenge the status quo (ibid: 163-64).  
 
 
Thus far, I have shown the ways in which atmospheres, in the most general 
sense, demonstrate means to aggregate, demarcate and manufacture 
consistency while always holding the potential for new relations. I now want to 
step away from Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos’s highly abstract and theoretical 
writing to more theoretical-methodological thinking that makes the means and 
processes through which atmospheres are produced and manufactured 
empirically grounded and practical. I will then consider the non-human or 
material aspect of atmospheric generation that is removed from human 
awareness. 
 
 
Atmospheric Interstices - Beyond Binaries and Toward Ephemeral Mixing 
 
 
One concept that has been developed to take into account the explicitly sensual 
aspect of the in-between aspect of atmospheres is that of resonance. Vincent 
Miller (2015), a sociologist of forms of association, fragmentation and 
community, in his outline and exegesis of the concept of resonance and its 
impact within sociological thinking, speaks of the difficulty the discipline has with 
thinking about the domains of social life that are not explicitly connected to a 
concept of individual/collective, or, structure/agency. He suggests that these 
dichotomous, discursive binaries have caused social researchers and theorists 
to primarily focus on the extremes of these divides, such as Durkheim’s 
collective rituals (Durkheim, 1995), without fully taking into account the means 
by which mundane and quotidian interactions allow such exceptional conditions 
to exist (Misztal, 2003). Or, in the case of more micro concern such as Simmel’s 
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“Sociology of Sociality” (Simmel and Hughes, 1949) where sociality, as enjoying 
social interaction for its own sake, does not draw attention to the power relations 
of intergroup interactions. The concept of resonance is an attempt to provide an 
“inbetween concept”. In order to do this, Miller draws upon a phenomenological 
and embodied expression of the concept of resonance from the anthropologist, 
Tim Ingold (1993). Ingold describes this process through acts of: 
 
 
watching, listening, perhaps even touching, we continually feel each 
other’s presence in the social environment, at every moment 
adjusting our movements in response to this ongoing perceptual 
monitoring […] in the resonance of movement and feeling stemming 
from peoples mutually attentive engagement in shared contexts of 
practical activity, lies the very foundation of sociality (Ingold, 1993: 
160). 
 
 
Instead of thinking intersubjectivity through abstract concepts, that requires 
cognitive, rational processes and assumes a universal capacity of humans to 
perform this procedure, no matter the situation: 
 
 
Resonance relies on common practical and emotional experiences 
connoting “sameness” in feeling-thinking engagements in the 
practical world […] and is […] cultivated through the mutual being-
there of practical human experience which intertwines feeling, 
thinking and doing (Miller, 2015).  
 
 
Miller notes that such a conception of atmospheres is not specific enough. By 
which he means that atmospheres or affective forces that pervade everyday life 
do not form enough of an impact on structural concerns, or, meaningful and 
shareable experiences for social actors. The concept must be grounded in a 
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framework that recognises how atmospheres can set their own distinct tone to a 
social situation. This can only occur through and because of the material, 
discursive and somatic entities within a specific milieu. Following Ingold and 
Miller, this translates to a shared, sensual mode of intersubjective connection 
that equates to an embodied sense of connection and engagement that does 
not overturn discourse or language, but complements them. In relation to 
habitual favourites, because favourites become situated within a cycle of 
ongoing temporal engagement, we develop deep and potent connections with 
these activities. We can explain, to some degree, why we feel so strongly about 
a particular favourite activity, but, there still remains an ineffable aspect of a 
favourite that can only be expressed when engaging in it which can lead to 
experiencing a sense of resonance. For example, taking a craft-based favourite 
hobby such as pottery, you can only get a true sense of the different textures of 
clay and the pots and other items they go on to form via connection to others 
engaging in the craft that can only be expressed via execution of deep, 
habituated knowledge and understanding. It is difficult for someone who has 
never used a pottery spinning machine to physically get a tactile sense of the 
materiality of the clay through language alone. It is also difficult for someone 
who has an emplaced and bodily appreciation of the properties of clay to fully 
articulate this knowledge without being located in a community of practice to 
share and develop these skills to fit community goals (Lave and Wenger, 1991). 
As such, my attention to individual and group perspectives in the club space 
enables a dynamic account of how habitual favourites are encountered and 
enacted atmospherically. I shall return below to the question of the negotiation 
of materiality in affective atmospheres.  
 
 
Edensor (2015), agreeing with Wetherell and Leys that to divorce the affective 
and discursive from each other is misguided, argues that atmospheres are not 
just affective; they also incorporate the symbolic, conscious emotions and 
meaning-making within themselves that produce “a flow of experience” 
(Edensor, 2015: 334). Edensor then provides the example of his work on the 
famous Blackpool Lights display that runs through much of autumn to display 
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this interconnection. They at once feature characters from popular culture such 
as cartoon characters like Basil Brush, The Mad Hatter or Noddy that elicit 
explicit symbolic and discursive reactions as to their personalities, behaviours 
and how people should react to their presence in the Illuminations. These may 
be viewed as being too tacky, “just for the kids” or recognition of pertinent 
popular cultural events such as TV revivals. Equally, “as forms of illumination, 
(the illuminations) also transmit qualities of sparkle, animation, colour, intensity, 
temperature and glow that sidestep symbolic meaning” (Edensor, 2015: 334). In 
bringing attention to these dynamics, Edensor enables us to view affective 
atmospheres as more defined and empirically nuanced than can be captured by 
dominant notions of affect.  
 
 
How then to go about exploring and conceptualising such a complex, difficult, 
yet unavoidably essential task? The next section will outline some 
methodological and conceptual work that explores ways in which atmospheres 
as material-affective-discursive-emplaced phenomena can be empirically 
examined.  
 
 
As Niels Albertsen (2012) argues, atmospheres have been discussed and 
theorised in contexts where they occur in situ, however, scholars have 
neglected to consider how such affective situations and accounts can be 
performatively reproduced to others ex situ. Utilising Wittgenstein’s (1980a) 
argument that gestures merge sensuousness and symbolic meaning, that in 
order to speak, we must know what it is to smell for instance and then 
differentiate specific smells to categorise and make meaning that can be 
shared. In combination with Actor Network Theory’s (ANT) focus on translation, 
the material, social and discursive processes that must be in place for meaning 
to be communicated. Albertsen notes that in order for an atmosphere to be 
effectively communicated, what is often required is a relatively homogenous 
cultural group, but within this group, meaning can be conveyed via sensuous 
and affectual atmospheric conditions to others. For instance, we often 
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communicate our experience of music by referring to qualities of art. These can 
be further structured by non-discursive elements such as timbre, rhythm and 
tone that can conjure up particular atmospheres. This can be achieved and 
summarised via the concept “gestural semiosphere”, which incorporates 
Wittgenstein’s notion of “family resemblances” (1968) in language to gesture. 
This term refers to sets of cultural meanings and shared understanding that 
operate in tandem within particular groups that can be thought of as forming a 
kind of short-hand that integrates diverse knowledges. Albertson asserts that 
the same can be said about a set of culturally defined gestures. We can convey 
meaning through the particular cadence or rhythm of our words, through the 
constellation of colours in a painting to create cheerful atmospheres that have a 
life in and of themselves. Utilising ANT, Albertsen argues that unlike material or 
informational immutable mobiles, or obligatory points of passage, where ideas, 
objects or people must pass through in order to be part of the network (Latour 
1986), atmospheric conditions must be created anew and are thus performative, 
requiring particular formations of gestural semiospheres incorporating multi-
modal and multisensory dimensions.  This performative dimension brings to 
light “kinds of “presencing” [which] can be “person making” as when the 
expression “I love you […] uttered rightly” i.e. with the right “trembling of the 
voice” (Latour, 1998 428, 435), with the “gestures” of “the words exchanged by 
lovers” (Wittgenstein, 1990 712) […] a “redirection of attention” towards giving 
presence to each other” (Albertsen, 2012: 73). This ongoing cycle of 
performativity is grounded in emplaced processes and negotiated discursively 
by social actors.  
 
However, the problem with this view of atmospheres and affective relations is 
that there is no way to account for relationships between people or objects that 
do not directly relate to each other. Because object relations can only be viewed 
when in connection to something else and not as unique, individual entities, it 
becomes difficult to discuss aspects of these relations that relate to the ways in 
which relations produce gaps and intervals where objects are at rest or inert 
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because they, to human perception at least, do not react or respond in any way 
to specific stimuli (Harrison, 2008, 2009).  
 
 
Drawing on Object-Oriented Ontology (See Bryant, 2011, Harman, 2009, 
2010a), Ash (2013, 2015) argues that, due to the specific perturbations of 
human-to-human or object-to-object or human-to-object relations we experience 
specificity in affective phenomena. This specificity can only arise because of the 
capacities of the entities in question; there can be both a relational dynamism 
and also an inaccessible aspect of objects that cannot be accessed despite the 
potential multiples of relations. This inaccessible core is not an essentialised 
domain, because no amount of relational perspectives will ever exhaust the 
core’s inherent individuality. This allows us to go beyond an atmospheric 
approach that privileges the human and their affective relationalities, which 
would not account for objects that are not in direct relation to them, but still 
contribute to their atmospheric attunement and envelopment. Ash describes 
object perturbations as creating their own space-time perturbations that are 
unique to them and that humans both create the conditions of their interaction 
but are also shaped by hidden or non-accessible perturbations that they move 
through without necessarily even being affected at all (Ash, 2013: 21). This 
means that objects produce forms of temporal and spatial atmospheres that 
shape humans’ capacities to engage with the world. So, a lonely, unmoving rock 
may make time seem immovable, but a human observer may see or feel the 
wind across the rock and feel time slowly (ibid: 24). 
 
 
The multiple perturbations and interactions between objects and people allow us 
to consider the relational qualities that make up atmospheres so that time and 
space are developed and maintained between objects themselves. Further, 
inorganic affects are impacted by the material capacities of the objects that are 
created for humans, yet remain exclusive to the objects themselves. Following 
Guattari (1995), Ash uses the example of a lock and key, where the lock and 
keys have to be made of specific materials in order to enable constant use 
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without wearing out or breaking down all of the time. They need to display their 
own forms of homeostasis so that they remain a key and lock. If the key is used 
too aggressively, it may break or snap and become a new object capable of new 
actions and capacities such as using the sharpened and uneven broken key 
stem to pierce paper or similar materials. However, inorganic affects are not 
free-flowing, desire-producing machines, they have absolute material thresholds 
that, if crossed, will turn them into new objects and open up new relations (Ash, 
2015: 87).  
 
Following on from Ash’s discussion of the ways in which objects and 
technologies have their own atmospheric properties, Bille (2015), in his 
discussion of light and the notion of comfort or hygge in Danish, refers to the 
ways in which the introduction of incandescent energy-saving bulbs changed 
the ways in which practices of light use and appreciation have been shifted due 
to industry-led alterations in light quality and colour intensity. Of further interest 
to Bille, is to avoid taking for granted people’s conceptions of atmospheric 
processes as wholly defined or sorted out in their conceptualisations or 
emplaced enactments. If atmospheres are performative and enacted, in the 
sense that they are selectively felt by the preconceptions, biases, emplaced 
bodily and cognitive affordances, how do they enable certain realities over 
others? How do we then account for the fuzzy and uncertain aspects that lie 
outside of conscious conceptualisations such as object-centred atmospherics? 
Finally, how do the mechanisms where multiple conceptions of phenomena 
such as hygge, are always uncertain and based on how people respond to 
atmospheres? 
 
Further expanding upon Albertsens’ engagement with Wittgenstein, Bille refers 
to Wittgenstein’s iconic example of “aspect-seeing”. In the famous example, 
when shown a “duck-rabbit” drawing, a person can only see one or the other 
depending upon their perspective and positioning in looking at the picture 
(Wittgenstein, 2009: 205). This inherent ambiguity of sensory perception and 
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experience in relation to atmospheric processes is central to the empirical 
realities of people’s understandings and negotiations of what atmospheres are 
for them. In the example of hygge, which  comprises seemingly contradictory 
notions such that light is at once cosiness itself, is just a metaphor, or if it is just 
convenient shorthand for a general sense of the intermingling of warmth, light, 
homeliness and national pride, the question becomes how to make sense of this 
ambiguity. These complex meanings and their interaction in the lives of Danish 
communities, leads Bille to frame atmospheres as a hazy, in-betweenness of life 
that is: 
 
“both an ontological reality that exists and an analytical implication 
of studying people’s practices and understandings of spaces, as 
well as material and social life. It cannot be confined to the physical 
boundaries of room or place but is the volatile and changing 
sensation through which reality comes into being as a unity with 
innumerable nuances without borders or direction” (Bille, 2015: 
268).  
 
Bille argues that this conceptualisation moves away from notions of relational 
materialism, where things are enacted away from their surroundings and not as 
something that is, but, rather, objects are defined through how they come to be 
via the contacts between bodies, affects and objects and how the atmospheric 
relations between them influence each other. We cannot decide in advance 
what a participant means when they talk about atmospheric relations or how 
they act or are influenced by atmospheric fields, but must pay attention to the 
specific relational and unique modes through which we are open to, influence 
and create atmospheres. It is also important to stress that atmospheres are not 
just constitutive of intensive affectivities. They are also everyday mundanities 
that are “just there” as a form and force of social life that instigates and 
influences the ebbs, flows and grounded, material relations of the world (Pink, 
Mackley and Morosanu, 2014: 352). They form the taken-for-granted element 
 ~ 243 ~ 
 
that Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos talks about. Yet, he did not go into or take fully 
into account the hazy aspects that Bille describes so cogently and insightfully. 
Even if atmospheres are all encompassing and stultify, withdrawal is not the 
only option and neglects the haziness of sensory atmospherics.  
 
Having outlined these diverse ways of exploring atmospheric phenomena, I will 
now draw upon several empirical examples from my fieldwork that exemplify, 
expand and allow for greater understanding of how each of the components I 
have discussed so far played out for the club members.  
 
Data Analysis - The Research Set-up and The Material/Spatial Organisation of 
The Club  
 
It is also important to keep in mind that as Bille (2015) has argued, doing 
research and analysis is also infused with atmospheric qualities and dynamics. 
This can include the kind of fieldwork environments and forms of research 
participation that are utilised to give participants a sense of ease, friendliness 
and trustworthiness. These elements are then transferred to the analysis and 
writing stages of the research where the researcher will attempt bring out these 
atmospheric dynamics into their writing by modulating a verbal transcript with 
devices such as ellipses or formatting to convey emotion or intention behind the 
words. Or, we could think of ways in which rapport is demonstrated to have 
been established by looking at processes involved in making participants feel 
listened to and at ease around researchers (see Horowitz 1986, Russell et al, 
2002, Ryan and Dundon, 2008)25. This atmospheric focus is crucial for Bille, as 
                                                          
25
 Interestingly, Ryan and Dundon explicitly use the term “atmosphere” when discussing how to 
attain research rapport that led to research relations that were “open, engaged, and trusting 
(Ryan and Dundon, 2008: 446). This was achieved via “establishing empathy” in which 
commonality of the research objective led to more nuanced examples, expansive narratives and 
confidence in the researchers (ibid: 447). The problematic nature of a “communal”, supposedly 
 ~ 244 ~ 
 
the kinds of atmospheres created by researchers and participants will shape 
how research encounters proceed and what atmospheres are allowed to 
develop and be sustained will shape what kinds of social relations and 
encounters are possible. In my case, the disrupting of members’ leisure time to 
take part in the focus groups was something that created new boundaries 
between the groups. Despite the fact that participants were free to move in and 
out of the focus group “space” at any point to engage with other members, the 
sheer fact that the focus group existed, albeit for 30-45 minutes at a time, 
generated new atmospheres of expectation and awareness for club members. 
As such, this expectation and anticipation of being part of the next focus group 
was something they needed to keep in mind and my presence at the club 
reinforced this relationship as to when the session was happening. Looking to 
me as an authority for example, Josh’s enthusiastic inquiries to me: “Is the next 
session today?”, this was not just predicated on my desire to host sessions, but 
these kinds of questions were only asked if more than three participants were 
present. Co-location was thus a central part of this anticipatory atmosphere and 
was much reduced if members were absent. Responsibility and desire to act 
and be swayed by this anticipatory potential was linked to these key factors and 
was something that I took into account when organising focus groups in the later 
stages of my fieldwork.  
 
One way in which to conceptualise and think through these implications is 
through the insights developed by McCormack (2015) in writing about 
researching, thinking and writing atmospherically about the impacts, affects and 
events of balloons. As he notes, balloons are multi-faceted as an atmospheric 
phenomenon as they contain meteorological components, helium and other 
gases. Alongside socially infused meanings and affects, the symbolism of 
celebration and anxious anticipation of a loud BANG when they burst are 
mundane examples. But, more importantly, balloons are useful to think with in 
                                                                                                                                                                          
unilateral agreement between both parties is unexamined here and neglects the hazy, continual 
performance and indeterminate nature of atmospheric relations as I have discussed.  
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terms of researching atmospheric questions because of the challenges of 
moving balloons in the air. Balloons are almost coterminous with the milieu in 
which they are located, aside from the thin skin that surrounds and forms a 
quasi-barrier to make the balloon a distinct object (McCormack, 2015: 103). 
Because of this, it becomes of crucial importance to work out how to influence 
the trajectory of movement in order to produce movement in the desired 
direction. However, this means working against the milieu in which the balloon 
and subject are submersed, going against the gradient, so to speak, of the 
atmospheric surround. However, this is never a purely antagonistic relationship, 
it requires “working within the medium and what it affords, while responding to 
its obligations” (ibid: 103). This attention to the possibilities inherent in the 
situation and being open to divert our modes of thought and action, McCormack 
argues, is a way of attending to the atmospheric aspects of social life by being 
open to and giving oneself up to new practices, thoughts and experiences. In 
my research, my position as an ethnographer with Asperger’s Syndrome 
investigating autism, can directly attest to these kinds of concerns.  
 
On the one hand, I share a condition with the participants in my research and so 
atmospheric differences, at first anyway, were harder to detect as the 
demarcation between my ways of being and theirs did not produce much 
movement in understanding. The boundaries between our modes of being were 
on an undifferentiated and general level such that I was, in effect, coterminous 
with the social dynamics of the club space. Thinking back to the ideas regarding 
Complete Research Membership (CRM), while I do share a condition with my 
participants, I do not share their emplaced life experiences and, as such, could 
not fully attune into them in ways that make sense and matter to them. But, 
because of my education as a sociologist have attuned me to the social and 
affective dynamics inherent in social situations, I began with generalised 
atmospheric affects such as boredom, excitement and discomfort to describe 
the events going on around me. As I noted and became embroiled in the 
dynamics and interactions of the club space, I developed more fine-grained 
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understandings of atmospheric interactions, some of which will inform the 
empirical analysis in the next section.  
 
In terms of the material and technological elements that constributed to 
atmospheric effects in the club space, there were a number of technical media 
devices that were often in use, all at the same time. These included a 
widescreen TV, latched up about 7 feet above the floor, right at the back of the 
club room that, could tune in to digital TV stations as well as digital radio 
stations. There was a second widescreen TV, at the very back and right of the 
club, that had a stand and was thus a more traditional table, desk or cabinet 
supported set. This TV was used to play Nintendo Wii games such as Mario 
Kart Wii or Wii Sports, and, on one special occasion, when it was moved to the 
latched TV so that a Just Dance competition could be held. Finally, there was a 
relatively old CD/Cassette player that appeared to be from the late 90s or early 
2000s. This was evident in the fact that it did not work properly on several 
occasions and needed additional tinkering in order for it to play the CD or 
cassettes brought in by mostly Social Club members of 80’s- 90’s pop music. 
These more stationary and set technological devices, not discounting the fact 
that their locations often changed throughout the course of the year due to the 
college students moving them or the school to accommodate for events, were 
complemented by more mobile technologies.  
 
Members also brought their own devices such as Ipads, Ipods, mobile or smart 
phones and, on occasion, portable gaming consoles such as a Nintendo DS. 
The atmospheric dynamics and members negotiation of the balance between 
the sound levels, channels listened to and activities undertaken in these 
contexts were important interactions during club sessions. To my surprise, many 
club members were able to negotiate these different boundaries sensory and 
social profiles needed to move between different interactional situations with 
relative ease. A central and potent example for me included two members being 
able to play a game of pool, have a conversation and keep track of where they 
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placed their food and drink on different resting points across the nearby club 
space. They were also able to keep track of the rules of the game and keep a 
smooth transition between players. Ultimately, we should note the potential for 
club members to be able to shift their awareness and boundary-setting activities 
as key skills in their interactional repertoires.  
 
Having said something about the general human and non-human atmospheric 
set-ups regarding the club space, I now want to develop three central moments 
during my research that sparked my awareness too the atmospheric dynamics 
present in the club.  
 
Empirical Case 1 - Sound Management, KISS Radio and Human and Non-
Human Atmospheres 
 
For this example, I will explore the interactions between sensory negotiating 
between members, the material capacities of different sound sources and how 
these go on to form atmospheric dynamics in the club space. In particular, I wish 
to focus on a specific set of negotiations regarding the different sound levels of 
the central TV, the back left TV with Wii connected and the balance of their 
volumes. The central TV was used to play radio music on occasion and the 
back TV was used to play Wii games. The conflict arises due to the relative and 
absolute material thresholds of sound being confused when both radio and Wii 
sounds intermingled with each other. On their own, as long as they were not too 
loud, neither sound source posed a problem, but, when combined, the unruly 
tempos, sound spikes and lulls were too disorientating to parse for members 
and the relative and absolute thresholds became blurred causing discomfort, 
anger and confusion.  
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During one particularly tumultuous session in the Youth Club, one of the club 
members26 had turned the latched TV to a metal digital radio station. I later 
came to learn that this was a very important identity to him and he had played a 
metal song on his smartphone a few months later after this incident. Whilst the 
song was playing, he was very clearly becoming immersed in the intensity of the 
music, head-banging, gesturing guitar playing and contorting his face to match 
the conviction of the vocalists. He was surrounded by a group of members who 
partly listened along and partly shifted back and forth between groups and 
activities. They did not interrupt him in anyway. Once the song had finished, a 
staff member asked “Did you enjoy that?” Clearly, based on his engagement 
with the song, he did and they knew this, of course. It was a kind of test to see if 
he was aware of the fact that he was so engrossed and that others would pick 
up on this. Slightly out of breath, he replied “Yes, I did”. This was more a 
confirmation of his personal enjoyment rather than a marker of outside 
awareness. It was clear that the energising and affective rush was important to 
this member. When he turned the digital radio to the metal station, he quickly 
caught the consternation of other club members who were trying to play board 
games and could not focus or talk to each other comfortably. When asked to 
turn the TV down by a staff member, he taunted “can you not handle the metal?” 
The staff member said “yes they could”, but they were concerned for the other 
club members. This led to another member suggesting that they turned the 
radio station to KISS radio. Unfortunately, this led to some discussion regarding 
whether this was what everyone wanted, after some disagreement, KISS did go 
on in the background. Eventually though, people became indifferent to the 
music as they focused on their activities and discussions. Thus the music 
eventually died down and was finally turned off later during the club session. 
 
                                                          
26
 I leave the club members in this case unnamed, including a lack of pseudonyms as they were 
not part of my focus group discussions and thus less involved in the research. This member’s 
conflict around sound however, impacted the club space as a whole, including the central 
participants I focus on here and thus forms a central component of atmospheric management.  
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This is not the end of the discussion however, as this disagreement raised a 
number of important distinctions between the use of particular kinds of music in 
creating atmospheric moods. In asking if the staff member could “handle the 
metal” they were laying down a test of whether they had the sensory, cognitive 
and embodied aptitude to listen to metal music comfortably and without being 
overwhelmed. This was important to their self-identity not just because of the 
metal, punk or other subcultural ethos that was behind the music, it pertained 
equally to their pride in their capacity to listen to metal without being 
overwhelmed or upset by it. Their sensory profile enabled them to become 
engrossed in the music so that they could share the emplaced, affective and 
gestural intensities that come with listening to the music as outlined above. It 
gave them a sense of belonging and social understanding that they may not 
have elsewhere in their lives. This habitual favourite served as a personal social 
object for the member and a provocative object demonstration for the other club 
members. In anchoring their own affective desires through metal, the member 
created disruption for others. As such, atmospheric analysis can enhance social 
quasi-object analysis. The ephemeral nature of atmospheres, in this specific 
instance, become entangled and anchored to specific cultural activities and 
actions. This anchoring is done, in part, by the person and their attunement of 
their sensory capacities and sensitivities and the particular technological 
frameworks in which they are embedded. Returning to Ash’s (2013, 2015) 
discussion above, the use of a smartphone is important in that sound quality, 
volume and type are controllable with different degrees of modularity. For 
instance, different remixes of metal songs may be available that may increase 
the tempo and rhythm to make a techno or electronic dance version which may 
increase the affective intensity and rush of the music while reducing the 
harshness of scream singing. More importantly, I now want to turn to the 
disagreement about what music would be played in the club as it points to a 
number of factors that can increase our understanding of the way atmospheres 
are mediated, created and extended via the intertwining of the social and 
technical means of mood management.  
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Key to the disagreement was the statement made by a club member, who was 
keen to have KISS radio playing, that “everyone likes KISS!” In general, this 
statement is overgeneralising and imposing the views of one person upon the 
rest of the group. As was inevitable, much debate was had about such an 
assertion, some agreeing and some disagreeing. KISS was put on and played 
to allow people to decide on their position. Some members were open to the 
music, enjoying the upbeat, youthful tone of the DJs and presenters in the 
breaks. Others disliked it for these very same reasons and because the music 
was played at such a frequency as to be discomforting. I will explain each of 
these reasons in turn and the extended means through which atmospheres are 
shared, expanded and demarcated, not just through gestural and social 
interactional rules, but also through technical auditory attunement, taste and 
networking markers. The first dimension of this can be seen through the way in 
which KISS radio presents and transmits its music, messages and creates its 
own brand identity. Some club members noted that KISS was not pleasant to 
listen to. This is not just a subjective sensory experience; it can be detected by 
comparing KISS with similar popular music stations such as Capital. The sound 
quality is of a different register with KISS such that adverts, songs and DJ 
commentary and presenting talk has a much more rough, guttural or “fuzzy” 
quality to it. Such is the case that their affective qualities are enhanced so that 
the narrators’ of adverts voices are accentuated to highlight their pleasant, 
consistent tones. Equally, upbeat popular music is given more “kick” by 
accentuating the beat, tempo and creating more bass for electronic or synthetic 
dance pop music. Because KISS is played on a number of different radio 
formats, TV, digital radio, car radio digital, tablet and phone playback via 
external speakers or internal headphones, this standardised sound format is 
liable to be disruptive or pleasurable depending on the situation and capacities 
of the speakers, 
 
By utilising these affective and sensory techniques, KISS radio creates a 
particular series or set of expectations or responses to the auditory crafting and 
management of sensory affective engagement with the radio. However, the 
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ephemeral and fuzzy boundaries of cultivating this sensory-based atmospheric 
set of relations are not enough to sustain a reliable or profitable relationship to 
listeners. An attempt to make these connections more concrete and quantifiable 
for the station and listeners can be seen from the deeply interconnected 
multimedia presence that radio stations now develop and manage. For the 
young adults at the Youth Club, the central focus of KISS Radio is its social 
media presence, primarily Facebook and Twitter. This can be seen in the short 
gaps between songs where the presenter or DJ will read “shout-outs” of people 
tweeting KISS. The most read-out comments are those that reaffirm their 
enjoyment of the music, “I love the KISStory remixes” (KISStory is a scheduled 
slot where “old school anthems” are played from the 80s to early 2000s). “I am 
dancing in my living room getting ready for a night out”, “Doing revision while 
listening to KISS, keeping me motivated”. Each of these statements are 
exemplifying the power of music to create action and thus sustain the sensory-
affective potential of upbeat popular and dance music to create a feel-good and 
positive atmosphere, solidifying a sense of community. Members of the club 
would often relay conflicts, gossip or news from their social media usage and 
were often performatively engaged in these social activities. This enabled them 
to take a stance on issues that occurred beyond their local spacetimes and 
KISS music enables these affective atmospheres to be carried over into other 
social domains. When KISS fans engage with each other and the radio station 
directly on Facebook or Twitter, they may use combinations of emotes, slang, 
images, video clips and formal prose to convey their atmospheric engagement 
with KISS. These multiple forms of engagement are not an example of a free-
flowing affective desire, unhindered by representation or material forces.  
 
As I have shown and following Bille (2015), this performative engagement does 
not remove the multi-modal specificities of listeners’ engagement, they take 
onboard and accentuate the desired affective atmospheres promoted by KISS. 
Thus, emotes, for example, have exaggerated, cartoon-like expressions and 
faces that convey emotion and affect through creases in the face, tears and 
hearts for eyes to convey a playful and engaged sociality. Listeners are affected 
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by them to become localised to specifically crafted spaces and times, as Ash 
(2013) and Edensor (2015) have argued. They also reinforce Wetherell’s (2012) 
point that multimodality again reminds us that these affective-discursive 
practices have social, temporal, spatial and material specificities that allow for 
particular kinds of social/affective positioning and accountability. In this case, 
KISS listeners are positioning themselves as being part of a collective mood or 
ambiance that gives them accountable reasons to be excited, motivated or 
intensely engaged in the specific activities they are undertaking.  
 
To finish this section, I wish to refer to McCormack’s (2013) discussion of radio 
commentating and what it can reveal about the sensory affective atmospheres 
present in the club space. While McCormack is referring to sports commentators 
relaying live games, his discussion can be expanded to explore the affective 
dynamics of presenters and DJs of a public radio station. Just as sports 
commentators are anticipating and relaying the actions of the players in sports 
such as football through techniques of voice modulation and attentiveness to the 
specificities of players histories, so do radio presenters set up the upcoming 
tracks with comments such as “timeless classic”, or “pumping dance song”. 
Even if no presenter is present or speaking for a segment, they still must set up 
the order of songs to produce the smoothest flow between the songs as 
possible without disrupting the expectations of the listeners.  
 
McCormack first reminds us that: 
 
radio remains an important participant in the “materialist energies” of 
contemporary technocultures and the atmospheric sensoria they 
generate: it operates very much in the familiar background of sonic 
cultures, part of the taken-for-granted and mediatized spacetimes of 
everyday life (McCormack, 2013: 119).  
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As I have noted, this background for KISS is very carefully constructed and the 
intended effect of playing the right music in the correct format is to create a 
sustained, middle-level. feel-good ethos for listeners. The level of effort 
expended to constantly achieve this is directly opposite to this affective ethos. In 
this case, radio is both an affective field that moves between bodies and objects 
and a representational one in which words and images are created and 
rendered to relate specific songs to specific artists or lyrical composition. Radio 
broadcasts “continues to “occupy” a voluminous space of variable intensity that 
expands and contracts, a space composed of noise, sound, voice” (ibid: 135). 
Presenters and DJs just like sports commentators, need to relay details and 
provide facts and updates as to the progression of the songs being played. Just 
as equally, they need to infuse what listeners could potentially be feeling about 
the music with what the representational elements that comprise it suggest 
should be the case. They need to be open to the rhythms and potentials of the 
music and social media engagement, this is why many presenters on KISS are 
young and utilise urban dialects and pronunciation of words such as inserting 
silent “t” intonations to words like water. They are being moved and learning to 
be affected by the bodies and sensibilities of their core, young, adult audience 
and cultivating affective spacetimes through relating the actual through the 
virtual.  
 
This is what Serres (1995c) terms “semiconducting”. The presenter is placed in 
the dizzying rush of experience, sensory modulations, affects, words and 
images (1995c: 66). They are constantly remaining vigilant to what is going on 
and can anticipate what might happen and what could happen alongside the 
actuality of what did occur. The semiconducting presenter is both inside and 
outside in that they occupy an isolated booth spot in the radio studio, but are 
also connected affectively through social media and the representational power 
of classics, popular hits and anthems that define groups of music listeners.  
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We have thus seen that a seemingly simple disagreement regarding music and 
noise levels is much more complex when viewed from an atmospheric 
perspective. These instances can be broken down to consider the elements that 
shape autistic peoples potential interactions with negotiating their sensory 
boundaries and balancing sensory hyposensitive and hypersensitivities to 
function effectively. This first example also shows the level to which the 
material, social, affective and representational interact to create a specific field 
of spacetime modulations and sensory management that fosters community and 
sustains certain kinds of atmospheres with different intensities.  
 
Moving on now to the second empirical example of atmospheric interaction at 
the club site, I will explore the ways in which gestural and embodied means of 
communicating produce another distinct set of atmospheric conditions and 
effects. These were much more consequential for in-the-moment, mundane 
talking and social interaction rather than the background nature of radio music.  
 
Empirical Case 2 - Echolalia, Gestural Semiosis and Blackadder 
 
The second set of ideas I want to discuss relates to the intermixing of 
movement, gesture and the shared sense of understanding and in-group 
knowing that is generated from these. This discussion was inspired from club 
member Doug and his use of echolalia, or, the repetition of words, phrases or 
sounds that are overheard. The key to what words or sounds develop into a 
constant form of echolalia is that they must have some form of meaningful 
connection such as a particular voice actor from a cartoon, or, have a positive 
affective/guttural quality which may stem from the way words in the quote 
sound, such as their rhythm, phonetic pronunciation, or the way in which the 
mouth and tongue need to move in order to produce the words or sounds. 
Rather than being habitually static, echolalia can convey interactional patterns 
and motivations (Sterponi and Shankey 2014). This can be demonstrated 
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through what we have seen with Wetherell (2012), positioning and 
accountability in affective practices. Echolalia can be described as a 
transactional resource for those with autism which develop an ecologically 
dynamic relation with their milieus.  
 
In Doug’s case, he would create a form of atmospheric awareness through 
particular, calculated uses of specific echolalias. These sought to interrupt 
atmospheres of boredom, general lethargy or social discomfort due to a lack of 
sustained social conversation. For boredom and lethargy, the echolalia 
interventions were to provide a shared sense of comedy and entertainment 
value for the group. Doug achieved this through the use of relaying quotes from 
the Blackadder comedy series from the titular “Blackadder” character. A central 
example of this is when, for one session, we were waiting to enter the clubroom 
due to another college-related film class overrunning for 10-15 minutes. As we 
were waiting outside, without the added stimulus of activities, the ongoing 
conversations in the group were beginning to die down. The aforementioned 
boredom and slightly impatient lethargy was emerging. Doug, sensing and 
feeling the general unease in the corridor, got the attention of a number of group 
members and started to quote from Blackadder. This served to inject a sense of 
light-hearted and familiar set of references to the group that functioned to create 
an extremely temporary, enclosed, atmospheric bubble/sphere. These echolalia 
based atmospheres, were intended to provide brief relief to the anxiety-
producing uncertainties of not knowing how to rekindle interaction that had 
ceased. This function also served the equally important task of bringing people 
together from their own isolated thoughts into a collective of social and cultural 
recognition. Saying that the atmosphere was transformed or entirely altered is 
not properly accurate however.  
 
The use of Blackadder in these kinds of situations was never to fully replace the 
sense of boredom or lethargy so that the attention would be drawn to Doug. 
They were more to bring brief respite from the unease which these non-
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standard situations brought for participants. In fact, during another club session, 
when “I Want to Break Free” was playing, myself, Doug, Garry and two other 
club members were sitting in a group chatting about the past week’s events. 
During a lull in the conversation, the intensity of the power ballad started to rise 
during the first chorus and Doug burst into song along with chorus. The gap in 
conversation meant that all eyes turned to him and he very quickly covered his 
mouth and regained his composure. Having been swept up by the increasing 
energy of the song, it had come to impact him in a way that prevented him from 
assessing the situation as to whether his action would cause undue social 
attention. I, in hoping to reduce the uncomfortable embarrassment felt by Doug 
and the other members, noted that he was literally, “trying to break free”, by 
getting so caught up in the energy and power of the song. This form of 
accountability seemed to satisfy the group and we returned to our general 
discussion. In being swept up by the affective rush of the song, Doug had made 
himself an active and provocative quasi-object, rather than merely remaining an 
interior personal quasi-object enjoyment. This may have contributed to his 
attunement to the social atmospheres of the group and club space. Yet, as Bille 
reminds us, atmospheric meaning-making and interaction always remain hazy 
and are never certain. Doug’s vigilance to maintain these barriers serves as an 
important example of this.  
 
In touching upon the socially and culturally shared understandings of the use of 
Blackadder, I now want to address the specifics of what this entails. As I have 
noted, the use of Blackadder echolalia is not meant to alter the atmospheric 
tone of the situation at hand completely. The reason for this is because of the 
style of comedy Blackadder utilises and which Doug and other members seek to 
embody in their recreations of these memorable quotes. Blackadder is a sitcom 
where each series parodies, satires and renders ridiculous a specific period in 
history, whether this is Elizabeth the 1st’s England (Blackadder: 1986) or trench 
warfare in World War 1 (Blackadder: 1989). The titular character, played by 
Rowan Atkinson, Blackadder, is seen, from Series 2, to play a misanthropic, 
self-aware, sarcastic, and scheming character who always tries to get the better 
 ~ 257 ~ 
 
of his situation, but never quite has the insight or connections to fully escape the 
confines or structural inequalities that limit his potential in the era he is located. 
The most important aspect for my purpose here is the way in which Blackadder 
is set apart from the other characters in that he has the sensibilities of a 20th 
century person. He is not blindly enamoured by the courtly politics of Queen 
Elizabeth 1st and recognises the contradictory absurdities and tragic injustices 
that were brought by World War 1. Blackadder is attentive to the discrepancies 
between the soldiers, commanders and the humanity of the Allied and German 
soldiers fighting for causes they never fully understood. The way in which 
Blackadder approaches these issues is most important for our purposes. His 
voice remains on a flat affect, with his characteristic sarcastic, unenthused 
feeling towards anyone he comes across. Gesturally, aside from some rare 
moments of anger or giddy joy, he remains straight-faced and grumpy. The 
most common reaction to any statement or event is a despondent roll of the 
eyes accompanied with sighs.  
 
Albertsons’ (2012) discussion of gestural semiosis is relevant here. The 
particular emotional and collectively shared affective displays by Doug and the 
recognition from the other club members signify the cadences, rhythms and 
temporalities of Blackadder’s comedic engagements and antics are shared 
between members such that they do not have to discursively explain what is 
going on. They are “in on” the shared cultural resonance and utilise gestural, 
vocal and emotion-laden bodyminds to mutually attend to the atmospheric 
situation at hand. The flat affect and diminished reaction to situations prevents 
Doug’s echolalia recreations from being overstimulating or disruptive for himself 
or others. The use of rhythm, cadence and tone is carefully considered and 
crafted, as Albertsen notes. Doug is thus considerate for himself and other’s 
comfort and ensure that Blackadder echolalias retain a positive capacity.  
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In bringing our attention to the specifics of Blackadder’s character, I want to 
suggest that Doug’s use of quotes and phrases from the show is the utilisation 
of a gestural form of producing an atmospheric sense of light relief and also 
demonstrating Miller’s (2015) description of resonance. Doug is able to pick up 
on the ambient level of boredom and lethargy and instead of being entirely lulled 
into a sense of stability or be fully complicit with the prevailing atmospheric 
conditions of the current time and space, he is able to, after taking a few 
moments to ensure the mood is appropriate, take this mood, and channel the 
character of Blackadder with his mannerisms and comic awareness. The club 
members mutually attend to the situation at hand and develop practical, 
emplaced, body/mind solutions and actions to these scenarios, to momentarily 
make apparent the socially bizarre nature of a whole group waiting outside in a 
small corridor to enter a room. When this process breaks down, as in the 
spontaneous outburst of singing to “I Want to Break Free”, quick reparations 
and the use of positioning via accountable excuses are provided and members 
move on before discomfort is extended too far. The flat affect, exaggerated use 
of facial expressions and the sarcastic levels of mockery and self-awareness 
come to life in this brief recreation. Importantly, the arrogance, condescension 
and antagonism is gone. Instead, the equally silly mannerisms of Blackadder 
are highlighted.  
 
This gestural and bodily form of working through atmospheric sociality enables 
the group to develop a sense of the wider structural mechanisms that form the 
ground from which to make sense of specific social contexts. This is because of 
the way in which the resonances of utilising well-known British sitcoms’ use of 
tropes, character types and storylines convey and highlight the absurdities and 
idiosyncrasies of everyday life. The utilisation of the stable and codified 
emotional, gestural and affective character traits of TV shows enables for a 
standardisation of these highly volatile, social acts of communication. Echolalia 
can then be used as a form of controlled repetition and to practice performing 
the emotional, gestural and affective tonalities of quotations. They can then be 
utilised in emergent situations and be given new life, despite their standardised 
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and familiar construction and utilisation. This is not to say that the standardised 
resources of echolalia are not open to change and can equally be altered to suit 
the situation at hand. This dimension also speaks back to Philippopoulos-
Mihalopoulos’ (2016) concern that atmospheric conditions and effects are 
codified and made stultifying. The use of these habitual responses to the 
situation at hand may be seen to embody such an imperative, but emerges from 
an individual and then becomes a temporary collective awareness before it 
dissipated as we were able to enter the clubroom.  
 
If nothing else, it shows that individuals are able to take the institutionalised 
character tropes and social interactions codified in BBC sanctified sitcoms and 
translate them into something new. Of course, this is not to deny the fact that 
the negative traits of Blackadder could manifest if Doug or another member was 
experiencing sensory overload, or very angry and lashing out due to 
overstimulation and extreme discomfort. It also does not go into providing tools 
to develop a critical role in thinking about how Blackadder, embodying a smug 
or arrogant 20-21st century know-it-all who knows better than the historical 
characters, serves to embolden a form of God-like knowledge and privilege that 
is not questioned regarding the complicity of the viewer in looking down upon or 
laughing at historical blunders rather than learning from them.  
 
Finally, in keeping with Wetherell’s (2012) critique of overly affective theories of 
social interaction, Doug’s Blackadder impersonations are not random, non-
representational affairs, but are choreographed so that they have a series of 
“affective-discursive” (Wetherell, 2012: 81-83) logics that shape the atmospheric 
spheres that are created. These are: temporal duration, recognition of the 
general mood, shared cultural recognition and echolalia which at once codifying 
and emergent. These logics also speak to questions of power and positionality. 
Blackadder is undoubtedly a White European perspective on history and, as I 
noted, a position of authority that is smugly all-knowing and self-aware. I return 
to this problematic in the conclusion of the thesis. My analysis also points to the 
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ways in which Doug is positioned and takes his “turn” to interject his 
impressions and thus creates a local cultural criteria for responding to the 
atmospheric mood (ibid: 90).  
 
I now wish to turn to broader issues concerning the atmospheric and sensory 
boundaries that were developed, maintained or broken during my research at 
the club spaces.  
 
Empirical Case 3 - Creation, Disruption and Maintenance of Sensory 
Atmospheric Boundaries  
 
The final example and topic of interest I want to bring to light in this chapter is 
the use, maintenance, creation and removal of atmospheric boundaries in the 
club space. I want to focus on examples that highlight the sensory dimension of 
these demarcation activities. For the club members, the experience and 
management of space, light, sound and a sense of spatial belonging were the 
most important factors that impacted their navigation of atmospheric 
boundaries.  
 
These kinds of spatial belonging often extended to other more judgemental 
forms of relating to the club space, such that a few club members, in both the 
Youth and Social Clubs, were often dismayed with the way in which the 
clubroom was left when the students left for the day in the early evening. For the 
Social Club members, this was used as a temporal and thus generational 
marker of degeneration of values and caring for the environments and spaces 
that situate and nurture their education or relaxation and leisure times. For the 
Youth Club, the moral judgement was present, but lacking the sincerity of the 
Social Club and often stated in a sarcastic or belligerent manner, some Youth 
club members even calling for students to be forced to pick up the rubbish 
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before the club began. There was to be no compromise on this request, even to 
the extent that the club members, who called for the action, did not take it upon 
themselves to tidy up. What struck me most about this was the way in which this 
distaste and disappointment with the students was forgotten about once 
members had settled down and began to generate discussions or take part in 
activities. This speaks to a number of dimensions that shaped the atmospheric 
boundary-making processes that structured the different levels of awareness for 
members, the first of which serves to illustrate the fact that a visceral reaction to 
events and situations as they first arose, to not being at all bothered by them is 
a hallmark more generally of the interactional dynamics of club members. It also 
points to the ways in which “tidy” and “messy” for participants is perhaps a 
“hazy” classification (Bille, 2015) that takes on different resonances depending 
on the threshold levels of sensory difficulties (Smith and Sharp, 2013) (see 
Chapter 3).  
 
The levels of engagement were different depending on the context. So for a 
more specific example at one point, the clubroom was being used for an event 
that had a makeshift mini-catwalk in the middle left of the room. This caused a 
rather diverse mix of simultaneous, interweaving reactions, including confusion, 
intrigue, concern, fascination, excitement and compulsion. Some members were 
compelled to walk the catwalk and parody a fashion show while others simply 
confusedly tip-toed around the large obstacle in the middle of the room. Some 
members took it upon themselves to create a display that located them as the 
centre of attention by hopping on and off of the catwalk. While others voiced 
concerns over damaging or misusing the college’s property. It is here that we 
can see how the boundaries between atmospheric actions and reactions are 
dynamic and open to becoming intermixed so that no one emotional-cognitive or 
discursive-affective stance took complete priority over any other. Indeed, the 
exotic nature of the catwalk’s intervention into the club space enabled a 
sustaining of members engagement with these newly emergent relations to 
boundary-making. However, after around 45 minutes, the catwalk faced the 
same fate as rubbish strewn all over; it faded into the background and normal 
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activities resumed. The active and provocative nature of the catwalk as quasi-
object became parasitic for a short segment of time, but did not have the quality 
of endurance as the spatial and material capacities of it were lacking in 
dynamism. In the rubbish example, the differential distribution of rubbish strewn 
each week as leftovers of the mundane goings-on of the Sixth Form college 
students, gave new specific details to focus on each time and thus allowed for 
continued engagement and consternation. The “purity” of the club space was 
polluted and made to be visually and morally dangerous for club members. 
(Douglas, 2002).  
 
Such a discrepancy between such visceral initial reactions to almost total 
indifference is based on the fact that to dwell too much on the unexpected 
changes would cause too much anxiety for the members. But it also points to 
the strength, immediacy and relatively unmediated and “raw” dimension of the 
visceral reaction to rubbish and/or external objects like catwalks. Such a strong 
relation to this object/event is unsustainable if members are to have the social 
reserves to maintain conversations, take part in game activities and filter out 
background noise or deal with future unexpected scenarios. Simply put, it is 
unwise to focus so much on the small details because of the multiple forms of 
social quasi-object processes at play. Due to obsession or not being satisfied 
with the lack of information, as thing stood for the members nonetheless, they 
took to creating conversation groups or activities groups that had more familiar 
dynamics. Activities such as board and other game activities played had clearly 
written-down rules that could be mobilised around, even allowing people to 
enter and leave ongoing games due to the stability of their operations. 
Theoretically, the move from indifference to change is marked by an intriguing 
shift from the visceral and affective immediacy of raw, unmediated reaction, to 
deliberately organised, calculated and familiar discursive and emotional spheres 
of activity. Instead of moving from affective to representational forms of 
acknowledgment, as was the case for Edensor’s (2015) study of the Blackpool 
lights, the boundary-making activities moved from spontaneous, reactions and 
verbalised responses of disdain. The affective and representational are mixed in 
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different ways in this example and provide an insight into how atmospheres are 
created, maintained and diffused.  
 
Looking at the specifically sensory domain of atmospheric boundaries now, I 
want to address and deepen the discussion of auditory management above and 
internal and external boundaries by focusing on how light became important for 
members. When conducting one of the first focus group sessions early in the 
autumn of 2014, an unexpected issue arose that was specific to the seasonal 
timing and lighting conditions of the clubroom. To give some context, at the back 
of the clubroom, there are a number of large windows that give an almost 
complete view of the entire college field that extends outwards from these 
windows. The windows are separated by sections of the back wall and so were 
not continuous. I say that you could see the field, but, during the autumn and 
winter months, for the majority of the time, you could not  see the field in the 
dark and there were no field or pitch lights, just some small spotlights on the 
outside wall of the club to illuminate the fire escape door back left corner. When 
I and the club leader set up the focus group sessions by moving away from the 
seating area near the centre-back of the room to the back left of the room, we 
were in purview of two small sets of windows. This just so happened to place us 
within the purview of a cycling club that was ongoing just outside these windows 
(cycling is limited to this area).  
 
Due to the limited lighting conditions, the bicyclists had to utilise a high light 
beam from their bikes in order to be able to cycle around the obstacles that had 
been put in place for them. Unfortunately, for the participants of the focus group, 
the flash of these beams was quite harsh as the cyclists turned corners around 
the obstacles in a constant string. The light in the clubroom was consistent and 
uniform, due to the arrangement of their positioning on the ceiling, the 
fluctuating shining beams entering the group’s perceptual field on a constant, 
almost rhythmic level due to the obstacle course navigation activity of the 
cyclists disrupted this familiar situation . The tempo of these illuminous 
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intrusions was so that just as participants recovered from the last beam flash 
and the emplaced thoughts and feelings dissipated, another flash arrived to 
reset the discomfort on a continuous loop. Further, a sense of anticipation, 
tinged with dread and tense, hyperawareness became the dominant 
atmosphere of the focus group area. As participants were experiencing and 
being subject to the light beams created by activities in an entirely separate and 
isolated sphere from the club, they developed ways of reacting to their outputs. 
Participants were anticipating the next beam, tensing up muscles, not being 
able to focus on other events and finding it difficult to filter out. If there was a 
gap in the beams, then this was not a cause of respite, as they could start up 
again at any moment, the intensity of the darkness outside did not make the 
cyclists visible, so they were indistinct silhouettes that remained unrecognisable. 
Lacking cues as to when the next activity might start, the only thing participants 
could do was simply anxiously wait for the next beams to arrive.  
 
After a few more rounds of this sensory bombardment, we moved back to the 
sofas next to the wall mounted TV and continued the remainder of the focus 
group session there. This event drew my attention to the clubs boundary-making 
practices. The back-left area of the club was a location that was not utilised for 
group activities to the same degree as the rest of the club space. As such, the 
spatial, material, atmospheric and social dynamics of this space were less well 
developed or could be accommodated by members’ sensory capacities. The 
club leader and I initially intended to utilise this space because it was far away 
enough from the other activities to allow for a degree of focus on the research 
questions, and it also provided an overall view of the rest of the club space so 
that participants could still be aware of what was going on in the rest of the club 
space. We did not or could not anticipate the light beam issue as it had never 
been a consideration for the club leader due to the aforementioned lack of use 
and also, because the cycling group only met a few times during the autumn 
and winter months of my research. This example has demonstrated the way in 
which the club’s and by extension, club member’s atmospheric boundaries and 
sphere formations are created through both already existing and familiar 
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spheres of activity alongside external and unfamiliar spheres of activity. They 
then go on to give rise to new atmospheric conditions and subjective experience 
and adaptation.  
 
Conclusion 
 
This chapter has sought to outline some core aspects regarding theoretical work 
that has been done on atmospheres within a social scientific context. I have 
examined the debates around the ways in which atmospheres have been 
described, categorised and conceptualised to explore their material, social and 
affective qualities that have real, felt consequences for social action in the 
world. However, I have also suggested that those atmospheres are also always 
ephemeral and “hazy”, blurring the boundaries of structural or conceptual 
formations and questioning the certainty or readability of subjective 
experiences. This means that, in order to study them empirically, we need to 
develop ideas and approaches that capture and think through these hazy, 
intangible phenomena that become variably tangible through their effects and 
affects.  
 
The concepts explored in this chapter such as gestural semiosis, resonances 
and the materiality of atmospheres can be used to develop and deepen 
accounts of affective atmospheres that do not stultify bodily and 
emotional/affective processes. Empirically, we can focus on the material, 
auditory and social effects on the negotiation and management of atmospheric 
conflicts that arise when atmospheric thresholds are disrupted from their 
mundane cultivation via affective engagement and technologically mediated, 
inorganic modulation. The gestural semiosis analysis of Albertsen, I argue, can 
provide nuanced and critical insights into how phenomena like echolalia are 
dynamically habitual and creative in integrating affective atmospheres into 
social action. Finally, the degree to which spontaneity and routinised 
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expectations inflect and impact autistic engagement with sensory and spatial 
relations, points to means of exploring the way quasi-objects do and do not 
parasitise social relations based on intensities of interaction. Affective 
atmospheres then, have a productive place in highlighting the simultaneously 
concrete and ephemeral nature of autistic being and acting in the world.  
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Conclusion - Sensory and Disability Futures  
 
Introduction  
 
The arguments and analysis developed across the thesis have covered a 
number of topics from habitual engagements with favourites, to 
autieethnography and atmospheric relations. What has united these topics is a 
focus on their sensory and their parasitic, quasi-object character. I have sought 
to showcase how the underlying framework that is used to make sense of 
autistic sensory experience is guided by and fruitfully analysed through attention 
to the interconnections between these areas of study and concepts. These 
connections take place in empirically specified milieus of action and meaning-
making.  
 
In concluding the thesis, I want to explore some of the ways in which the 
framework I have developed here can be expanded upon to develop potential 
future lines of inquiry and address shortcomings of the project. I will address 
three key areas and briefly sketch how my approach could be utilised and 
expanded upon. These sketches will by necessity be preliminary; nonetheless, I 
believe that the groundwork is present in my thesis to begin an in-depth 
discussion of the uses my research could have. I will first attend to questions 
regarding the ways in which my theoretical framework can be used around 
questions of policy and practice. The two examples that I will use to explore 
potential uses are the “sensory funnel” approach adopted by the “Asperger 
Experts” organisation. My second example will refer to the, at the time of writing, 
ongoing campaign run by the National Autistic Society’s (NAS) “Too Much 
Information” campaign. The multimedia and multimodal focus of my discussion 
in this application of my arguments leads me to my second focus, the use of 
multisensory methods to complement the framework developed in this research. 
I will explore some of the competing arguments about the use of sensory 
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methods before ending with how I could use such methods for future research. 
Finally, I will address concerns that I raised in Chapter 2 regarding 
representation. I address issues around gender, sexuality and ethnicity in 
relation to my fieldnotes.  
 
Habitual Favourites in Policy and Practice 
 
In keeping with the pragmatist spirit of this project, I now wish to highlight some 
of the ways I believe this research can be utilised within domains of both policy 
and practice. The first of these discussions relates to ideas and themes that 
were developed in Chapter 3 on habitual favourites and the various sensory 
“thresholds” identified by Smith and Sharp (2013). The “sensory funnel” 
approach developed by the “Asperger Experts” organisation (Asperger Experts - 
Defense Mode, 2017), seeks to redress a dominant focus on issues of executive 
functioning and social interaction to address what they view as the primary 
importance of the senses. The organisation is run by people with Asperger’s 
including parents, teachers and therapists and thus emerges from a breadth of 
experiences and perspectives. The “sensory funnel” perspective argues that 
sensory experience is crucial to the other domains of executive functioning and 
social interaction because the senses, including beyond the five classical 
senses such as visceral sensations like heartbeats, are the essence of being 
alive. These guttural and interior sensations are highly confusing for those with 
Asperger’s and cause them to enter what is known as “defense mode” 
(Asperger Experts, 2017). This is where those with Asperger’s become so 
wrapped up in their confusing sensory internal and external experiences that 
they shut down their awareness so that they become closed to developing their 
own capacities and the world around them. The ability to develop social skills in 
this context is very difficult for those with Asperger’s, as they are trying to 
negotiate sensory confusions and anxieties that often lead to depression in 
relation to their self-esteem and anger towards others in pushing them away. In 
order to counteract this tendency, the “sensory funnel” approach argues that we 
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should not try to bottle up our feelings and let them be open, not controlling 
them or manipulating them in order to change them. This should be used in 
conjunction with a process of “holding the space” (Asperger Experts - Holding 
Space, 2017). This is where people with Asperger’s should just be without 
judgement, without a need to be productive or any other form of goal-oriented 
action and to accept who they are. These strategies are conducted within a 
supportive community context that enables recognition of the importance of 
connection. This can be with feelings, sensory experience, environmental 
awareness and emplaced, bodily processes such as thoughts of confusion and 
the bodily sensations of anxiety.  
 
The “sensory funnel” approach connects with a number of arguments made 
across the thesis. It namely points to the way in which parasitical relations, on a 
sensory level, are highly disruptive for those with autism and features as an all-
encompassing phenomenon. As I show in Chapter 3, sensory experience is 
modulated through a series of habitual quasi-objects. The processes of letting 
things be and holding the space in the “sensory funnel” approach, I argue, are 
best formulated around habitual quasi-objects that are anchored in emplaced 
milieus. As Chapter 4 brought to attention, the posthuman condition of autism 
points to the ways in which distributed and more-than-human engagements are 
central to giving autistic individuals a sense of connection to the world. The 
“sensory funnel” approach enables these connections to flourish as no 
judgements are applied to the forms of interaction that are highlighted in my 
approach. The “sensory funnel” also does not reproduce stereotypical ideas of 
what autism or specifically Asperger’s is because of this focus on non-
judgemental acceptance of letting people express their individuality. Unlike 
psychiatric and medicalised understandings of autism that perceive autistic 
characteristics as a reduction of their capacity to be human, which view 
expressions of self through emotional distress or physical discomfort are seen 
as “the autism talking” (Yergeau, 2013: n. p.). The “sensory funnel” approach 
does not dismiss these behaviours as inhuman or reducing people to diagnostic 
labels; rather, these constitute the very essence of what it means to be human 
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for those with autism. It is by accepting these qualities as essential to autistic 
being that we can work to address sensory issues that go on to impact social 
difficulties. The approach developed in the thesis can ultimately provide 
empirical and conceptual grounding for the processes outlined by the Asperger 
Experts organisation.  
 
A further and more wide-ranging initiative is seeking to not just inform policy, but 
also to advocate and expand on how people perceive the abilities of those with 
autism. The “Too Much Information” (TMI) campaign, being developed and co-
ordinated by The National Autistic Society in Britain, focuses on detailing the 
ways in which the sensory and social difficulties of autism prevent those with 
skills and abilities from accessing jobs and reaching their potential. As the main 
website page states: “Employers don’t see my ability. They see my autism, They 
see a problem. That makes them quick to judge me, quick to dismiss me. 
Simply because they don’t understand me” (Too Much Information, NAS 
Website 2017).  
 
The TMI campaign has produced a film titled: “Could You Stand the Rejection?” 
(NAS, 2017), highlighting and exemplifying the sensory issues for those with 
autism during job interviews. The film shows a multimodal and multisensory 
experience of autism. This is achieved through a number of techniques 
including: varying the levels of background noise, focusing on unusual details 
such as the white teeth of an interviewer, bodily tics like tapping on tables to 
indicate anxiety and distress and the use of floating text to display the concerns 
of the autistic interviewee discursively. This film embodies a number of insights 
developed across the thesis. The first relates to the use of atmospheric affective 
practices as I discussed in Chapter 6 in relation to Wetherell (2012). The use of 
stims or bodily and verbal comforting mechanisms is not portrayed in the film as 
bizarre or deviant behaviours that have no rational meaning, leaving just “the 
autism talking” (Yergeau, 2013: n. p.). Rather, they are positioned as being 
responses to specifically crafted, social situations that embody a parasitic 
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cascade of distress. The film highlights the complex intermeshing of human, 
non-human, discursive and affective processes that accompany an interview 
event. However, more attention could be made of the specifically “inorganic” 
(Ash, 2015) qualities of the material objects that are independent of human 
intention. This would allow for employers to understand that sensory experience 
is as much bound up by the materiality of the interview situation  they are bound 
to the social and intersubjective practices involved.   
 
The quasi-object-focused, habitual relations framework developed in this thesis 
can further develop this insightful portrayal of emotional and sensory autistic 
experience by providing employers who view the film with a theoretical 
framework to make sense of the film’s depiction. The arguments developed here 
can be used to develop strategies to mitigate the ambiguous and anxiety-
provoking context of an interview situation. A poignant example can be found in 
the focus on the shiny white teeth of an interviewer showcased during the video. 
Rather than conceiving of social positioning in the interview context, as purely 
based on discursive constructions of employability via skills, or qualifications, 
employers might take heed of the affective sensory details noticed by autistic 
candidates. A nonthreatening and open attitude should be taken in this context. 
Rather than being made to feel uncomfortable by such attention, the interviewer 
may playfully inquire into this attention to detail and take it into account when 
comparing the job’s roles and skills the candidate brings.  
 
Due to the difficulty of assessing and verbalising his sensory overload and 
anxieties, at the end of the film, the male interviewee storms out of the interview 
room out into the street. He squats down, shudders, rocks into a tight, foetal 
position, gasps and shudders with fear. The parasitic cascade has broken down 
his ability to make sense of his situation. Employers, in trying to untangle the 
messy emotional and sensory challenges at play, may find it useful to work 
through and consult Vannini et al’s (2012) framework of sensory experience, 
defined in Chapter 1. They may wish to use the typology of iconic, token-type, 
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indexical and symbolic processes and practices to systematically work through 
the sensory experiences a person with autism may be going through. For 
instance, if the autistic person was experiencing problems in developing 
indexical relations, or making causal connections based on sensory experience, 
it may be possible to trace the iconic, or the in-the-moment sensory experiences 
that constitute such struggles. This can be combined with affective practices of 
positioning and accountability (Wetherell, 2012) to assess the way in which 
responses are being tailored to the intersubjective context and emplaced 
sensory experience.  
 
I offer only two examples of potential practical applications of my framework 
here. But, the potential scope of possible uses for the insights developed across 
the thesis can be adapted to the situation at hand. This adaptability is intentional 
and arises from the pragmatist commitments expressed in Chapter 1. The 
multiplicity of uses the concepts and topics of investigation throughout the thesis 
can offer to understand autism cautions against approaches that would strive to 
make a “one size fits all” strategy of address. The individuality of each person 
with autism should be allowed to thrive and go beyond the standardised job 
interview scripts of skills, qualifications and previous experience. Exploring the 
non-human and affective modes of attention autistic candidates can expand our 
understanding of diverse socialities and can in turn change the perceptions of 
disabled groups.  
 
Multi-Media Sensory Research  
 
The use of multimedia techniques to represent autistic sensory experience 
addresses a neglected aspect of my research project concerning the non-use of 
multimedia technologies to capture, analyse and present sensory experience. 
The primary focus of this thesis has been to develop a theoretical framework 
that can assist us in understanding the habitual and sensory experiences of 
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autistic individuals and groups. Now that this has been established, we can 
consider options to develop the framework sensually via developing sensory 
research methods. For the purposes of this section, I will focus on how the use 
of the method of “soundwalks” could enhance the analysis conducted in Chapter 
3 on Garry’s urban interactions.  
 
Soundwalks emerged as part of social and cultural geographer’s interest in 
detailing the multi-sensory aspects of life and in particular, urban living. Barns 
(2014), presents a useful outline of soundwalks:  
 
where the material world becomes a quasi-cinematic “image” to the 
mobile soundtrack […] [where] the mobile audio device acts as what 
Biggs (2008) calls “a sort of emotional and aesthetic prosthetic”, 
which is capable of extending and transforming the listeners 
surroundings (Barns, 2013: 11).  
 
The use of professional audio-recording devices for research or personal music 
players such as Ipods or Walkman’s, allows us to develop nuanced, attuned 
attention to soundscapes. Combining the use of these technologies allows us to 
gain insight into “the construction of a mediated, augmented listening 
experience that layers recorded sounds with the contemporary aural 
environment” (ibid: 11). Soundwalks then allow us to create empirically detailed 
sensory experience data while also keeping and reflecting the permeability of 
aural phenomena. In the case of Garry’s altercations during his train journey, for 
example, if a researcher was present with Garry, it might have been possible to 
document the aural background of the train and stations. In doing this, we could 
manipulate and analyse the impact of what Biggs (2008) has termed the “push-
pull” dynamics of urban audio experience. This concerns the relationship 
between the “cinematic lull” enabled by private audio devices and the 
hypersensory awareness engendered by the multi-mediated and multi-sensory 
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capture of attention in modern urban cities. These processes have been 
summarised by Thibaud (2003) as the construction of “city screens” that act as 
kinds of probes into the multisensory experiences of social life as they are 
interiorised and simultaneously projected out to others (Simone, 2012: 206). My 
use of Smith and Sharp’s (2013) framework to analyse Garry’s situation could 
thus be given a technically mediated character, possibly leading to a production 
of a film similar to the “Could You Stand The Rejection?” film. The use of 
multimedia effects could provide another provocative and moving insight into 
autistic experience. The combination of uncomfortable sensory stimuli and clear 
distress of the autistic individual may induce empathetic recognition through 
emplaced sensory experience (Pink, 2009: 50).  
 
The risks of focusing on a more multimedia-guided study of sensory experience 
are noted by a number of researchers. Deference to technology is something 
that has often been undertaken in sociological research in order to reduce the 
labour of researchers combing through ever increasing amounts of data (Back, 
2013). Guggenheim (2015) argues that such an uncritical use of technology is 
problematic. For example, in the use of cameras in visual sociology, 
researchers often view those tools as black boxes, whereby the technical 
aspects of its workings are not investigated by the sociologist. Guggenheim 
instead suggests that we should understand technologies in research as 
translators of a multiplicity of data that transform elements of the social world. 
This involves utilising “tight” and “loose” translations of the technology, like a 
camera and the object it represents to create a combination of mechanical and 
non-mechanical recording and representational strategies. One way to prevent 
such neglect in relation to soundwalks is to consider drawing on the quasi-
object, parasite and inorganic (Ash, 2015) analyses developed throughout the 
thesis. Thibaud (2003) notes that private music players and the mediation of 
audio recording technology acts as a kind of quasi-object that mediates third 
relations between social action. They seek to slow down auditory experience 
and shape it to ways useful to the individual. Equally, if we consider the notion 
that the use of audio-recording is a technological relation, we need to consider 
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the technical aspects of these devices in a theoretically informed manner. 
Thibaud argues that different material properties disrupt Hertz waves and act as 
“sonic parasites”. For example, the noisy interference of roadworks highlight the 
benefits of being able to rewind or fast-forward to specific points in a song or 
being able to volume balance this audio in the case of soundwalk recordings. 
The technical aspects of sensory recording are inherently and constitutively 
social. As I noted in Chapter 3, Garry liked to write letters or poems in order to 
express his feelings, thoughts and anxieties about activities in his life. These 
could be fruitfully examined alongside a soundwalk of train journeys to explore 
the multimodal and multisensory nature of the encounters I analysed.  
 
As Mason and Davies (2009) argue, the sensory domains of social life should 
not be studied or conceptualised as a pure domain in itself but rather, we should 
explore their interconnections between social categories, the primary concept in 
this case being disability (Mason and Davies, 2009: 598-99). We should thus 
not rely solely on multimodal or multisensory technologies or experiences in 
order to make sense of research data. The balance between a material focus 
that recognises the quasi-object character of material-social relations and the 
fleeting and abstract, sensory experiences need to be combined in any 
adequate account of sensory experience and meaning. In practical terms, 
Mason and Davies (2009) argue that resonances (see Chapter 6 - Miller, 2015) 
between sensory experience and the research topic are central in order to not 
rely on the material or closed-connection relationship between objects, 
environments and sensory experience. Researchers should also seek to 
examine the ephemeral, hazy and incomplete sensory resonances that people 
have with such things as family resemblances in photographs or feelings of déjà 
vu. To expand upon the discussion, these experiences are not inconsequential 
or irrational and so should not be ignored; they are formative and formed by 
atmospheric conditions and the expectations, sensory biases and past 
experiences of those who are participating within a specific social context (Bille, 
2015).  
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I have focused on one sensory modality in this example, but future research can 
explicate how other senses could be investigated in this framework.  
 
 
Habitual Favourites and Social Categories  
 
As I address in Chapter 2, there are problematic issues of representational 
diversity in this thesis. In this conclusion, I want to address these issues in a 
more theoretical and conceptual manner that engages with questions of 
intersectional analysis in relation to disability. My treatment of autism as a 
category in this thesis has remained relatively undefined in relation to other 
social markers such as age, gender and ethnicity. This is partly due to my desire 
to create a sociologically informed framework that was explicitly addressed to 
issues directly connected to autistic experiences. The lack of attention given to 
autism within sociology was something I wanted to correct. Now that a 
framework has been established through which we can analyse the habitual and 
sensory experiences, practices and actions of people with autism. It is time to 
consider some potential lines of future research and inquiry that connect autism 
as a disability to questions of gender, sexuality and ethnicity. In doing this, I will 
be expanding upon my use of Goodley’s (2014) and Goodley and Runswick-
Cole (2014) approach of “dis/ability” I explored in Chapters 1 and 4.   
 
As I noted in Chapter 5, my experiences of research, infused with the 
characteristics of autism, are at risk of being erased and excluded from 
meaningful measures of academic achievement and worth. To subscribe to 
such normative practices would be a disservice to my goal of revealing the 
academic mundane as embroiled in power relations. Further, to compete in 
academic labour markets serves to reproduce institutional privileges that seek 
to mitigate such struggle through ableist protections of prestige (Burrows, 
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2012).27 To avoid this, we need to connect autism as a dis/ability to other 
struggles involving social markers such as gender and ethnicity. Goodley (2014: 
35-36), suggests that an intersectional approach to disability in relation to social 
markers like gender or race allow us to analyse how the processes of dis/ability 
become empirically defined in relation to these social categories. We can show 
how the processes of sexism, racism and disability intertwine to show the 
processes of disablism and ableism. As Chapter 1 argued, this is the process by 
which disability disrupts the neurotypical assumptions of liberal humanism that 
governs modern, Western societies. Equally, those with disabilities also aspire 
to reach and maintain levels of competence that embody these idealised notions 
of human being. Intersectional approaches recognise that no social category 
experiences, struggles and identity negotiations are separate, demarcated 
issues. No adequate or just account of the experiences of women for instance, 
is complete without equal attention to questions of race or class (Hill Collins, 
2000). Equally, these experiences are co-constitutive of each other and should 
not just be an addition to appease the other groups. Issues of discrimination, 
exclusion and violence are shared, but their empirical specificity is only 
attainable through conjoined analysis of their constitution. I will now attend to 
several instances in my research that I have developed in Chapter 3 and 
Chapter 6 where this dis/ability intersectional approach can reveal new insights.  
 
Intersectional dis/ability studies challenges the “malestream” focus that much 
autism research reproduces. I have contributed to this reproduction in only 
focusing on male expressions of sexuality and sexual desire. Garry’s comment 
on the legs of a Russian tennis player in Chapter 3 serves as a case in point. 
His seemingly throwaway comment is actually a form of: “Compulsory able-
bodiedness (that) bolsters heteronormativity. Boys show their virility through 
their bodies while girls are encouraged to seek the desirability of others through 
their bodies” (Goodley, 2014: 42). However, these moments should not always 
                                                          
27
 These protections are nonetheless still vulnerable to neoliberal-able tendencies of infinite 
flexibility, self-care and individualised competition (Goodley, 2014).  
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be read as negative or along normative lines of desire. Garry and the other 
members and participants of the Youth and Social Clubs disrupt ableist 
practices in that rather than being self-sufficient, flexible and always available or 
socially or emotionally prepared for labour or civic engagement, they require 
support in order to eat, sleep, be independent, access leisure and employment 
opportunities. These questions of interdependence are of particular relevance 
for our purposes, in relation to assistance required in managing sensory and 
emotional experiences of sexuality. My participants at once embodied 
heteronormative practices of sexuality, while also potentially requiring 
assistance in working through sensual and intimate relations and desires with 
others. Equality of gendered interactions in this case is bound up in notions of 
dis/ability (Erevelles, 2002b). This opens up opportunities for” crip” and queer 
relations that:  
 
moves us outside the politics of shame and toward a praxis that 
neither denies the complicated messiness of the body nor redefines 
these characteristics as normal or a strategy of stigma-management 
(Meleo-Erwin, 2012: 395).  
 
To queer and “crip” disability is to show how “sexuality and disability link into 
one another” (Goodley, 2014: 42). Garry’s heteronormative desires and 
comments are just one part of the puzzle in this instance. This emphasis on 
desire disrupts the “male-brain” (Baron-Cohen, 2002) perspective that privileges 
logic, mechanical reasoning and downplays emotional or sensual thoughts and 
feelings. It does point to evidence that the preference for local processing 
(Happé and Frith, 2006), or cognitive styles that may enhance the capacity to 
objectify female bodies and reproduces heteronormative desires and structures.  
At the same time, unique sensory experiences of sensual interactions are likely 
to pose unique problems for intimate relationships that challenge 
heteronormative assumptions of sexual citizenship. How to untangle the 
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heteronormative and crip possibilities of disabled sexuality is a topic that could 
be explored in future research.  
 
 
The fact that Garry’s comment related to a “Russian” tennis player, speaks to a 
form of othering that arises from equating non-majority, white European others 
as “uncivilised, emotive, fearful but is also exoticised, fetishised by white 
cultures” (Goodley, 2014: 46). Russia’s position as a “far” Eastern European 
country speaks to a unique form of “orientalism” (Said 2003) that incorporates 
repulsion and fascination with a Soviet, Communist past that rubs against the 
Metropole of western capitalism (Hardt and Negri, 2000: 124). Here, the cultural 
differences between Central and Eastern Europe feed into Garry’s desire for the 
legs of the tennis player.  
 
A future research project may wish to challenge these stereotypical 
representations of ethnic others and develop more benevolent conceptions of 
these groups. A way to do this is to utilise and embody traits of what Kannen 
(2008) has termed as being a “race traitor”. Race-traitors “expose the ways in 
which privileged identities are constructed (i.e. whiteness, ablebodiedness, 
heterosexuality) elucidates how resistance to oppressive identity categories is 
possible” (Kannen, 2008: 149). Goodley adds to this analysis by incorporating 
disability into this concept, turning the researcher into a “race-able traitor” 
(Goodley, 2014: 46). These intersectional traitors reject both racist injustices 
and reject the stereotypes of disability representation and understanding. For 
example, the use of the Oriental concept of the “mongol” has been used to 
represent and understand the physical features and characteristics of those with 
Down Syndrome (Goodley 2014: 46-47). In applying this to my research, we can 
think back to Chapter 6’s discussion of the atmospheric use of Blackadder 
echolalia. There, I briefly noted the Eurocentric conception of history depicted in 
the programme and the smug knowingness that Blackadder displayed to others. 
One way to challenge this distorted view is to discuss with members the political 
and historical significance of the European focus in Blackadder. Such 
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discussion might include the stereotyped depiction of cannibalistic savages in 
Series 2, Episode 3 and the colonial imperatives of Sir Walter Raleigh’s journey 
to the Americas. However, rather than viewing autistic echolalia as uncritically 
reproducing vocalisations that solely symbolises linguistic and interpretative 
difficulty or lack of capacity, we can, as Starponi and Sharkey (2014) have 
shown, view echolalia as forming meaningful and symbolic interactional 
dynamics. Echolalia is not thus an enhanced sense of interiority, but is just as 
complex as traditional linguistic communication whose meaning can be 
negotiated in individual and group interaction. Both forms of discrimination can 
thus be debunked and lead to more inclusive and engaged understanding for 
the groups involved.  
 
My discussion of these issues are again only indicative of the kinds of in-depth 
analyses that could be undertaken within a dis/ability studies framework. Future 
research could connect my framework of habitual quasi-objects in sensory 
experience to these questions of gender, sexuality or ethnicity and the nuance 
such accounts can give to intersectional analysis of autistic groups.  
 
Thesis as Quasi-Object 
 
My attention to these issues can best be encapsulated by Woodyer (2008):  
 
The body, the subject, is never fully determined; not bounded, but 
provisional, relational and enacted, in constant dialogue with objects, 
environments, spaces, times and ideas. This multiplicity results in 
complexity, but this complexity is so fundamental to our being, so 
commonplace, so everyday, that it is taken-for-granted; it is lived not 
deliberated (Woodyer, 2008: 353).  
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My commitment to making the academic mundane strange in Chapters 4 and 5, 
has pointed to the multiple vortexes of significance outlined by Woodyer. In 
particular, my second writing story in Chapter 5 described and explicated my 
discursive and affective responses to research. These were at once bodily and 
cognitive processes of discernment. I endeavoured to break down these 
habitual means of encountering research and relate them to wider discourses of 
power relations within academia that reflect on the significance given to 
marginalised perspectives.  
 
I have sought to recognise the complexities and unravel what we might take for 
granted in relation to habitual and sensory experience. In giving these domains 
critical scrutiny, this thesis has asked us to slow down and think again about 
what we think we know about autism, sensory experience, atmospheric relations 
and parasitic chains of action. The argument developed here is then its own 
form of quasi-object, placed in the volatile and turbulent academic debates that 
have structured and framed my investigations. My hope is that my intervention 
is meaningful, useful and novel to those who read it and can provide insight into 
autistic experience.  
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